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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
The United States has been passin[~ through an experience during the 
past five years ·ahich is undoub-tedly unique in its history § an experience 
which has shattered the very foundation of its industrial and financial 
stability. The walls crw.;1pled und er the existing order. The ce.uses 
fo1· such a calamity ha;re been many and varied; some justifiable, some 
not . One thing, however, is lmown and that is the fact that ·!:;he 
enormous number of bank failures in the United States during the period 
from J anuary, 1920, to Llarch , 1933, Yrere unparalleled i n our history . 
I f we t-v.rn ·i:;o Cana.da we find an entirely different situation in 
that no banl: failure has occurred sinc e 1924. Canada operates on wha·t 
is lmmm as the branch ba:tlJ::ing system with a head office and branches 
maintained all over the Dominion. In contra st, the United states has 
the indep endent unit ba11J::ing system with thousands of independent banlcs 
operating in local areas only. In our country, generally speak ing_, each 
bank is an independent business and affords liti~le opportunity for 
unified control and Yride diversification. 
In order to bette:c understand why Canada has had such a remarkable 
record since 1920, and the United States such an abominable record_, 
this treatise is being ·written. An attempt is made to trace the h istory 
of bar~s in Canada and the United States since their i nception in each 
country and interpret the supervision of each under its respecti;re 
sy stem. 
The discussion ·which follo·ws confines itself largel y to C0111J:lercial 
baYlJdng in the United States; n8.!-nely, those banks v;hich are directly 
accountable to federal and state supervision. In Canada the chartered 
banks will be used as the basis for discussion. It is in thi s field 
1 . 
of commercial ban.ldng that the l arge majority of failures occur. 
In prepar i ng the nlaterial it has been an ever pre s ent fact that 
the t vro sy s·tems are not equal to each other in size of population_, in 
v ohune of banking facilities neces sary to serve the needs of t h e 
country_, or i n the volume of business transac·ted. It is a lso evident 
that the f i !l.ancial n e eds of the tvro countries are not the sru:J.e . Canada , 
in the north ter:1perate zon e, has not the varied climatic conditions of 
the United States, has not the vast wealth of natural re sou r ces, or the 
denand for her goods. The banks of Canada serve a population of 
slightl y over 10,000,000 people while the bank s of the United Sta tes 
ser-v-e a popul ation of more than 125_,000,000. 
Despite these economic i nequalities , the banking rr<Jstems have had 
absolu te l y an opposite experience i n their record of success in main-
tainin g their liquidity. It is upon the supervision of be.nking , and 
the record of actual performance, that t h is report is based . 
To discuss all of the factors pertinent to t h e success of any 
banking sy stem would entail voltunes u pon volumes of written material . 
The scope of this report is n ecessarily limi·bed to those points dealing 
directly vrith supervi sion. 
To t hose individuals who have so wil lingl y given of their time to 
assisJc me in this effort, I run deeply grateful . Their suggestions, 
criticisms, and words of wisdom have been very helpful and to each, 
I run indebted beyond mea~lre . 
2 
PART I. 
GOVEPJ\~"MEHTAL SUPERVI SI OIJ OF BlUm:nTG. 
(A) United States. 
Prior to 1790: 
I n trac i ng the history of banks in the United States vre find that 
"The first institution worthy of the na.r.:te of bank orga...11.i zed in t h is 
1 
country Tvas founded" by the "eminent financ ier and patriot, Rob ert 
2 
I\!orris, then Superintendent of Finance in 1781 11 • There were i nstitu-
tions prior to t h i s time but not the t ype of institution that vre like 
to call a ba11J.;:; an organization which is sound and safe f or the money 
of t hose people who wish to place their saving s i n soraething other thru!. 
the attic trunk. 
One of the earliest attempts at bank i ng vras made by the "La~:1.d Eanu-
facturers Bank, es·tablished in Massachusetts i n 1740. It d id not p re-
tend to do better ·than issue notes redeemable in goods, but they stood 
for a time so nruch higher than ' Massachusetts bills' that in spite of 
h ost ility of Governor Belcher, merchants specif ica lly advertised 
3 
goods to be so ld for ' manufactory bills'." Thus it is shown that mo st 
of the functions of banks in the earlier part of our banking hi stor y was 
fo r the purpose of issuing notes for circulati on, and i n many cases the 
currency issued by the banks vras more acceptable than that issued by the 
colonies. "In Connecticut i n 1733 the lJew London Society f or Trade e.nd 
Comme rce circulated no·ces which ·rrere current until p rohibited by the 
al,tthorities o.nd in Hmv Hampshire a company of ' private gentleE1en 1 
-----------------·----------------------------------------------------------1. Flugel, Felix., and Faulkner , Harold U. - Readings i n the EconolT'ic 
and Social History of the United states, pp. 23- 24 , Harper s 
Broth ers, IJew York, 1929. 
2 . Ibid. 
3 . Conant, Charl e s A. - History of Hodern Banks of Issue, PP • 334- 335 , 
G. P . Put nrun r s Sons, Nevil' York , 1909. 
3. 
attempted to meet the demand for a circulating mediwn by an i s sue of 
bills. 1£ost of· these schemes including the specie banks, fonned to 
counteract the Land Manufacturers Bank fell under the prohibition of 
the Joint Stock Companies' Act . This Act was passed in England a ft e r 
the bursting of' the South Seas Bubble in 1720 and forbade the f ormation 
of banking companies without a special cha r·ter but it was not until 
1 
1740 that it was declared by the Parliament to extend to the colonies. ll 
Perhaps the first bank to be •·rorthy of such a title wa s the one 
organized i n Philad elphia in 1780 by a group of public spirited citizens 
whose purpose was to help finance the war and to supply rations f or the 
a r my. This was knovm as the Bank of Pennsylvania. They i ssued b ills 
which were nothing more than interest bearing notes pa;rable at a future 
2 
time. One year l ater the Bank of North America was forna.lly chartered 
by Congress, in Philade l phia . This bank was founded nnot with any 
purpose of enriching those connected t herewith, nor of facilitating 
ordinary trade but of patriotically assisting the infant republic of the 
3 
Un ited States to ach.ieve it s national independence ." This new· bank vras 
organized with a capita l stock of \HOO _,OOO but the amount of capital 
paid by the individual stockholder was not over ()85,000 . In ord er that 
this nevr project might be a success and of material aid to the cou..11.t ry 
in helping it out of its financial d ebacle , the government subscribed 
for .,12 50 ,000 of the stock. However, the conditions of the government 
were such that i t had to be relieved of its oblige.tion to the amount 
of ~ 200,000 of that sub s cribed , and the remaining shares vrere sold in 
4 
Holland . Robert Morris who was then Superintendent of Finance il the 
1. Conant, Charles A. 
-
op. cit. 
- PP • 334-335. 
2. Ibid. 
3 . Flugel, Felix, and Faulkner , Harold u. 
-
op. cit. 
- PP • 23-24. 
4. Conant, Charles A. - -op. cit. 
- PP • 334- 3 35 . 
4 . 
new gover:nment "arranged ·with the Banlc of Pennsylvania to transfer the 
bills it was holding to the new bank and paid in cash its claims 
against the federation. Business actually began in this bank on 
1 
January 7, 1781." 
At this time there Yvas prevailing in the political ranks two 
divergent schools of thought regarding the n~t republic. On the one 
hand was that of individual or staters right and on the other, the 
control of certain powers by the new central govermnent. Obviously, 
when the Bank of North America was chartered by Congress there were 
those who opposed and challenged its right to grant such a charter. 
In order to be sure of continuing as a bank, "a charter was obtained 
in Rpril, 1782, from the State of Pennsylvania under v;hich the bank 
continued to operate until absorbed into the national banking system 
2 
in 1863. 11 The first bank was organized for the purpose of giving the 
nece ssary assistance to the newly formed republic, and in less than 
six months time "it had loaned to the government $4001 000 and to the 
3 
State of Pennsylvania $80,000. 11 Th b k d 1 t 1 < • !! e an me. e a oan o l.10rr~s, as 
Superintendent of Finance, of :;"1,249,975 of which ~~996,581 was repaid 
in cash and the remainder by surrendering ba.nk stock ovmed by the 
4 
Federation. i i 
Although this ba!L'k was doing nru ch to aid the new government, it 
was not acceptable to Hamilton because of the limitations placed upon 
it by the incorporation of the i::.'tate of Pennsylvania. 11 In 1790 
Hamilton in his report refers to the ambiguous situation in which the 
Bank of North A.-rn.erica has placed itself by the acceptance of its State 
1. Con~~t, Charles A. - op. cit. - PP• 334-335 
2. Holdsworth, John - lfioney and Banking, p. 162, D. Appleton & Co., 
New York, 1929. 
3. Flugel, Felix, and Faulkner, Harold U. - op. cit. - pp. 23-24. 
4. Conant, Charles A. -op. cit. - PP• 334-335. 
charter and concludes that as this ha s rendered it a bank of an in-
dividual state vrith a capital of but ~1 2,000.,000, liable t o dissolution 
at the expiration of its charter in fourteen years, it would not be 
expedien·t to accept it a s an equivalent for a banlc of the United 
1 
States. 11 For this and many other reasons, Hamilton put all of his 
energy and brilliancy into bringing about the ests.blishment by Congress 
of the First Bank of the United State s which will be discussed 
presently. Political issues were ever present in the ear ly days as 
t hey are today. For a better and mor e adequate facility for financing 
the Federal Government, Hamilton attempted to bring about the estab-
lis~~ent of a central banking system. 
Establishment of the First Bank of the United States: 
With the possibility that the Bank of north America would not be 
able to give the necessary assi stance to the government t hat was re-
quired by the f irst Secr etary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton 
sought to find ways and means of bringing more financial stability 
and resources within the com.mand of this department of the new go-vern-
ment. It was not an easy task for H&ui lton t o make the leaders of his 
tL~e see the need of a Banlc of the United States. Many opposed t his 
new scheme on the basis t hat it had too centr alizing tendencies and 
that the Constitution did not expressly give the new government t he 
power to grant such a charter. "Their argument was that the case fell 
plainly within·the rule sub sequently embodied in t he tenth amendment 
t o the Constitution that fJche powers not delegated to the United St ates 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are r e served 
1. Flugel, Felix .., and Faulkner, Harold U. - op. ci·t .... PP • 23- 24. 
6.1 
1 
t o the States respectively or t o the people'. 11 
The purpose of organizi ng t his bank according to best authority 
appears to be threei'old, na.meJ.y; 11(1) to act as i'isca l agent of the 
United States Government in the collection and disbursement of 
i'ederal revenues, (2) to assi st t he Treasury in times of financial 
emergency t hrough the purchase of' gov-er11..ment bonds, ( 3) t o promote 
sounder and more stable bank note currency and to exercise an in-
2 
i'luence in stabilizing business and financial conditions generally . ' 
Hamilton ' s efforts were i'ruitful in that the first Congress of' 
1791 chartered the First Bank of t he Uni-ted States. President 
;·lashington sought the advice of his able cabinet members who did not 
agree on the issue . Jeffer son was , of course , opposed for he vras an 
ardent states ' rights adherent , and Hamilton the oppo sit • Hovever, 
:iashington relied upon the astut e judgment of the Secretary of the 
Treasury and signed t he bill creating the First '"'ank of the United 
Stat es . 
The new bank was organized with a capital stock of ~10 1 000,000 
divided into shares of' $400 each. The protection of srrk~ll i nvestors 
in ban_l{ stock was sought by a graduated scale of' voting 'rhich did not 
pernit more than thirty votes to any one shareholder. Foreign sh re-
holders vrere not al lowed to vote by proxy. The number of' directors 
was i'ixed at tv;ent-y-i'ive vrho must be citizens of the United ste.tes and 
3 
not more than three-i'ourths of whom were eligible i'or re-election. 
Thus, in the First Bank of the United States, even in the early peri od 
1. Conant, Charles A. - op . cit. - p . 336 . 
2. 1foulton, Harold G. - The Financial Organi zation of Society, p . 526 , 
Univ ersity of Chicago P1·ess, Chicago, Illinoi s , 1926. 
3. Bradford , F. A. - Banking, P• 54, Longmans , Green & Co., Nei'f York, 
1932. 
7. 
of our banking history, we find those vrho wanted ·to control the banking 
and financial business in our country and consequently the framer::; of 
the charter of this first banlc wi sely inserted the provisions for 
limited voting power . Another feature incorporated in this bank 
chari~er forbade the ban.k to make a lo"m on real estate (beyond t hat 
which was needed for the banking house) unless the property came into 
its ha..'I'J.ds in satisfaction of reortgages or judgments. This p::?.rticuls.r 
feature has abV'ays been in the Canadian ban...1dng laws but was repealed 
l 
in the United States in 1913. 
The life of this bank was to be twenty years and it also provided 
that Congress was not to gra..-rl.t a charter to another bank ·within that 
time. 
In this pro.ject as in other things ) the Government was to lend 
its assistance and so the charter provided that 11 one-fifth o f the 
capital should be subscribed by the goverrunent, to be repaid in ten 
annual installments of $200,000 each with interest at 6 per centum. 
lJo other loans were to be made to the government exceeding 0100,000 
2 
without au·thori ty of law. 11 
Probably the first instance of branch banking in the United 
States 1itas the creation of branches by the charter of this new bank, 
for they were permitted to open offices of discount and deposits in 
the several states. A large portion of the capital stock raised at 
the time of che.rter was to be deposited among the branches. However, 
a large sum was to remaiJ~. at the Central Bank at Philadelphia as a 
3 
reserve f\md. 
1. Federal Reserve Act as Amended to March 4, 1931, Page 52, 
Section 24. 
2. Conant, Charles A. - op. cit . - pp. 338-339. 
3. Holdsworth , ,Jo!m - op. cit. - p. 164. 
8. 
11 The only limitation upon note issues was that ·which limited 
all debts other than deposits to the amount of capital stock. The 
notes v.rere receivable as dues to the government so long as they were 
1 
redeemable in coin on demand. 11 
The banlc carried out the expectat ions of t he original b ankers 
v1hen it made a loan of nearly ~~ 7 ,000,000 to the Government in 
assisting it during times of financial stress. However, the Gov-
ernment was not a prompt creditor and much of the stock wh..ich it 
held in the First Banlc had to be sold to defray its obligations to 
the bank. In a report Yvhich Secretary Gallatin released in 1809, he 
disclosed that the Gover:rune:nt had made considerable profit on t he 
sale of i ts stock in the First Banlc of ·the United States besides a 
h i gh ra-'c;e on the dividends paid by the bank annually. 1Nhen the final 
settlement was mo.de a large sum as profit had been realized by the 
Gover!l ..rnent as a stockholder in the nev-,r banks. It is often quoted as 
2 
being over three-million dollars. 
By its charter the bank was to run for twenty years and by that 
order it expired in 1811. M:ost historians give this bank a clear 
11bill of sale 11 in that it was of tremendous aid to the Governnent in 
those formative years of its early existence . 11 The necessity for 
such an institution11 says 1Kr. Honry Adams , 11Was merely one of the 
moment 'but in the period of national history between 1790 and 1860, 
the year 1811 vras perhaps the only moment v<hen destruction of the 
3 
bank threatened national ruin." 
lffuen the shareholders petitioned for a new charter for t his bank 
the petition was refus ed by the Congress, and thus the first attempt 
1 . Conant, Charles A. - op. cit. - P• 336. 
2 . Westerfield, Roy - Bruli:ing Principles and Practices, P• 214, Vol. 2, 
Ronald Press, Nevr York, 1921. 
3. Conant , Charles A. - ,op. cit. - p. 336. 
9. 
at national banking on the part of the new Federal Government cane to 
a close . This 1 eft the Government without any direct fina..-·1cial 
stabilizer but political expediency seemed to be the motive for its 
dissolution. 
Condition of Money after the Establi smnent of the First Bank of the 
United States: 
In tracing the history of' s.ny political office we o:Lten find that 
-~he dut ies (or ob1igations) of the office are not always carried out 
with the highest order of efficiency or by the wisest of men. However, 
we have to admit that in making a critical analysis of anyone ' s per- · 
formance in a. specific office ue are not e.lvrays given a11 the facts 
and circumstances under which this office Yfa.S conducted. Thus, it is 
generally best to make some reservations when criticizing our public 
officials until we have all the facts at hand . nevertheless, from 
reliable sources it has been stated repeatedly that during the war 
"the management of the Treasury had been unhappy to say the least . 
The Government had been seriously embarrassed by the refusal of the 
banking interests to give the i r loyal support and t he incapacit y of' 
the Republican fiscal system to bear extraordinary strain had been 
amply demonstrated. Indeed, it could hardly be said that there was 
any z.ystem. On the expiration of its charter in 1811 1 Hamilton ' s bailie 
had been allowed to lapse and the banking business of the country had 
passed into the hands of numerous state corporat i ons and concerns of 
varying strength and soundness. I n five years the nu111ber of these in-
stitutions had increased from eighty- eight to ~vo hundred and forty-
six and their note issues had risen from about fifty-million to ap-
proxirll.ately one hundred million dollars, -- an inflation so magnificent 
_o. 
that all but the New England. houses suspended specie payment v;hen the 
City of ·vfashington was captured by the Briti sh. The effec-t; of this 
on the Madi son administration was disastrous. Its bonds which were 
floated between 1812 and 1816 totaling over ~~80 1 000,000 brought in to 
the Treasury only about ~:34 ,000,000 measured in specie. In the 
process the Government increased its oblig~tions from $45,000,000 to 
the appalling sum c.f ~;1Z7, 334,000 the increment alone amounting to more 
than the domestic debt incurred during the Revolutionary v·rar s..nd 
1 
funded by Ha.rnil ton." 
Thus monetary stability of our country ·was something of a 
question and the passing of the First Bank of the United States gave 
the "money changers" an opportunity to use their unscrupulous methods 
to gain the ends which they sought. This chaotic condition during 
the five year interval betvveen t he operation of the First and the 
Second Barucs of the United St ates was undoubtedly good reason for 
chartering a new bank in 1816. 
The Second BruL~ of the United States: 
When the Congress convened in December, 18151 the chaotic con-
di tions of the country had not been overcome and consequently some-
tl1ing had to be done which would bring again a period of prosperity 
and stable conditions. The most logi cal plan before the Congress 
seemed to be the estab1ishment of another bank which, aside from 
political bickering, might be of material benefit to the country. 
11 President madison suggested a national ban.k as a suitable instrument 
for promoting specie payments . Secretary Dallas submitted a deta iled 
1. Beard, Charles A. and Mary R. - The Rise of .Arnerica...'tl Civilization., 
pp .. 429-430 , Vol. 1, Ivlacr•iillan Company, New York, 1930 . 
11 .. 
1 
plan for the bank Tlhich was adopt ed by CongreE;s vlith little chang e. ;, 
This seems stre.nge with the hundreds of amendments that go into bills 
p resented to Congress in our own. time. 
Fundamentally, this W!?.s to have the same structure as t h e First 
Bank except thajc it TfP.s to be o1·g tm:i.zed with a capitaliza tion of 
~) 35,000_,000 of Trhich one- fi fth wa s to be subscribed by the Gov-e r nment 
in money or in its own obl i gations. In t h is new bank the public funds 
were to be deposited unless the Secretary of tl1EJ Treasury saw f i t to 
have t h em placed else-rrhere and then he was to p l a ce this 1w.tter of 
disposi t i on before Congress . This bank a lso had a durat ion of t','renty 
years and no other bank could be established by the Congr e s s dur ing 
this period of jcwenty years . The Gover11.ment was to be a beneficiary 
to the amount of ~500 , 000 aJ:"l.nuo.lly as a bonus . This, undoubt ed l y , was 
a compromise on the part of the politicians for granting the bill by 
2 
the opponents of a second bank. 
There is little doubt that the Second Ba:'lk of the United States 
contributed a great deal toward bringing the economic conditions of 
the country into a better state bu t perhaps it wa s not the ;i se 
rnanag ement of the bank that caused t his cha..1J.g e . During t h e first few 
years of i ts existence the new banlc w-as very poorly manag ed and i n 
1818 i t came close to going in·l;o insolvency. The bank Yvas opened for 
3 
business on J anuary 7, 1817. The records show -chat corruption and 
political maneuverir.g were ever present during its existence and it 
was of considerab le h i ndrance to the 1:1ai ntenan.ce of a. stability of 
4 
finance which could be expected of such · a.n institution. Thi s bank., 
1. Conant _, Charles A. - op. cit. - p. 343. 
2. Bradford _, F. A. - op . cit. - p . 58 , (Banking). 
3 . Conant, Charle s A. - op. cit. ~ p. 346 . 
4. Flugel , Felix, and Fs:ullmer, Harold U. - op . cit - PP• 27 9- 291 . 
.Lt::. 
like the other , had branches in the more important centers, eighteen 
in all. One of the most outstm1ding reasons for the poor management 
of the bank as a vrhole 1'ms the failure of the branch managers to carry 
out orders from the head office of the ba:nk. Politics again entered 
i nto the management of the bank and with li t·tle consideration for the 
good of the bank. 
Even four years before the time for expiration of the charter for 
. . 
the Second Bank of the United States , 1832 , it had become a political 
issue in the election of that year . Clay made it an issue and thus 
Jackson won in his efforts :not to grant another charter to this Bank . 
It is reputed that Jackson might have been pe rSD.s.ded to give to the 
Bank a renewal of its charter had it not been made an issue of the 
election. Apparently the financiers of that time, that is, the 
ma,jority of tho se in puwer , were in favor of granting it. The Bank 
of the United states obtained a charter from the State of Pe1msyl vania 
on February 18, 1836, for thirty years. The Bank agreed to pay a bonus 
of ~~2 ,000 ,000 to the State and :)loo,ooo per year for thirty year s be-
sides various subscriptions to the stock of transportation routes 1-rhich 
the Secretary of the Treasury described as bribery of the legisls.ture 
and the people. The shares in ·the bank oTrned by the United States 
ar,1ounting to f?7 ,000,000 were paid in four am·mal installments at the 
rate of ~,i lli:i.58. IJew· stock was sol d to replace the govern...-n.ent stock, 
. l 
lel:l.ving the capital i ntact at :j35,000 ,ooo. 
Some years later this banJc failed because of mismanagemen-t. Thus 
the Second Bank of ·t;he United States had passed out of e:Cistence 
and the gove rnment was left vfithout the facilities of this bank to 
1. .A History of Bankinr; - pp . 227-228, Vol. 1 - The Journal of 
Cor::rrnerce and Corr.mercie.l Bulletin, Hev: York, 1896. 
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aid it in the financing for fiscal needs. In the main, the causes 
for its failure were political corruption and mismanagement on the 
part of those at the helm. Governmen~,; projects have gone the way of 
these banks all too often and the good which might have been brought 
about by such institutions has been destroyed by needless and greedy 
aspirations of unscrupulous politicians. 
Condition of Money after the Failure of the Second Bank of the 
United States : 
"As a rule Hamil ton's system of consolidation had been favored 
by northern business men because it afforded elastic credit facilities 
and guaranteed soUL~d currency for trade throughout the entire United 
States. Generally speaking, the oppo sition to that system had come 
from the e.gricul tura1 sections. The Democrats adopted the policy o:f 
depositing Federal funds in local barucs chartered under state 
authorit-y \vith a vievr to securing effective assi stanc e akin to that 
furnished first to the Federalist and then to the ~~igs by the United 
Stat es Bank - a practice which helped to release tension of 'tight 
money' in the West and South and afforded funds for land speculation 
1 
as well . ;; 
It was necessary for the Democrats who were now in power to 
abandon the distribution of funds to the various banking concerns and 
establish an independent treasury system. 11Under this plan all money 
received would be deposited in the Treasury at -,'[ashington or in 
various 'sub-treasuries' to be established in certain selected centers. 
Becaus.e of opposition in Congress, the President's measure was not 
enac-ted until 1840. In 1841 the Yihigs repealed it but in 1845 the law 
1. Flugel, Felix, and Faulkner, Harold u. - op. cit. - PP• 682-684. 
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·was re-enacted. The independent treasury lasted tmtil 1913 when it was 
l 
superseded by the Federal Reserve Sj.·stem. 11 
"The destruction of the Second United States Bank left m1solved 
the problem of currency, tha t powerful engine which could be used for 
transferring wealth from one group to another as well as for supplying 
the means of conunerce. Since the Constitution mentioned only gold and 
silver coins, there were in the early days of the republic a f~; 
statesmen who clung fiercely to hard money in the belief that the right 
to issue paper money ·would be employed Jco favor politicians, if 
exercised by the government and to enrich capitalists, if invested in 
private corporf.l.tions . The First United States Bank was authorized to 
emit bills and before it came to an end trmnty years later numerous 
local banks had also been empowered to scatter notes broadcast. I n 
1815 there v1ere already in existence more than two hundred state banks. 
After the abolition of the Second United States Bank in 1836 they in-
creased vfith extraordinary rapidity. Each year saw additions to the 
number until on the eve of the Civil War there were sixteen hundred 
institutions with a circulation of $202,000 , 000 in bills based upon 
$87,000,000 in specie. To make a long story short, on the eve of the 
final crash in 1860 the American currency system under the drive of 
agrarian democracy had reached a state relatively more alarming, if 
possible , to business enterprise than it had . attained under the 
2 
Articles of Confederation in the previous ceni..11ry. 11 
1 . Harlow, Ralph Volney - The Grmvth of the United States, p. 373 , 
Henry Holt & Company, N"ew York, 1925. 
2. Conant, Charles A. - op. cit. - PP• 684-685. 
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Iifational Banking 8'Jstem - 1863: 
Reforms in banking were neces sary . This statement is corrobo-
rated by the statements made in the material in the previous section. 
Since the Second Bank of the United States had been relieved of its 
povrer sJ banking had turned to the hands of almost a..nyone who was 
desirous of gaining wealth easily and qu.ickly. Inflationary con-
ditions v1ere prevalent and thus a crash -vras experienced in 1837 and 
again in 1857J both of which were a tremendous hindrance t o our 
economic stability. Something had ~co b e done to aid the Union in 
financing the War and thus in 1863 a national Banking System V1as 
created by Congress . This Act was passed to "establish a uniform 
system of conLrnercial banking throughout the country authorizing in-
. 1 
corporation under national law." Prior to this time~ all banks had 
been chartered by the states with the exception of the First and 
Second Banks of the United States . Y/hen this act was passed it was 
hoped that all of the state banks would join the national system so 
that the country vmuld be uniform in its law and as a result would 
bri:::.g about a closer coordination in our financial system. 111"/hen 
such changes did not occur on the scs.le expected, the Comptroller of 
Currency recommended the enactment of legislation that 7roul d impose a 
discriminating t a:x: on state bank notes for the purpose of forc"ng all 
2 
banks to operate under national charters . 11 "The en actment by the 
Congress of the recommended legislation in 1805 consequently proved an 
altogether effective measure . Whereas the number of state ban}:s h a d 
declined only from 1416 to 1089 f r om 1863 to 1864, by 1866 it had 
dropped to 297 . The number of ne.tional banks i n contrast which had 
1 . The Banking Situation in the United States, p . 28 - The National 
I ndu stri al Conference Board, 1932 . 
2. Ibid. 
16. 
1 
increased to only 4:67 in 1864 totalled 1634 in 1866. 11 Thus 
nationally incorporated banks quickly bec~:une the predominant type 
of banking organization in t he commercial field. The purpose for 
which the legislation was enacted had brought the success desired 
temporarily, however, because soon after this, state banks bege.n to 
gain in number . "By the year 1894 state banks outnumbered national 
banks by a small margin and subsequently up to 1921 by an increasing 
2 
• 11 
margJ.n. 
As an indirect method of stabilizing the currency of the 
country as well as creating a market for government bonds to help 
finance the war, each "bank chartered under the act was required to 
purchase bonds equal in amount to at least one-third of i·ts paid-up 
capital . These were to be deposited with the Treasurer of the United 
Sta·tes and held by him. Then banks were allowed to issue notes equal 
3 
to ninety percent of the market value of the bonds. 11 This measure 
thus provided a market for the bonds to aid government fina.."rJ.cin,g and 
to aid the s·tabilizing of a currency. However, in 1865 the dis-
criminating ta.."C which had b een enacted against the state banks, drove 
out of circulation all of Jche paper money which had been issued by 
these banks and thus national bank currency, along with the 
"Greenbacks 11 , were in use from the middle of the war until 1879. 
Even the fractional silver currency disappeared and its place was 
t aken by fractional notes knovm in the picturesque language of the 
.t1 
day as 11 shin plasters\'. 
1. The Banking Situation in the United States - op. cit. - P• 30. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Harlow, Ralph Volney - op. cit . - p. 506 . 
4. Ibid. 
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The contribu·bion which the National Banking S:/stem l!l8.de to the 
country is stated by Professor Davis R. De·wey - nThe founding of 
ba11Jcing currency upon national government securities had many ad-
vantages . First of all, it not only created a special demand for 
bonds., but enlisted a strong and active interest in the general 
welfare of the government ' s credit . In the second place, by driving 
state bank issues out of existence through heavy taxation, it tended 
to create a demand for United States l egal tenders and other treasury 
issues for meeting ordinary operations of trade and exchange. 
Lastly, the assistance of the national banks in floating loans of 
the government was of the greatest importance . A more remote effect 
of this legislation was its influence in shaping 'both popular dis-
cussions and congressional action upon government paper currency as 
l 
a rival system to bank paper . 11 
J.\..fter the National Banking Act was passed it was not a 
very popular piece of legislation among the bankers . Congress, hovrever, 
added many amendments to the Act in the next fmv years which made it 
more agreeable to the bankers as a whole; and the bankers as well as 
the public came to see t hat the stringent national laws were more 
beneficial than the state laws . It will be shol'rn later that national 
banks have made a much be·t;ter record as a whole than have state banks. 
State ba.'rlking la·ws are well known for their leniency. 
G-old Standard Act - 1900: 
2 
From the time of' the Civil War to 1879, the United States had 
1. Lippincott, Isaac - Economic Development of the United States, 
PP• 570-572, D. Appleton & Co . , Hew ·:r.ork, 1921. 
2. Harlow, Ralph Volney- op . cit.- P• 615. 
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been on a paper basis and it was a jubilant time for the financiers 
when specie payments were reswned. The Bland-Allison Act, passed in 
1874 and put into operation in 1878, nmade it necessary for the 
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase and to coin not less than ~vo, 
1 
nor more than four million dollars worth of silver every month. " 
This established a ratio of sixteen to one . 111Lnother law lmmm as the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act and passed in 1890 still further increased 
the quantity of silver that might be coined although it did not go so 
2 
far as to r estore the bi-metallic sy stem." This all led up to the 
Gold Sta...ndard Act of 1900 which was a Republican issue at the election 
of 1896 with Bryan as the champion of bi-metalism. 
This Act definitely placed the United states on the Gold Standar d 
and from that time to March, 1933" the United States 111as not off the 
so-called "standard 11 • The Act did not es sentially change the basis of 
bank-note currency and did not provide for retiring the go·vernment 
notes or the redemption of standard silver dollars in gold. A gold 
r eser ve was definitely fixed at ~~150 .,000 ,000 and was to be maintained 
if necessary by the sale of three per cent gold bonds . All the bonded 
3 ' 
obligations of the Uni·l:;ed Sta-tes were made payable in gold. Another 
feature of the Act of 1900 was the reduction of the mininru.m capita l re-
4 
qu ired to create a national baruc f r om $50,000 to $25,000. 
This Act marked an important change in the financial progress of 
the United states and particularly did it increase the circulation of 
money and t he creation of many more independent unit banks in small 
communities. 
1. Harlow, Ralph Volney - op. cit . - P• 615. 
2. Moulton , Harold G. - The Financial Organization of Society, p. 70 , 
University of Chicago Press , Chicago, I llinois, 1926. 
3. Devrey., Davis Rich - Financial History of the United States, 
PP • 468-469, Longmans, Green & Co., New :fork, 1931. 
4. Ibid - P• 479. 
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Federal Reserve Act of 1913: 
".An Act to provide .for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, 
to furnish an elastic currency, to afford a means of rediscounting 
conmercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking 
1 
in the United States, 11 were the words which titled the Act creating 
the Federal Reserve System for the United States of krnerica. 
As early as 1897 attention was being focused upon the inadequacy 
of the national banking system vrhich had been enacted in 1863, partially 
as a war measure and also in order to establish a more unified banking 
system for the country as a whole . Commissions oi' various kinds were 
appointed to investigate and report their findings which, in most cases, 
were adverse to the present system. However, not much action vras taken 
toward a change until the financial panic in 1907 when the banks of Hew 
::tork City, especially, ·were paralyzed . 
Vfuen the Congress convened in 1908, action was taken to see if 
some methods of conducting our banks could be devised to cope with the 
ever changing industrial world. To this end a Hational Monetary Com-
mission was appointed, with Senator Aldrich oi' Rhode Island as Chair-
2 
man. This Commission vvent to all parts of the world investigating a..."tld 
studying the supposedly best banking systems then in existence, 
preparatory to making some drastic changes in our mvn system. 
With only the national banks chartered by the Act of 1863, the 
liJe:tional Goverrunent had littl e control over banking in this country. 
Mention has been made elsewhere in this wo rk of the multiplicity oi' 
laws in existence in this country; namely, forty- nine different juris-
dictions. However, this was not changed in the main but control over 
1. Section I of the Federal Act of 1913. 
2. Harlow, Ralph Volney - op. cit . - P• 723. 
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more institutions was effected by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. 
The more definite reasons for moneJcary and banking reforms vrere 11 de -
centralization, inelasticity of credit, cumbersome transfer systems , 
1 
and defective govern..rn.ent depository systems. 11 
The Congress did not want to create a central banking system for 
the United States such as was fom1d in 1:1any of the other leading 
countri es of the v'ro r ld so from it s efforts it c reated a decentralized 
banking unit for our country which, fo r the most part , included those 
good features of the central banks and those features v>hich, in their 
opinion, fitted better into our peculiar c onditions in the United 
States . 
At the head of this new financial structure was p l aced a Board 
which was to consist of eight members, including the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Comptroller of Currency and six members to be ap-
pointed by the President of the United States. This Board vras to be 
located in Washington s.ncl each member was to give his entire 1cime to 
the -.·mrk of the Federal Reserve Board at a salary of :]12 , 000 per year . 
In order to avoid the existence of a central bank, a plan of 
sectionalizing the country was conceived and t--vre l ve so- cal l ed Federal 
Reserve Districts were divided according to the loc~.tion of trade aree.s 
rather than by states . In each district vvas created a Federal Reserve 
Bank to take care of the demands of those banks v-,rhich became members of 
thi s system so we have twelve Federal Reserve Banlcs in the United States 
serving the financial requirements of the country rather than a central 
bank located either in the Capitol or at New· York., the f i nancial center 
of the cou:.r1try. i·dth this decentralization it was hoped that no section 
1 . Kem1nerer, Edvrin- The A. B.C. of the Fed eral Reserve System, pp. 26-27 , 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, liTew J ersey, 1932 . 
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of the cou.."ltry would be served at the expense of the others, and that 
Viall Street would not control our National Ba..11.lci ng System. 
Control over the national banks was further strengthened Tvhen the 
Act J:J.ade it mando.tor-.r ·!:;hat national banks must join the Feder:?.l Reserve 
System or lose their charters.. Further control was gained ·when it 
allowed state baD..ks to become members of the System. Despite the en-
rollment of state banks in the $ystem, a considerable number of state 
institutions did not or have not seen it advantageous to join the 
System and it hs.s fostered some situations in our financial history of 
recent years vvhich have undoubtedly caused much embarrassment. 
Funds for mai ntaining these nev; banks in each district ·were fur-
nished by those banks who became members of the System. They subscribed 
for an amount of capi te.l stock in the new bank 11 equal to six per centum 
1 
of the paid-up capital stock and surplus" of their bank. 
Industry and commerce , as well as ba.:n.l:::ing enterprises, were to 
have representation upon the board of each Federal Reserve Banlc 
directorate. To this end , three classes of directors Yrere named,; 
Class A directors to be appointed by the member banks to reprcsen·b 
the stockholding banks, Class B directors to be elected by the member 
banks but those elected to be engaged in commercial or i ndustrial 
pursuit, Class C to be chosen by the Federal Reserve Board in 
2 
Washington. Each class had the right to elect three directors and 
one of these was elected governor. 
An advisory council ;vas se·t up consisting of one member from each 
Federal Reserve Bank, to consult and advise the Board at Washington on 
the conditions in the various districts and for any other information 
1. Section II of the Federal Reserve Act , 1913, Revised to 1927. 
2. Section IV of the Federal Rese~re Act, 1913, Revised to 1927. 
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desired by the Board. It had no executiite po-wers, however. 
A primary reason fol" thi s c hange in our banking structure was the 
necessity of making pos sible a vrider expansion of credit at times of 
f i nancial s·brain. Bec~:mse of the high l egal reserves maintained by the 
national st~tutes, exp~~sion of credi t became increasingly difficult i n 
periods of economic decli:n.e v:hen large amounts were dene.nded. The new 
policy of rediscount was to alleviate this situation in the future,. 
It made possible the rediscounting of eligible paper previously 
prescr i bed by the Act, and securing credit by means of issuing Federal 
Reserve notes by the Federal Reserve Bru1ks in the variou s districts . 
Thus when an um.tsual demand was created fo:t loans by the member 
ban k s and they did not have the necessary funds on hand , they sub-
mitted to the bank in their distri ct corrJnercia l paper ·which they had 
previously made loans against, and r e c eived in return notes to issue 
to their cli ent s. The easy and quick method of expanding credit 
facilities made po ssible the necesse.ry capital for :i.ndustry and 
conunerc e at the times when they were most needed which, of course, 
gave to currency an el a sticity it never had before. 
The support which the Federal Reserve Banks gave to its members 
i n times of stra in vms e.n important aid to eliminating failures be-
cause of runs on the fuP..ds of the bank. Viho lesale withdr awals on 
account of unfound ed rumors -r;ere stopped when the depositors found the 
Federal Reserve Banks were supporting the victimized bank. 
The Federal Reserve System has been i n operation a little more 
than t wenty years and we can find, if we are to look, arguments for 
and e.gainst its policy during these years but it can be said vlit hout 
question tl:m.t the system has been a vast improvement over the old 
order of t hings. Without doubt it has made its mistake s as a ll 
23 . 
institutions do, but the United states would be in a much worse finan-
cial and economic condition today if it had not enjoyed the benefits 
of the Federal Reserve Banks during the past five years . 
A statistical picture of the progre ss of the membership of' 
national and state banks is given belovv: 
I 
GRQ1NT~7_;J;~~ 1\.lEM.BERSHI P IN FEDEEAL RESERVE S'I_S.TEH 
l914 .. 1931_ 
-ot--- --------Jj------ -
End of Year Total .1=~ Jl~tiolt;ember Bank;on-netional~ 
-. ----
19141 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
'1922 
1923 
19242 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
19293 
1930 
1931 
. 1932 
I 1933 
L _19344 
7, 582 
7, 631 
7 , 614 
7, 907 
8,692 
9 , 066 
9,606 
9, 779 
9, 859 
9, 774 
9,587 
9, 489 
9, 260 
9, 034 
8 , 837 
8,522 
8,052 
7,246 
6,816 
5,606 
6 , 206 
l - 1'-- -- - -
11 
~ : ~~~ 3~ 
7, 577 37 
I
. 7,657 250 
7,762 930 
7,885 1 , 181 
8,125 1,481 
8, 165 1, 614 
8,220 1, 639 
8,179 1 , 595 
8,043 1, 544 
9,048 1,441 
7, 906 1 , 354 
7, 759 1 , 257 
7, 629 1 , 208 
7,403 1 , 119 
7,033 1,019 
6,368 878 
6,011 
4,897 
5,288 /_ 
805 
709 
918 
1. 1914- 1923 Goldenweiser , E. A. - Federal Reserve System in Opera-
tion, p . 124, McGraw-HilJ. Book Co. , Inc., 1925. 
2 . 1924-1928 Annual Report of Federal Reserve Board , p . 159, 
December 31, 1933. 
3 . 1929- 1934 Federal Reserve Bulletin, P• 587~ September~ 1934. 
4:. Membership as of Harch 5. Al l others as of December 31 . 
(Char t No . 1) 
The national ba...11.ks -v:ere largely used as depositories for government 
funds prio1· to the establ i shment oi' the Federal Reserve System and they 
di d not function t o the advantage of both ~che government and the national 
24. 
banks. However, vrith the crea:bion of' the new system, funds y;er e 
largely transferred to the Reserve Banks in the several districts. 
Edwin rr. Kenunerer says that having funds in the national banks as 
federal depositories vvorked badly because ;; (1) it led to ·!;he continual 
hoarding in the treasury vaul-ts of large sums of money involving sub-
starrGial administrative expenses and a heavy loss of interest; (2 ) at 
certain seasons of the year the government receipts greatly exceed its 
' disbursements which had an adverse effect on money rates; (3) the 
system caused depository banks to rely unduly upon the Secretar y of the 
Treasury for aid in the forn1 of increased government deposits in time 
1 
of financial pressure . 11 
The cumbersome transfer system for .funds from bank to bwJ<: and 
government to banks, and vise versa, were largely eliminated when the 
2 
Gold Settlement Fund was created. This Fund is on deposit in 
Washington and ·when one Reserve Bank W!:'.nts to transfer money to another, 
it doe s so by means of a bookkeeping entr-,1 in Washington which does not 
require the shipping of actual gold or paper money from one section of 
the country to the other. Previously this was a rather expensive item 
for the various banks. Each Reserve keeps a portion of its funds in 
Hashington in this Gold Settlement Fund to take care of its daily trans-
fer of checks and charges against other banks in the several distr icts. 
Thi s is only a brief outline describing the structure of the 
Federal Reserve :::,ystem, its functions, and the improvements it me.de over 
the old system. Other sections of this paper will evaluate some of the 
practices and policies of. the system as a whole. 
1. Kemmerer_, Edwin H. - op. cit. - PP• 26-27. 
2. Section XVI o£ the Federal Reserve Act 9 1913, a s amended by Banring 
Act of 1933 . 
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1~33 - Acts of the 73rd Congress: 
As the depression became more severe, investigations v<ere mo.cle 
into the causes of this economic u pheavel . Attention vra s given to 
many of the larger banking concerns and what their policies and 
practices had been during the boom years and early part of the de-
pression. One of the instruments used by the financial geniuses of 
the time was the holding company. Holding companies were formed to 
control the activities of banks as vrell as other industrial and 
fimmcial organizations. Gradua lly these structures became so in-
v·olved that banks were not only doing a banking business but also a 
stock and bond brokers' business, i nvestment banking, and sometimes 
running great industrial concerns. The legislators demanded tha t 
bankers do a banking business. The Banlc Act of 1933 has done much to 
se1.rer the relations of the holding compa..."~1Y and affiliates from the 
bank s who maintained such a standing. 
After June 16, 1934, no member bank shall be affiliated with any 
corporation, association, business trust , or other similar organization 
engaged primarily in the issue, sale, undervv-riting, public sale, or 
distribution a·l:; w·holesale or retail of syndicates of stocks, bonds, 
1 
debentures, notes or other securi·bies. vd th this provi s ion it is 
going to divorce the affiliates ·which have caused much loss of money 
to many individuals because in time of strain, the holding company 
could not stand the demands upon it . 
It has often been charged that the lo.ws regulating our banks are 
adequate but we need a higher class of men at the head of the banks. 
In many cases this is undoubtedly true. Professional banking has not 
1. Section XX of the Federal Reserve Act~ 1913> as amended by 13anJcing 
Act of 1933. 
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gained as high a standing in this country as in somo places and thus 
it is a contributing cause to many failures in the immediate past . 
In order to alleviate this si tua·l;ion to some extent b;>r rule rather 
than by preference on the part of the bankers, the amount of stock 
that a director must hold in the banks to become a member of the 
1 
.board has been raised. This will insure more interest in its 
management than was evidenced by some in the past. Also, the :n: ~" e 
of directors possibl e for a board has been prescribed under this 
2 
Act. After January 1, 1934, officers and directors of banks tl.B.Y not 
be officers , directors, or managers of concerns dealing in securities. 
Also, the above mentioned , as well as employees, are prohibited from 
becoming directors, officers, or employees of a corporation or a member 
of a partnership organized for a..11y purpose whatsoever wh · ch shal l make 
loans secured ~S stocks and bonds to any individual, association, 
4 
partnership, or corporation, other than its subsidiaries. This last 
provision will tend to eliminate many interlocking directorates. In 
other words, ba.nk officials must be more closely supervised if question-
able practices are to be eliminated and the depositors ' money is going 
to be safely guarded. The more laws we have , the more chro1ee for 
evasion , but also less possibilH;y of loss. 
Important to the field of branch banking are the provisions making 
po ssible the establisl~ent of branches by member ballics on a state wide 
basis provided there is existing in the state at that time la-vrs permit-
5 
ting state banks to operate branches. Thi s is a step which will have 
1. Sec-bion XXXI of the Bank Act of 1933. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Section XXX:II of the Bank Act of 1933. 
4. Section XXXIII of t he Baruc Act of 1933, Sec. 8a. 
5. Section XXIII of the Bank Act of 1933. 
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considerable influence in swi~1ging more and more people to the side 
of branch banking on some national scale. It seems almost inevi-table 
that some sor·t of branch banl<:ing plan will pass the Congress either 
as an emergency ~easure or an outgro;vth of the disgrace~~l record of 
our independent unit ~'YsteE1 since 1920. 
Perhaps the most revolutionary measure in the Act was the 
1 
establis:h.ment of guarantee of bank deposits. On June 30, 1934, the 
permanent plan v;ent into effect and deposits up to ~~10 ,000 Ylere 
guaranteed in full in all ~ember banks. Deposits of' lart;er run.ounts 
are guaranteed proportiona-tely under the Act. Again, this Act may 
have a profound influence toward branch ba:rJ~ing under ne:tional super-
vision in the near ftti~re by the provision which says that banks that 
2 
do not join the Federal Reserve ~Jstem by July 1, 1936, rnEJ.y no 
longer enjoy the benefits of deposit insurance . This vrould seem to 
mean that more and more banks will have a tendency to join the system 
as their deposits will be withdrawn and placed in ·those institutions 
that have deposit insurance, assuming, however, that this national 
venture proves to be more successful than some state insurance ple.ns 
that have been tried in the past . 
Other important cha..11ges in banking legislation in 1933 will be 
discussed under the topic of GoverTh~ental Remedies. 
Separate Banking Laws in Each State: 
Under t he Constitution of the United States the Federal entity 
had the right to make laws regarding banking on a national scale and 
the right v1as inferred by the states that they might have the same 
1. Section VII of the Ba..~c Act of 1933, Sec . 12b. 
2. Ibid. 
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right within the boundaries of their state. As soon as a new state 
was admitted into the Union, a new set of laws was legislated for 
banking , thus increasing until we have today forty-eight set s of 
banking laws in forty- eight states and a set of national statutes as 
well. To say ·whether the creation of this situation shovred wisdom 
on the part of the framer s of the· Constit ution does not concern this 
writing. However, there will be some inferences made later as to 
what history has recorded about the great multiplicity of' ban..1cing laws 
on the statute books of state and national governments . To trace t he 
hi story of each state vvonld be of l ittle value here • 
. ( 
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(B) Canada 
Prior to 1792: 
In dealing with the banking si·l:;uo.tion in Canada, as comps.red to 
the United States , it is necessa17 to state at the outset that there 
is a vast difference in the type of banking which is carried on in 
the t-no countries. In the United States we are operating under vrhat 
is lG.'1.own as the independent unit banking system while in Canada they 
are operating under the branch banking system. It will be part of 
the purpose of this ·work to show the main differences in these two 
systems; to make a comparison bet"vveen them and to point out the on·e 
v•hich seems to meet its needs most adeque.tely and satisfactorily. 
The ftmctions of the earlier incti tutions in this countr~r v,;ere 
much the same as tho se of the United States in that they " issued 
promissory notes payabl e to the bearer on demand. iNhe;_· e the ban}: ' s 
credit was good these notes passed freely from he.ncl to hand and were 
the .chief circulating medium o:J' Canada. In some ca ses in the 1-raritime 
Provinces, bank notes were preferred to those issued by the Provincial 
1 
Governments . :: 
At abou:t the s ame time as the First Bank of the United Stutes was 
bei ng formed by Hamil to~ in f,__rnerica ., the need of a uniform circulating 
mediu111 in Canada was felt by the merchants oi' I;~ontreal and the 
prospectus of a proposed bank of issue -to be k:novm as the Ca..'l'ladian 
Banking Company was issued in 1792 . T}lis scheme depended ., however ., 
chiefly on the cooperation of British capital and -rtas frustrated by the 
2 
outbreak of the war ·with France . 
1. Currency end Banking i n Canada, p. 1 3, Canada Yearbook, General 
Statistics Branch, 1933 , Otta1va. 
2. Ibid. 
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Bank of Canada - 1808: 
11L11other attempt to organize a btEl.k of is sue was made some y ears 
1ate1· but t his a l so failed to secure the assent of the l egi slature of 
1 
Lower Canada and so failed . " 
Be.nk of Mont real - 1817 : 
The Bank of Montreal and three ot her s were given charters by r oyal 
2 
assent between 1817 and 1822 . 
These banks vrere establi sh ed soon a fter t he Se cond United States 
Bank had been chartered by the Con gress and were to some e·tent modeled 
after this bank • I n contrast to the f act the_t the Congress only 
chartered one national bank, we find t hat Canada. had four nevt banks 
e_t about the same time . These banks had the right of note i s sue vvi.th-
3 
out any legislative control for a considerable period of .1-" t.. l me . 
Up to 1841 ea ch provi nce had its own laws regarding banks much 
as we do today &'llong the variou s states, and in "Lowe r Canada the 
p r actical monopoly of note issue was confer r ed u pon the chartered bank s 
4, 
by an Act of 1830 . 11 
About this time banldng was somewhat of a fake and several stoclc 
companies were organized and they, natural l y , assumed the right of 
note issue. However , t hi s f ad d i d not last long as i t becrune unlawful 
to issue notes tu1.less the issuing bank had a l egislative charter . Thus 
it checked the i nflux of worthless notes and gave more regulation to 
5 
this important monetary problem. This vras al l occurring when in 
America t he veto of r e-charter for the Second Bank of the United Stat es 
was -btking p l a ce . 
1 . Currenc~r and Banking in Canada _, op . cit . - P• 13 .. 
2 . Scott , w. A. - Honey and Banking , P• 223, Henry Holt ~; Company , 
I'Jevv Yodc., 1916 . 
3. Ibid - P• 225. 
4. Curr ency and Banking in Cffi1ada_, op . cit. ~ P• 15. 
5 . Scott . W. A. - op. cit . ~ P• 227. 
The Union of Upper and Lower Canada was accomplished on 
February 5, 18,U, m1der the title of the Province of Canada, 8.!l.d 
banldng; leg;i sle.Jcion was henceforth enacted in uniform terms for the 
entire Province. The goverma.ent of Upper Canada prepared f or the 
Union by the sale of goverrunent stock to the Bank of Upper Canadt:. and 
the separation of the goverrunent from official connection vri th the 
1 
Bank. In order to check the amouni~ of note circulation after the 
Union, 11 a ta.."C of one per cent was imposed upon bank notes which was 
limited to the amount of the pai d-up capital , notes of l oss than one 
2 
pound not to exceed one- fifth of such capital. 11 The legislature was 
finding it one of its duties now to i mpose regulations for the pro-
tection of depositors and so aft er t h e Union ·vl{hen banks vrere re-
chai:tered , provisions included " t he prohibiting of banks from 
holding shares of their mm stock or gre.nt:Lng advances there against . 
They were also prohibited from l ending on the security of lands_, 
houses, ships or pledge merchandise (though they could be taken as · 
additional security for debts p r eviously contracted) or holding loans 
or houses except for the transaction of their business , neither could 
they OY1l"l shi ps or be engaged in trade except as deale:cs in bullion or 
bills of e~cchange ~ the object being to confine tre.nsactions to 
legitimate banking business . Statements of as s ets and liabilities 
were to be submitted periodi callyJ half- yearly or yeHrly, and such 
f·urther information as the gover!1.1Tlent rnight call for was to be sup-
plied confidential l y. A further important enactment v-ras the imposition 
of' the double liabilit:y upon shareholders which harl not previously 
1 . Conant$ Charl e s A. - op . cit. - pp . 453-454. 
2 . Currency a..'l'ld Banking in Canada - op . cit . - p. 15 .. 
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existed with respect to the banks of Upper Canada al·bhough it had been 
for several years a requireraent of the y oung banks in Upper Canada. and 
it first appeared in British North .Arr.erica by incorporating the Ban..\: 
of l'Toila Scotia, enacted in 1832 . Suspension of specie payments on 
dema..11d for a period of sixty days , either consecutively or at inter-
1 
vals during one year, wa s the cause for fori'eiture of ch.arter." 
Thus it appears that Canada started off on the right foot in 
making l aws to take care of some of the defects ,Nhich he.v e been of 
doubtful benefit to the commercial banking field in .Ameri ca. She re-
quired that commercial ban...1cing be such in name and in action., This 
ha s not been the case in the Uni ted states, however . 
After a period of wild speculation and note issue for the 
"get- rich-quick11 politicians, the Canadian Government took drastic 
steps to bring i ts banking system under a sound financial policy~ 
not be. s ing its foundation upon quicksand but upon a rock of sc i entif ic 
experiences of the moU1er country. Particularly was her system 
similar to the Scotch banks and to t l.1.j_s day in 1934 has stood the 
test of t ime far better than the bank of her sister country - America. 
Free Ba:nldng Act - 1850: 
A rather general revision of ·bhe banking l aws of Canada took 
p lace under what ws.s knmm at that ti!fle as the "Fre.e Bs.n1:ing Act." 
This Act continued the provision previou sly enacted whereby no bank 
2 
could issue notes unles s i t was a chartered bank . 
In order that the goverrunent mi ght a gain have more information 
about the conditions of the banks which had been granted char·ters, 
1 . Currency ru1.d Banking in Canada - op . cit . - P• 15. 
2. Scott, ~. A. - op. cit . - P• 228 . 
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in 1851, a lav< was passed requiring these banks to submit to the 
government monthly instead of yearly, statements of their assets and 
1 
liabilities. 
A step which has probably done more ·than any one thing f or unifi-
cation of banking in Canada , and consequently lent itself t o a. one 
purpose course of policy, was the Imperial Act of' 1867 11which created 
the Confederation of' the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and l~ew 
Brunsv\rick. The parliament of the New Dominion was given control of 
coinage, currency, banks , issue of paper money, bills of exchange, 
and legal tender; it thus had authority over the eighteen barurs 
chartered in Canada, one by Royal Charter, five by Nova Scotia. and 
2 
four by Ue1rr Brunswick. 11 
From these early laws which were passed before and just after 
the Confederation, a firm foundation was laid which had been the 
vital and important factor in the industrial and economic stability 
of Canada through the years. Chester Arthur Phillips says "The 
Canadian system is a. product of evolution. It has taken it s present 
f orm because of the cow~ercial and financ ial needs of' the Canadian 
people . It vms not created by lavvyers and statesmen t o meet a fiscal 
need of the government, but has grown up gradually under the foster-
ing care of experienced bankers, no changes having been made until 
3 
experience proved them necessary or advisable.il 
Banking ~ct of 1870: 
For three years following the Confederation in 1870 the Banking 
Act was of considerable importance to the evolution of Ca.nadian 
1 . rurrency and Banking in Canada - op . cit. - P• 16. 
2. L9.ughl i n , J. Laurence - Money, Credit and Prices, PP• 448-449, 
University of Chicago Pres s, Chicago, 1931, Vol. II . 
3. Phillips, Chester Arthur - Readings in Money and Banking, 
Selected and Adapted , P• 407, Macmillan Co., Nevr York, 1920. 
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banking as a whole •. As compared to t he National Bank Act of 1863 
in the United States, which set up a minimwn capitalization for banks 
of $50 ,000, by the Act of 1870 no ba~J(ing interests could petition 
for a charter unless it was go ing to h0.ve a paid-up capi-l~e.l of at 
least $200~000 and at least twenty per cent of it must be paid up in 
each year after the commencement of business. In order to have suf-
ficient surplus to carry on the bank in times of depression and 
financial reverses, it was required that no dividends could be over 
eight per cent, until or . unless the bank ' s reserve :f\md vms the 
1 
equivalent of twenty per cent of its paid-up capital. 
In 1871 the first comp:rehensive banking law was passed which 
contained much that had been in the act of the previous year but 
brought about more :f\tlly the policy of the new government regarding 
banks . From 1871 ·to the present time~ Ce.nada has had a dece:nnial 
revision of its laws to bring i nto operation those things v1hich a r e 
needed for better protection to its customers and for greater 
st ability and resourcefulness. Benjamin Haggett Beckhart has said 
of this act, "Through the adoption of this l egislation, Canada had 
perhaps the most elaborate and detailed banlcing code of the Briti sh 
Empire whi ch definitely committed her to the policy of nation-wide 
br~1ch ba~~ing and to an asset secured bank note issue confined in 
total amount oi' the paid-up capital of the banks and yet possessing 
sufficient elasticity then to respond to seasonal and cyclical move-
2 
Under this act no new bank was permitted to commence business 
unle s s it had at least a capital stock of $500,000 bona fide 
1. Scott, ~. A. - op. cit. - P• 237. 
2. Beckhart~ Benjamin I:Iaggott - The Banking System of Canada , P• 301 , 
Henry Holt &: Co., Hew York, 1929. 
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subscribed and at least ~~100 1 000 of it paid up, vrith a further stim-
ulation t:b..at at least [,~200 _,000 nru.st be paid withi n two years after 
1 
the comr:J.encement of business. 
I n order that more aid could be. given to the. manufacturer and 
to agricult-ure it was provided that banks could " take security on 
com.modi ties in store pending marketing e.nd also while undergoing 
2 
conversion fror.1 the raw material to the finished product.~~ It vras 
provided that a bank might make advances on the shares of other banks 
3 
but this feature was repealed in 1879 so it was not of use to the 
borrower very long . The features v-•hich will be mentioned in this 
act are those which have had a vital place in the changing conditions 
of banking in the Dominion and consequ.ently those features vrhich are 
yet important though not mentioned, are working constantly for the 
strengthening of this banking order. 
Revisions of Bank Act - 1880: 
In 1880 came the first decennial revisions of the Bank Ad; of 
1870. The severe depression through vrhich the Dominion passed be-
tvreen 1874 and 1879 fl.nd the several bank failures which occurred , led 
to further important c hanges in the banking lavrs when the charters 
were about to expire in 1880. Undoubtedly the secondary dep ression 
follo·wing ·che Civil Vlar in the United States r!light have had a de-
moralizing effect upon Canada at this time . Here was a feature quite 
different from the American charters in that banks were chartered i'or 
only ten years and if the government saw fit at the end of that t i me , 
1. Scott, iN. 11.. - op . cit ... P• 239. 
2 . Currency and Banking in Canada- op. cit. - p . 17. 
3. Scott, IT. A. - op . cita - p 239. 
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it could :refuse to g:ra_nt another charter . This featur e seems to 
have had a tendency to !P.ake banks carry on their transactions n.c-
cording to the spirit of t he law better than those of the United Sta.tes 
vrhich had been given p erpetual succession. 
In this revision, the holder of a note was recognized as a 
preferred creditor Yri -th claims of the Dominion and the Provincial 
1 
Governments coming next in order of liquida tion. By this provision 
it assured those holding notes i ssued by the c artered banks that t h ey 
would undoubtedly get their money back in case of failure and was o.f 
material assistance in circulating t_le notes of these ba_nks . 
Also, by the revisions 11 banY-s were p ro:':libited from i s suin , notes 
under five d.ollars, hi gher denominations to be multiples of this sum. 
Domini on notes vrere to constitute not l ess than forty per cent of the 
2 
bank 1 s cash reserve. a 
As in 1870 and 1871 , more d eta iled reports were required of the 
banks. to be submitted to the gover:n.-rnent for their use and supe_ v ision. 
3 
Before 1883 any organization, whether a bank or not., had been 
using the title " Bank'' at will and it was , therefore, necessary to 
prohibit the use of th t title by any but chartered banks and t hose 
which had been g i "llen authority to do so under the Act. The out-
standing feature of this revi sion seemed to be the pref erence g iven 
the holder of notes of the banks in case of liquidation or f ilure . 
1890: 
There se ems to be little evidence of any radical misdemeanor 
during the past ten years which l eads us up to the 1890 revision of 
1. Scott , w. Ae - op. cit . - P• 241. 
2. Currency and Banking in Canada - op. cit. - P• 18 .. 
3. Ibid. 
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the banking laws. This periodic revision seems to have a strong 
feature attached by virtue of the fact t hat time is not l o st unt i l 
the crisis arrives but attention i s given to the problems at certain 
intervals and laws passed to corr e c-t the probable disasters .. 
The ever increasing capital requirement of new'ly chartered b ank s 
in Canada ·would seem to be a i'unQ.amenta l reason for so fc·w failures. 
Therefore, the revision of 1890 increased the quota to $250_,000 
1 
paid- up capital before a certificate could be issued. 
Some difficuHy had been encounter ed by the banJ:.:s because t h eir 
not;es ·would not be accepted always at par in alJ. parts of the 
Dominion, and in some sections they carried rather heav-.r di s counts 
which did not make for a fair system for all concerned. So at the 
1890 revisions it vms stated that banks should provide for the re-
demption of their notes at par in all parts of the country and set up 
such machinery as will be required to make this possible. 
Still another feature which was designed to protect the depo sitor 
and note holder v1a.s the creation of the 11 Banlc I'Tote Circul ation De-
dernption Ji\tnd. 11 This was established 11 consisting of deposit s made by 
the banks with the l.i:inister of Finance of ru::tounts equal t o five p e r 
cent of t heir average not e c i rcul8.tionJ such deposits to be sub ject 
to adjustments ammaJ.ly and to constitute a guaran-t ee of the paymen-1:; 
of all notes of a suspended bank with interest at six per cent from 
the date of suspension until -the date when their redemption was 
undertaken by the liquidator. Failing acJ.;ion by the liquidator within 
t wo months the Minister of Finance was authorized to redeem the notes 
out of the fund and such outlay in notes, made good out of t he asset s 
1 . Conant, Charles A. - op. cit. - P• 460 . 
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of the failed banks, was to be reimbursed by the contribut ing banks , 
1 
pro rata to their contribution. 11 
Again in this revision there is little doubt of the fact that 
the note ho lder i s t he pri me notice in view of the legislation re-
vie·wed. He has been further protec·b ed against te:p1porary as well as 
permanent loss. The Bank Uote Circulation Redemption Fund seems to 
be t he outstanding feature of this revision. 
1900: 
At the regular revision of the Bank Act in 1900, one import~~t 
addition to the code wa s t he recognition of the Canadian Bankers ' 
Association. The Canadian Ban.."kers 1 Association we.s organized i n 1891 
when the banks became mutually responsible for the circulatin-g note 
issues. It was not until 1900 that it ·was given a Dominion charter 
and at that time all routine matters relating to the preparation and 
issuance of notes ·were placed under its control. Also t he control 
2 
of call i ng in and destroying was given to the Association . 
This Association has become one of the most po·werful influences 
upon Canadian barucing and incidentally one of the most respected 
bankers ' associations i n the world. As time goes on , we find that 
the Association ·takes on added duties to discharge for banking in 
Canada .. 
Following the financial crisis of 1907 it was plainly seen that 
the circulation of money was not adequate to t ake care of the 
country's need in times of fins.ncial strain and the crop moving 
season. Thus in 1908 11 provision was made for emergency circulation, 
1. Curr ency and Barucing in Canada - op . cit. - p. 18. 
2. Holladay, Jrunes - The Canadian Bankers' Association, PP• 30-31, 
American Bankers Association ,Journal, September , 1933 .. 
during the crop moving season from October to January when banks were 
allovfed to issue excess circulation up to fift een per cent of their 
combined paid- up cap:i.tal and rest of reserve funds, this emergency 
circul ation to be taxed at a rate not to exceed five per cent per 
e.n.num. However, in 1912 the period was extended to six nonths from 
1 
September to February, inclusive. " 
The provision was of material benefit to the farmers for it al-
lowed them to get cheaper money to fimmce the harvest and to have 
a.rnple time to market their products. 
1913: 
Prior to the revision of 1913 rome dissatisfaction had been mani-
fested over the audits of the banks as such and so in this revision, 
2 
provision was made for a shareholder s ' audit . This 1Has provi ded so 
the shareholders would have better control and more knowledge of the 
actual affairs of the bruik. Heretofore audits had been sanctioned by 
the directors but neither independent control nor audit had been 
authorized by the shareholders . Thus another cy stern of closer control 
of the banks in Canada had been brought about which would lend i -tself 
to sound banking and vmuld eliminat e some of the po ssibilities of 
fraud and deceit on the part of those in control. 
Under this revision v.ras enacted " a provisi on for the e stabli sh-
ment of Central Gold Reserves in which ba.nks might deposit gold and 
Dominion notes for the purpose of issuing additional notes of their 
3 
own there a gainst ." Thi s lent elasticity to the note issues of the 
1 . Currency and BeJ:1king in Canada - op. cit. - P• 18. 
2 . Ibid. 
3 . I bid . 
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chartered banks in time of stress. A n eed was seen for more elasticity 
of note circulation and in 1914 the l egislature passed rrhat rms knmm 
€ts tho FimL ce Act of 1914. Thi s Act authorized among other things in 
time of -vrar or panic by proclamation 11 (a) To suspend the redemption of 
Domi nion notes i n gold whi ch n eant the legal abandonment of the gold 
standard and (b) to e_dvance Dominion notes u pon the pledge of satis-
factory collateral. 11 This vrhole section wa s to be under the conplete 
direction of the Department of Finance and the supervision of the 
Treasury Board. This virtually n eant that operations under this 
1 
section of the Act were to be lmovm as "rediscounting" , a s 1·re lmow it 
i n America. 
The poners of grant i ng loan s to farr11ers n ere broadened i n the re-
vision of Hll.3, by giving povter to the bank s "to loan to farmers on 
2 
grain stored i n the farm and still i n the farmers' possession." 
Still another provision Ttas the require_.1ent for 11AIL'1ual Reports to 
the liinister of Finance of the fai r market value of real and i mmovabl e 
3 
property held by the banks for their mm use. 11 
The provisions of the Finance Act will be more fu.lly discussed 
under the topic of "Currency". 
1923: 
More time ·was spent on the details of control and infor mationa l 
seeking legislation i n the revisions of 1923 so that the govern~ment mi ght 
have closer and norc adequate statistics by ·which to be guided. The 
qualificf<tions of provisional directors were re-defined and provisions 
were made to keep a record of the attendanc e of directors at meeting s, 
which records were to be brought to the attention of the shareholders. 
1 .. Curti s , c. A., - The Canadi aYl Eonetary Si tuatior~, P• ~18 , Journa l 
of Political Econor.1y , Univ. of Ch ico.go Press , Ch i cago , June , 1932. 
2. Beckhart, Ben;jam.:i.E IIaggott , op. cit . - P • 307. 
3. Cl.rrency and Banki nG in Canada - op . cit. - ?• 1 9 . 
As before .; the returns of chartered banks were required in rome detail , 
and further consideration v1as given to seeking more :i.nform tion from the 
ba.1'1ks in the monthl y and yen.r l y statei:lents of their conditions. It Tlas 
further p rovided that specio.l or any other returns might be required by 
the Hinist er of Finance if he san reason for alarm o.bout anJr of the de-
1 
tails in the l"eports as submitted. Sha r eho lders ' audits were incr eased 
by -L··wo ; 11 the a ffa i rs of the bank shall be audited by t"lvo per sons 
residing in Cana da , eE.t.ch one of whom shall be an accountant vrho had for 
at l east six yeo.rs preceding the date of his appointment, practiced his 
profe ssion in Canada , a1~d who shal l also be a member in good stan ing of 
an institute or association of a.ccoun·i:;ants incorporated under the 
2 
authority of the leg i slatu re of any province of Canada. " The ::per sonal 
liab ility of directors in case of di stribution of profits in exce s 
limits wa.s also more c l early defined. Regulat i ons regarding l oans were 
amended e.nd adv anc es to any officol" or cl erk of a b ank could not in any 
c ircwastance be granted in excess of ~;10, 000 . The puni nhment of' 
3 
directo:ts and othor bn.nk officials was provided for .,; 
The Finance Act of 1914 remained in effect until the revision of 
1923 w·hen certain changes took p l ace . 11 This Act gave permanent authority 
to the Department of Finance to make advances of Dominion notes to the 
banks, gave the Treasury Board compleJce contro l over the r Rt e and i n 
4 
eneral elaborat ed the earlier act ." This section will be d iscussed 
under the topic of o1Currency 11 • 
Th e last b nJc fai l ure in Canada to ol:: p l ace in 1 924 Ythen the Home Bank 
of Canada clo sed it s oor s. So a n anendment of 1924 was placed on the 
1 . Currency o.nd Banking i n Canada - op . cit . - P • 19 . 
2. Section 55 of the Bank Act J 1·evised to 1927. 
3 . Currency and Ba:t:'Jdng i n Canade. - op . cit . 
4. Curtis , c. A. - op . c i t. - P• 318. 
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books of the Ba.nk .Ac-1.:; ·which pr ovide s, 11For the governnent insnection 
of the chartered banks. The work of ban}:: examining vas to be placed 
1 
in the hands of an officia1 knmm as t~1e Inspector-General of Banlcs . 9 
The liabilities were l arger than thor.e of any be.nl: nhich ha failed 
since 1868 and · thus it aroused JTI.l.lch agita·cion among the banking 
f'raternity and steps were taken immediately to remedy the possible re-
currence of the tragic event . 
The major acts of legislation ha-ve been shoYm in the pages just 
preceding. These have made provision for better control of bsnks in 
Canade. and thus the number of Canadi t=>.n bank fo.ilures i s not nes.rly as 
great as the number of ~1\.merican bank failures. 
The med.ts of the independent unit banking system ·.vhich i s in 
operation in the United States , and the branch banking system! in 
Canada, cannot be compared in every detai l because of the val"-ying 
economic and financiaJ. conditions of the two countries but an attempt 
"\'fill be rr..ade, a.s the work progresse s , to show the outstanding points 
of advantage of each system and to drv:w such conclusions as the facts 
warrant. Each country has had different requiremen-t s for i ts capital 
and banldng facilities ; each country has tried to adapt i ts banking 
facilities to those needs and thu s to some extent at least., they have 
met those needs and requirements. The banking systems of both 
countries have been necessary aids to the economic development of 
each countr;y . :·n1.ether ei·ther of the system.s Yrorking in the other 
cou_11.try could have been a.s successi'ul is e. matter of conj ect1.1.re and 
does no t concern this part of the work. 
1. Beckhart ~ Benjamin Hagg;ott - op. c i ·c. - P• 316 .. 
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Ear l y in the hi[;tor-y- of Canadian banking the people saw the ad-
vantages of ha•ring uniform. laws for all the provinces . ;u"hen the 
1 
·famous British North American Act was passed, it gave to Canada her 
independence as a Dominion and vrith it the right of making all the 
laws pertaining to 11 currency and coinage, banking, incorporation of' 
bo.nks a.:.'ld the issue of paper money . n These lavrs vvere to be made by 
the Parliament of Canada . 
wi·{:;h thic uniformity of banking procedure it was possibl e to 
eliminate ·what has existed in the United Ste.tes from ·{:;he very begin-
n i ng ; that is , a Federal authority as wel l as a State or Provincial 
authority over hanl::inG transactions . Since there are in the United 
States forty-nine different authorities, there i s bound to be too 
much difficulty in control and supervision and despi·{:;e the efforts 
of rr.any leaders in banking , little has been accomplished in the way 
of obliterating the situation. 
\lhether or not this uniformity has been a definite advantage to 
the success of the Canadi an Banking Sy-stem may be a question vrhich is 
debatable but all evidence would point to the conclusion that this 
feature has had its share in making the systern more stable end sound 
as a ban.lcing system. The focusing of all attention u:ron one lexr 
ra·ther than many ·would , in its si.mpli city, carry much weight . Con-
certed action by all can ... "l.ot he l p but bring better results than forty-
nine dif ferent entities striving to maintain forty- nine separate 
systems competing against each other . 
Revision of 1934 : 
The regular decennial revision of the Bank Act should have been 
1. 11cLeod, J. A. - Historical Outline of Canadian BaiLlcine; Legislation, 
present ed before the Royal Corr~ission of Banki ng and Currency at 
Ot·{:;awa ., 1933. 
made in 1933 but on accoun-t of the investigation being made by the 
Ro;ral Commission on Banking and Curr ency it vta.s po s-'cponed one year 
and the .~'\.ct 1..'llovm as the Banlc Act of 1934 was assented to June 28_, 
1934. Following the Bank Act by only a ~ew days, the Bank of Canada 
Act was e.ssented t o July 3 _, 1934. This is the most importe.nt piece 
of legislation to be passed i n the decennial revision bece:u.se it 
changes materially the supervisory povre r s of t~1o government . This 
Ac·l:; brings into operc:l:ion a central banking sy stem for Canada , the 
bank to be known as the Bank of' Canada. 
Perhaps the outst1:1.nding revi sion to be made in the supervision 
of banl.::s in Ca::1ada Vias the privilege of note issue which has been 
1 
forbidden the chartered banks and no·w assumed by the Bank of Canada. 
This Tiill 111i thdr~rw an important function of the che.ri;ered banks 
in the past but will coordine.te ·rrhs.t has been the privilege of all 
into a centre.l controlling agency. 
Another major change which vvas b rought about by the Bank of Ca nada 
Act_, and will be in force when the bank starts opero.tion, was t he 
a l terinr; of' t he reserve requirement in that chartered banks ·will main-
tain a r eserve " to be not less than five per centum of its deposit 
liab:Uities withi n Canada and which sh..all cons i st of a deposit -rrith 
the Bank of Canada , and of notes of the Be.nk of Canada helc by the 
Bank; and t he Bank shall also maintain v.ri th the Bank of Canada or else-
where, adequate reserves against J.iabili ties else·rrhere than in Canada 
and furnish such information as may be required by the Hinister f rom 
time to time to satisfy him that such reserves a gainst external 
2 
liabilities are so maintained. 11 
1 . Section 24 of the Bank of Canada Act. 
2. Section 59 of the Bank Act of' 1934. 
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The Bank of Canada, howeve1· , i s to maintai n a reserve of not less 
th~~ t wenty- five per centum of the notes and deposit liabilities in 
1 
go l d coin s.nd bull ion in the unrestricted ownership of the Ban_l{ . 
I n order t o bring the gold deposits in Canada under a central-
2 
izing control, the Bank of Canada Act stipulates that on the day 
the Bank of Cane.da start s business, a ll chartered b anks shall transfer 
to the Bank all go l d coin or bullion owned and held by it in Canada. 
It further provid e s that any persons ho lding coin o r bullion may be 
required also to t ransfer their ho l dings to the Ba~l{ . The creat i on of 
a central bank brine;s Canada under the sarae type of s;y-stem ·which is 
prevalent in most of the British coloni es; namely, Australia, South 
Africa , Hew Zealand, and I ndia. 
1. Section 26 of The Bank of Canada Act, 1934. 
2 . Ibid - Section 28~ 
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Part II. 
CURREUCY 
(A) Supervisory Powers in the United States. 
Barter: 
I n tracing the history of currency in this country or any o-ther, 
one first turns his attention to the ea rliest form of medium of ex-
change , namely - barter . Before coins or paper notes wcro instituted 
as a medium, i t ws.s the cus·i:;om to exchange goods for goods and thus 
culmi na-te the ·i:;rn.nsactions of business. Very evident are the many 
difficulties and inconveniences which arose out of this r.1ethod of 
trading. For instance, bullets and wampum were used in Massachusetts 
while in Tennessee land vms used as a kind of currency. Too nu..:1erous 
to mention are the many kinds of goods used as money exchange during 
the early days. 
Prior to the Mint Act of 1792, coins of many countries were 
circulated in the Uni·l~cd States . It was sor,wtimes as diffi cult to 
can--;>r on e::'::chs.nge as under the old barter system because French, 
Spani f> h _, and English coins were not circulated in all areas . A 
merchant buying goods from any other than his nat ive section of the 
country found prices given in some other coin rather than his ovrn 
and -thus complicated exchange calculations had to be made. Because 
of this unsatisfactory condition which existed in our country follow-
ing the Declaration of Independence~ the Mint Act of April 2 ~ 1892 , 
1vas passed and this gesture by the Congress l a i d the foundation for 
1 
a coinage system in the United Sta.tes . 
The pa.ssage of the Act was instrumental i n bringing the chaotic 
condition of business to order . Since there were so many different 
1. Lippi!lcott, Isaac Economic Development of the United States , 
P • 125, D. Appleton C. Co . ~ lJew York , 1921. 
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kind s of money in circulat~on in the United States, and t hus so many 
st~.ndards of value, business was a·b a very- low ebb. rrith a definite 
standard of value to be used in al l parts of the country, busi:.'lAss, men 
could trade with other sections in confidence that their goods Yiould 
be of equal value in tho se sections where they Yvere to be shipped . 
'!.' his Act establ ished the bi-metallic system for the United Stat e s, 
on a gold and silver basis, a t the re:tio of fifteen to one .. It also 
provided for the free and unlimi·bod coinage of both metals, and con-
sequently est abli shed a system of legal tender. 
For the time being it brought order out of chaos and gave to t he 
country a monetary stability it had never before experienced .. 
Therefore, a definite st ep he.d been t aken a l ma st simul trmeously 
with the establishment of the First Bank of the United States, to have 
a stable currency a s well as a safe e.nd convenient !_) lace to put it. 
The monetary reforms v.rere again the suggestions of the brilliant 
financier, Alexander Hamilton, First Secretary of t he Treasury. 
The ex istence of note issues in the country came largely after 
the establi shment of the First Be.nk of the United States in 1791. 
During the y ears that the First Bank of the United States was in op era-
1 
tion, notes were freely pas sed and at par , with some state ban ... "k: s 
n'>_aking issues. However, after the bank charter was revoked in 1811, 
and until 1816, ·when the Second Bank of the United States was chartered , 
state banl::s had a free run on notes a..11.d in me.ny instances t h ey were not 
accept ed at par, and the people did not know when to accept and ·when 
1. Bradford , Frederick - l\IoneyJ p. 138, Longmans, Green ~~ Co., 
Nevi York , 1933. 
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not to . This, in turn, led to an unsound financial situation during 
this period and bec ~ use of this condition the Second Bank of t he 
United States vms chartered . From 1828 up to the establishment of 
the Hation a l Banking System in 1863, state banks issued a n increa.sing-
1 
ly excessive ~~ount of notes , Snd during this interval the so - called 
"wild-cat banking" period existed in our cou..r1try. Although some 
sta tes had strict rule s regarding the issuing of notes and others did 
not, an over-abtmdance of not e s were in existenc e and they consecpently 
became of little value. Notes with little or no reserves b ehind t hem 
couJ .d not be redeemed at par upon present tion becaus e the banks did 
not h ve the necessary funds to cover them, thus many suspens ions 
were experienced during this period . 
The exi 0 encies of the Civil ·dar pressed hard a gainst t he Treasury 
of the United States . In an eff0r;c t o secure the necessary fund s to 
f inance the ':ia.r, Secretary of the Treasury , Chase, final l y secured 
pas sage of the National Banking Act in 1863. 
The government found it possible t o i s sue bonds during the ';[ar 
period but the market wa s insufficient to take care of the l a rge 
amount of money necessary so one possib le outlet Ttas the securing of 
national bank notes with government bonds. Charter s were granted to 
t hose institutions which app lied and vli th the charter came the right 
of note issue 1vhich would be safe and easil~/ circularized at par if 
they Trere secured by the National Go"'J"ernment. Each national bank nrust 
deposit ·tith the Secretary of the Treasur~r of the United States~ bonds 
equalling the amount of notes to be issued and the Comptroller in turn 
would issue notes equalling this amount to the applying bank. The 
1. Bradford, Frederick - op. cit. - P • 1 39 . ( Honey). 
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big limitation in this note issuing plan 1Nas that notes could be 
issued only for the amount of the capital stock authorized by t he 
bank in its charter. This did not allovr for expansion of credit 
during periods of economic stress and consequently the benefits of 
this legisl ation were not as far reaching as was hoped when the act 
was passed . 
With t he creation of the Federal Res erve S'IJstem, another form of 
banl-: note came into circulation. These are similar to tho se of the 
nat i onal banks except that they do not have a limitation upon the 
amount of notes that can be issued and they are notes of the Federal 
Reserve Banks. 
State banks do not issue notes now because the government r equir es 
a ten per cent tax on all notes issued by such a bank and thi s has made 
it prohibitive for the state banks to make it profitabl e to circulate 
them. This has been true since the revision of the national banki ng 
system in 1864. 
United States Obligations: 
"The first legally authorized monetary system of the United states 
'Nas adopted with the pas sage of the Coinage Act of 1792 . Thi s Act 
provided for (1) the establis}l..ment of a mint, ( 2) the gold dollar unit 
consisting of 24 . 75 gre.ins of fine gold and the silver dollar unit 
consisting of 371 . 25 gre.ins of fine silver, ( 3) the adoption of the 
decinml system of denominations and (4) the free and gratuitous 
coinage of certain specified gold and silver coins of the denomination, 
1 
weight, and fineness at a rat io of 1-15. ',' 
1. Bradford , Frederick - op. cit . - p . 118 . (Honey) . 
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The preceding paragrD..ph very definitely describes the early attenpt 
on the part of the United States to create a currency system. 
From the time that a bi-metallic system was created by t he above 
mentioned act , it was a matter of controversy in the Congress and 
among those interested in gold and silver movements. The changing of 
the ratio had a gre0t deal to do with the over and under value of gold 
and silver in relation to the mint and market prices. Much money vras 
made when these metals could be delivered to the mint for a greater 
price than market and vice versa. Thi s controversy was finally ended 
when the Gold Standard· Act was passed in 1900 and the United States 
be carne another gold sta11..dard country. The United States government is 
directly responsible for the issue of all coins in existence today. 
The note issues during the early history of this country; at 
least those pertaining to the governmen·c of the colonies, and as a 
war measure by the Continental Congress, were f'9.r reaching in their 
effects upon the economic stability of the land at that time. Although 
t here are recorded earlier issues of note:s or paper money, it was 
1 
during the Revolutionary War that paper money was issued f'or the 
purpose of financing this struggle for independence. Whenever paper 
money was issued as irredeemable, t he consequences have been the sa.'ile_, 
narn.ely, a period of inflation and sky-rocketing of prices which seem 
prohibitable. Thus, thousands upon thousands of dollars of bills of 
credit were issued during the Revolutionary period to finance t hat 
struggle a.."Yld aid in the establishment of a democracy. Whether the price 
for this course of financing the struggle was more costly than it might 
have been some other way , history does not record . 
1. lioulton, Haro ld G. - op. cit. - pp . 153-1 58 , (Fi nancial Or ganiza t i on ). 
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Hov;ever, the ill effects of the paper currency issues of this 
period did not stop the United States Government, or Union forces 
and Coni'edere.Jce forces from repeating the same course of events 
during the Civil V/ar period. The Union, as well as the Confedex acy , 
was in need of great financial support in buying supplies and the 
1 
necessary implements of ·war . As o. last resort, the greenbacks vrere 
issued by the northern sts.tes for the purpose of r a ising capital. 
Irredeemable paper or greenbacks amounting to ~449,000,000 Yere 
2 
issued by the government during the Civil i'!ar period. 
The natural course of events was sure to drive gold and silver out 
of circulation (Gresham ' s Law) and paper money was at a high discount 
3 
in ratio to go ld during this period. It ••asn 't until January 1, 1879 
that greenbacks were redeemable in specie on demand. ( In order that 
previous acts passed for the retirement of the greenbacks would not 
v;i thdrs.w all the greenb a cks then in circulation, a~1 act passed in 1878 
stopp ed any fud:her cancellation of greenbacks to the amount of 
0346,681,016 vrhich were re-issued as they came to the Treasury for re-
4. 
tirement.) In 1900 a fund amounting to ~a 5o ,ooo,ooo in gold was set 
aside as a resenre agai nst this issue of greenbacks . The h rdships 
that this inflationary period caused the debtor and creditor o.t various 
times in its cycle vrill not be s hmm. here as ·they are materially the 
same in al l cases . 
Under the Act of 1890 ·che Secretary of' tb.e Treasur;y vas to urch..ase 
clearly defined amount of silver which, inturn, were to b e p i d for by 
1. Moulton, Haro ld G.- op. cit . - PP• 1 63-167~ (Principles of l ~oney) . 
2. Har-low3 Ralph Volney - op. cit . - P• 505. 
3. Moulton, Haro ld G. - op . cit. - P• 179, (Principles of Uoney). 
4. Ibid .. 
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1 
an issue of treasury notes .. Eovrever, the plan stirred a cons iderable 
amount of controversy and was charged with being contributory to the 
depression of 1893. In 1900 provision was me.de for the retirement 
of the .lt:reasury notes, as silver do llars vrere coined under ·che prevail -
ing statutes pertaining to silver coining and in their place vrould be 
2 
issued silver certificates . Thus the existence of our silver certifi-
cates which are so widely circulated , particularly in denominations of 
one dollar and tvm dollar bil ls at the present time. 
Federal Reserve Hates: 
One of the vmrst financial panics in our hi story came in 1907 vrhen 
3 
the Knickerbo cker Trust Conpany fai l ed in Jiew· York City. Other bai'.l:s 
and industrial establishments soon fe l l in line and a compleJGe paralysis 
of busines s set in. Something had to be done and consequent ly the 
Aldrich- Vreeland Act cf 1908 wa s passed. Prio r to t h i s act note s 
could b e secured by goverrJ.Jilent bonds, that is, othe1· than go ld. This 
p rovided that " approved securit i es of states , cities, toTms, or 
municipalities deposited 1'li th t he Treasurer at vlashington or by other 
securities customarily held by national banks , including commerc i al 
4 
paper" could be used as collateral for the issuan ce of notes. Thi s 
gave the banks of issue a flexibiJ.ity which they had never experienced 
before and consequently gave an oppo rtunity to the banks to me et t he 
demands of industry in the r e covery fro!n the panic of 1907. A com-
mi ssion, lmmvn as the National Monetary Conunission, was appointed to 
study the banking systems of ot her countries and bring in a report to 
1 . Moulton, Harold G. - op .. cit. - p. 253, (Principles of ;"Ioney). 
2. Ibid - P • 255. 
3 . Taussig , F. W. - Principl es of Economics , P• 391, Vol. I, 
Macmillan Company~ New York, 1921 . 
4. LippincotJc, Isaac - op. cit • .:.. p. 572 . 
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Con£re ss for the establishmen-t of a more stable and flexible c entra l 
banking system for the United Sta-t;es. 
Both major political parties recognized the need for ba!1Jdng reform 
i n the United States. In 1912 the Connnission made its report but it 
v1as not favorably recei vecl,. Howev er, this did not stop the idea of 
reform. On December 23.., 1913, major differences h ad been settl ed E'.nd 
a definite and concret e leg islative progran enacted. 
One of the ir:1ports.nt features of t he act was t:i.1e flexible note 
issue clause which allorred the Federa l Res erve Banks to issue notes to 
be lmo•m as Federal Reserve Bank l·!'otes, secured larg ely by co111.r.1ercial 
paper . The Federal Reserv-e rTotes gave to our moneta ry system a flexi-
bil i -L-y Yihich we had not experienced befor e. When industry needed more 
ce.p i tal , the member bo.T'Jcs would send the approv-ed commercial paper to 
the Federal Reserve Banks in their district and get i n return the 
Federal Reserve notes to issue t o their customers.. Y.ihen the n0tes had 
been used sufficientJ.y for the purpose for which they were issued , t he 
Federal Reserve Bank returned them to the Federa l Reserve Board in 
Vfa shington where they were retired from circulation. Thu s , in tines of 
e:<pansi o~ bo.nks could rediscount their commercial paper at t he district 
ban_ and get the nec essary capital for expan sion, and Tihen that cap i ta1 
was not needed any more iJc d i d not find its way into the money centersJ 
to make cheap money . 
The commercial paper presen-ted for discount had to be approved by 
the Federal Reserve Board and thus a limitation was placed upon the 
number of notes ·which cou ld be issued . Ho~·:ever , thi s expansion e.nd re-
vision of capita l v1as not possible wi i;hout due safeguard with re serve 
or collateral. 
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" This coll o:i~el·al mi ght consist of (1) paper indorsed by member banks 
and dravm for strictly cornr:1ercial and agricultural purposes or for the 
purpose of ca.rlj'·ing or trading in sectlri ties of the United States 
Gov ernment, ( 2) bil l s of exchange indorsed by a member . bank and bankers ' 
acccpto.:-:1ces bought by the Federal Reserve Dank i n the open market , 
1 
( 3 ) gold and gold certificates. " The member banks were required to 
keep a forty per cent t;o l d reserve ago.inst the amount of ~otes which they 
received fron the conunercial paper re-discounted at the district banks . 
Also , Federal Reserve Ba11Jcs mu st keep G. reserve of thirty-five per cent 
• aga i nst deposits of lawful money . Tihen t his reserve gets below a certain 
perc entage the re-discount rate automatical l y increase s , which acts as a 
stabilizer against over-expansion of credit . 
Thi s neYf met hod of expanding c redit in the Unit ed Stat es was a v i tal 
factor for the economic and financial stability of the United States 
Cit r i ng the World iffar . It seems to be gener a lly accepted as a fact that 
had ·we not been under the Federal Reserve System during the war period 
we would. have had to resort to the issuance of' "fiat11 paper money , as did 
other countries and our plight would have b een much t he same. He >wuld 
have been i'orced to have gone off the Gold Standard and inflation, 
economic destruction, and readjustment of the standard of value i'or our 
country vvculd have been the result. 
The Federal Reserve Banks acquired the same right tha t national 
banks ha d; t hat of issuing notes i f' it so desired_, to b e lmovm as Federal 
Reserve Ba!'J:: notes in contra st to the Federal Reserve l·Jotes issued against 
suitable collatera l. However, Federal Reserve banks have not u sed this 
privilege to its fullest extent. 
1. Kemmerer, Edwin Wal ter - op . cit. - P• 11 . 
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It has been conclusivel:r proven that this flexibility did not 
elimi nate all of the evil s attendant u..nder the old s:;rstem. During 
tl~.e depression, starting in November, 1929, and continuing to t he 
present time_, many banl:s failed because they could not use certain 
types of commercie.l paper as collaternl for re-discount i ng ; thus , 
tiley did not have the necessary capital to continue Emd a portion of 
their resources were tied up in "frozen" assets . 
Inf~uence of Checl':.:s as Currency: 
The currency hi story of the United States nould not be complete 
·without !!lention of the influence which the bank check has had s.s a 
mediu..m of exchange. It has been variously est imated that from 
eighty-five to ninety per cent of all the business transact ions in-
volving money payments are made by the meclimn of Jche check. Although 
checks Here used in the early histo ry of our cotmtry, it was not until 
1 
about 1870 that they became an important means of monetary payment 
in this country. From that t ime on 1\'e have seen the ever increasing 
use of this ind;rument until today it has reached the gi gantic 
proportions mentioned above . 
I n order for checks to meet the po int of greatest efficiency it 
is necessary for them to be accepted at par a·c all banks a.nd thus a 
steady and uninJcerru.pted flow of money payments can be mad e. This 
situation exists in the United States at the present tiine , especially 
s i nce the coming of the Federal Reserve S>Jstem of check clearing. If 
they are easily transferred from the payee to ·che bo.nk the check is 
dravm upon, they wi l l be honored at par . With the t rrelve Federal 
1. Bradford, F. A. - op. cit. - P• 170, (Money). 
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Reserve Banks acting as national clearing houses, together vri th local 
clearing houses , checks are transferred with the greaJcest dispatch. 
Although all banks are not menbers of the Federal Reserve s-.tstem, 
the non-member banks are allowed to clear their checks in the system 
i.f they redeem the checks at par . Most of the non-member banks~ 
however , accept the checks without discount. 
Oi' course this type of currency must have security in the sa.rne 
v;ay ~cl<...at -!:;he note issues of the banks must . This type, in turn, 
should have its reserves maintained in the s~:une way but perhap s not 
to -!:;he same degree. Checking accounts as a part of the bank s ' de-
posiJcs are demand in nature and one might think that if he deposits 
money in Jche bank he could be sure to get it out by check at all times 
vvithout question. This is, however, not true. These deposits are 
loaned on conunercial paper deposited in other banks as well as a 
certain s.mount held in reserve. The reserve is somewhat determined 
by the volume of cash needed to meet the daily demands of the de-
positors. Hovrever , these deposits should be held in easily convertib le 
paper as the bank is never sure when the majority of t he deposits will 
be drawn. Uo time limit is set on demand deposit s as is the case with 
time deposits in the savings departments of com.rnercie.l be.nks and 
savings banks . 
With the coming of the Federal Reserve System 3 and its flexible 
clauses for the expansion of credit, cmne the possible expansion of 
check currency which makes it very elastic in nature. Hember banks 
are required to keep on the average of ten per cent o f their demand 
deposi·l:;s• Also, Federal Reserve Banks are required to keep a 
reserve of gol d or lawful money amounting to at least thirt7-five per 
cent of the I'l.ember banks' deposits. Yofi th this 8.s a reserve a gains-t; 
57 . 
dema...'1d deposits.., 11 one dol lar in gold in the vaults of t he reserve 
banks 3nay act as reserve for ~~28 .57 of member bank reser-ve depo s its, 
which may, in turn, act as a rescrve again nt approximately "'28. 57 of 
1 
demand deposits held by member banks .;; 
There is ever.f indication that checks will still be a very 
importru1t factor in money payments in this countT"J for ~- long t ime 
t o come unless some radica l legislation which is not in vie1v at the 
present t ime comes to pass. The convenience which it affords t he 
people of the country .is invaluable and b illions of dollars of paper 
money as wel l as added coins ViOuld have to be printed and minted if 
these instruments were eliminated . The fact crumot be d enied that a 
checkin g accoun·t saves the use of money and its demand deposits can 
be protected sufficiently to leave no doubt in the minds of the payee 
of the check that it will be honored upon presentation. Ther efore, 
t he sy stem will have a lasting influence upon our currency. 
1 . Br adf ord , Frederick - op. cit. - P • 173 ~ (Money) • 
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( B) Supervisory Powers in Canada . 
~ign Cu.rrency: 
The early history of currency in Canada i:s quite similar to tha t 
o f t h e United states as f ar as b~:<rter as a medium of exchange is con-
cerned. However ~ the articles u sed vvere sometimes of a different 
nature. Furs Tlere prevD.lent as well as ·wheat and they formed a basis 
for business tra...'lsactions in the earlier period. 
Perhaps one of the first evidences of paper money , h01rrever cru de , 
was introduced dur i ng the nFrench regime ·when p laying cards, sbu:1ped 
with a value redeemable yearly on bills of exchange from Paris, came 
1 
into circulation. 11 Like the United States , Canada had sever a l other 
types of fore i gn currencies introduced into her country, which pre-
vailed in districts vrhere peopl e from these countries 1i"rred and thus 
busines s was transacted in terms of that media. 
Eoi'fever, the French system did not prevail for long because the 
English sovereigns became numerous e:nd an effort Yras made to encourage 
t h eir c ·rculation in Canada . The proxi mity of the United Sta t es to 
C~u1.ada had some i nfluence upon her monetary unit. Internati ona l t r ade 
had been increasing with the United States and as in intra-provinoial 
transactions, so 1rri th internationa l ex change, it wrcs becoming i mporte.nt 
to have a defini tc unit of value for Canadia..YJ. exchange. 
The Acts of 1853-1857: 
It -;rras difficu1 t for the several provinces t o carry on their 
business transactions 1.v:i. th each other under a system of v a r y ing 
standards of value. 
1. Cur rency and Banking in Canada - op. cit. - p. 5. 
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Inter-provincial business acthri ty Yifl.s handi capped by t he 
heterogeneous coinage sy stems then in e::istence ~ I t w·asn't unti l 
1853 that definite steps were taken to change thi s situ tion and 
1 
then it was by an act of t he united provinces to adont a decimal 
ct'.rrency with a doll e.:c equhr"tlent to the United St ates . 
The passage of this act fncili tated the provincial, 13.s Yrell as 
the internat i onal, exchange :?roblem for the time being, giving the 
~erclw .. nts an equal basis for !:1.11 tr:msactions .. 
The British Sovereign became l egal tender at ;)4.86 2/3 at this 
, . . '"'4 8 '}/ 1 
·t;ime . 1':fi·b1 the BrJ.t:L sh Soverei gn at ~:· • 6 (. 3 t_1e provinces v:ere 
on a go ld standard basis which, in turn, f acil itated int ernational 
tra~1.sactions 'With the mother count ry . The go lcl standard vras r;:ain-
2 
~cained with dominion no tes payable on derna.nd in go ld and ce>ulcl. be 
exported if desired. This did not make fo:t e. very f lex i ble currency 
system but was an i mprovement over the former condition. 
3 
The Act of 1857 pl ac ed tho government of the various p1·ovinces 
on e. d e cimal system 2.i.'ld thus it brought a stabi l izil1g effect upon 
tne currency system i n the provinc es $ Al l transactions , 1·rhether in 
the east , \'fest, north , or south , had a simi lar value , except where 
e.ddi t i onal economic and geogro.phical forc es had a direct bearing 
under whatever system vvas us ed. This , naturally~ app li ed to only 
t hose provinces who joined i n the Act of 1853. 
Uniform Currency Act of 1871: 
In 1867 when the Bri tish North America was passed , the banking 
functions '.'!ere assumed by the Domini on and only mino1· changes were 
1. Addis , Si r Char l es - CanadB. and its Banks , pp . Ll: l-42, tTournal 
of the Canadian BarJcer s 1 Association, Toronto, Vol. XLII, 
October , 19 34 .. 
2. I b i d. 
3 . A IIistory of Bar.clr.ing , P • 447, The J ournal of CoDli'.erce and Com-
so . 
made until the periodic banking revisions Trere to b e made in 1870 .. 
1 
Ilovmver , it VIas not VJ1til 1871 , that the Uni f orm Currency Act vras 
adopted . This placed the entire countr~r on a decir.1al system and 
the British Sovereig11 as lega l tender at f,;4 . 8G 2/3 . 
I n relation to what the past had sho'.'ffi l)~r the volume of trade 
be'b:recn the United Sta·tes &...'l'ld Canadt::t. and the promi se of an ev er-
i n cr·easing volume in the :fu.Jcure , it was good j udgment on the part of 
t h e framers of tl:.i s Act to adopt the decimal system for their countl""'J • 
For the greater par t of the time s ince the adoption of ~c 1i s 
:.>tatuto , cn:change has been easi l :r carried on be~cnreen t:.1e United States 
and Canada.. l~ot in a l1 part;:; of each country i s the money of the 
other country at par > out vhere mo st of ·the transaction s are carr i ed 
on vre find t is true . However, when England went off the gold 
standard in 1901 t h is , of cou.:t s e , 'Na s not true either , conversely 
,;hen United States went off t he gol d standa rd in April , 1933 . 
The Hint : 
AfJcer the dec i ma l system of currency was estab lished f irmly in 
Canada, s he had to have coins to carry on her business transactions. 
2 
By an Act of 1870 the Ot t aw·a Hint was established bu t it vras not 
opened until 1908. This Mi nt was a branch of the Ro:Tal t~in·t in 
London. An arrangement wa s mad e with the Ca.J.1~tdian Goverrunent vrhereby 
it wou ld f urnish o. buildine; a.'1d e qu i pment and the nec e s sary c apital 
to pay expen ses of mai ntenance of t he Mi nt . By an Act of 1931 ., t he 
Mi nt came into possession of the Ca nadian Gover nment and now is 
1 . Dodd, Agnes F. - The History of Money in the British Empi re and 
the United States , PP • 217-219, Longm.ans, Greon & Co . , He•:J' York, 
1911. 
2 . Report of the Royal Commiss i on on I3s .. nking; and Cur rene in Canad8 .. , 
P• 23 , 1933. 
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operated as the Royal Cami.dian Mint . Lil~e-rfise min-ts wer o establi3hed 
in the United States for the coinage o f go ld and si l ver but the 
c oinage of large quantities of gol d did not become so populs.r in Canada 
s.s in the United Sta tes . Most of the go l d '.Vas left in bullion form and 
used as a reserve i n this 'Nay. Of cour se the sub sid i a ry coins vrere 
min-ted , a s they vrere in the Un iJced States . 
Caine and Bru1k Notes: 
Af·t. er the Acts o f 1853, 1857 , and 1871 , making decimal cur rency 
legal tender in t he entire Dominion , and the establishment of the 
Royal .;Iint of Otta·wa, more token mo:nGy vras necessary e. s well t'.s the 
use of paper as a l"ledia of exchange . Tr.e a c·t s bringing to existenc e 
the various denortlinut i ons and their volume hs.ve been di s cussed else-
where in this work and wil l not be dealt with here. l.!erely to show 
·!.;hat the situation is today regarding Jche specie and nota circulat i on 
11At t he pr esent time not es may be is sued under· tm;y one of thr ee 
ste.·tv:tory :m1chol· i ·c i es , (l) t he Domini on Notes AcJc of 1927 ·which re-
quire s a gold reserve of twenty- five per cent t o be held aga inst t h e 
first $50 , 000 , 000 of notes issued and i 'ull sold coverage against any 
i ssue in excess of ~ \50 _, 000 , 000; ( 2 ) the Finance Act of 1927 , Pa:;.·t II , 
of which authori zes t he l:Iinister of Finance t o advance to any 
chartered bank or to the sav ine;s banks of Quebec Doln.i n i on Hot os to any 
8.m.ount on the pledge o:f approved secur i t i es deposited with the l.fini ster . 
These e.dvances bear interest e.nd n o go l d c overage i s required to be 
h eld on Dominion \Totes so adv~.:mc ed ; ( 3) Chapter ·4 of the Sta 1cut es of 
1 9 1 5 ~ e.uthori zing t he gov.:::rr..nlEmt; to i ssue Dominion Hate::: 1co the amo\.Ult 
of z~ 2G , OOO , OOO without go l d coverage but part l y covered by the deposit 
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oi' ,:~16 , 000 , 000 of r ailway s ecuriti es guaranteed by the Domini on 
l 
The notes ~·Jhich can be issued under any one of the above 
men-tioned pro-visions a1·e di vid.ed into -t-wo groups ~ nt?..rc,e l;,r ~ general 
circula-!:; i on and speci a l notes . The l at-t er· ::t.:;,~e generally i n l a :;.·be 
d anomi n:=.-l:; i ons snd are u sed for i nter- bank settlements and do not r;et 
into circul ation as do the small er denominat i ons. 
As i n -!;he United S·te.tes , bank no tes form the l argest i'orn of 
circulatin~;, medium in Canada . Of course, silver , b r onze _, e1cc. , are 
1..1 s ed i'o r subsidiary co ins and f or convenience in making change. 
Large sums of heavy coins are not portt?.bl e as c ompared to pso.per no~ce 
currency. Chartered banks have the priv~ilege of issuing notes of 
srnalJ. de11orni:n .. tiOI1s for an araount equal to the paid-up c a. pi t al E:Jco c ] ~ . 
1. Currency and Banki ng in Canada - op . cit. - P• 9. 
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(c) Control of Currency. 
Expansion- United Sta t e s : 
Equa lly as imnortan t as are many other factors which ne.de a good 
currency system is the possibility of expansion in t:Lrne of greo.t 
economic stress , or in periods of' econom.ic de-v-elopment . 
There are se-v-eral .-rays for money to get i nto cil'culation but the 
various note issues vri ll be di scussed e.t this point . It was mentioned 
el se'!,rhere t hat the l ack of an elastie currency ga-v-e rise to the enact-
ment of t he Fed ere. l Rcsex·ve SIJstem in 1 91 3. Uatim1al bank notes are 
ine l o.sti c in that they can be issued only t o the e.rr.ount of t he capital 
stool: of the individual benks. Ther efore , when thi s a..rnount had been 
loaned , further demands c oul d not be met wi thou-!:; bo rrovring from other 
banks and that was not a popular and succ e ssful method of secu1~ing 
extra capital par-ticularly in times of financial r ecessions . This 
sa.'Tle situat ion is equ~.l ly true of the Federal Re serve Bank notes vii t h 
the provision, however, ths:t they a re not limited to the a_rp_ount of the 
capital stock of their bank. Hoy,rever , they must be secur ed by govern-
ment bonds as are -~he national bank notes .. 
Th e Feder~.l Reserve notes have become the more import an·t ~cype 
of note issue i n the United Sta tes. Yi11en a m.ember bank i s in ne ed 
of ex t ra funds ·to a c conunodate H;s cus·tomers i n period of expansion 
and it has eligible paper ( c o:mrnercial paper pr e s c r i bed by the Federal 
Re serve Board ) it make s a pplicat ion t o the Fede r al Reserve Ba.nk in 
its district f or a loan. Thi s paper which has been pr esented has, in 
a ll probability , been discounted by them at some earlier date. This 
cornmerci a J. paper is not eligible if it has more than a ninety day 
matu ri·ty in c ase it is for a comnercial or industrial loan a11.d for 
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agriculture over a six to nin0 months maturity. l'Jo loans are m.ade b;:r 
the Federe.l Re serve Banks for purposes other than produc·tion and dis-
tribution. 1'.:11. attempt has been rnade to create credit fo r purposer: 
other than security and capital requirements . If the Federal Reserve 
Bank has ·the credit available, it immediately re- discounts the com-
mercial paper pr esen-!:;ed by the nember ban1~ , thus demand for ext· a 
loans is sa-l~isfied. However , if th0 Federal Reserve Bank is not in 
a position to grant this credit to the member bank, it deposits with 
the Federal Reserve Ag;ent for thD.t bank, collateral equalling tb.e 
8..mount of the notes required and the agent applies to the Board for 
the notes , finally consmnmating t he transaptions e.nd bringing into 
circulation more Federal Reserve notes f or the period of eJcpansion 
or economic or financial strain. If thiG process vrere not possible , 
money vrould be extremely dear and much greater economic recessions 
would ensue or else eJ.qx:msion and development wonld be retarded. 
The means of keeping these notes at par in circulat:Lo:'l is Eade 
possible by the fact that a forty per cent gold reserve aga5.nst 
actu.al notes in circulation must be mai:nt.::dned by the Federal R.eserve 
Bank issuing them, and also a reserv·e of gbld or lawful money of not 
1 es s than thirty-five per cent1..t.m against its deposits. However, a 
i'und in gold of not less than five per centum of U·w note s in circu-
la:cion must be maintained wiJch the Secretary of the Treasury for the 
redemption of such Federal R.eserve notes as are present there for the 
same. But this f'ive per centum may count as a parJc of the required 
forty per centwn reserve previously mentioned. Yfi th eligible paper 
which is available for discount still flowing into the member banks , 
it -vrould seem that there lllight be an inexhaustible supp l y of credit 
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possible. However, this is not the case, for during the depre ssion 
period of 1929 to 1933 a l arge number of ba.'rlks were in an unfavorable 
position because of their inability to secure loans. Certain types of 
paper are not poss ible of re-discount vrhi ch tends to retard expansion 
and over-development at certain stages of the bu siness cycle. 
Probe.bly the most potent and effectiv e means of reta rdi ng the ever-
increasing demands for credi·l:; i s the right of each Federal Reserve Bank, 
with the consent of the Boarcl , to raise or lower the re-di scount rate 
to the member b anks . 
Expansion - Canada: 
The expansion and contraction of currency i n Canada has been 
largely contro lled by the Dominion Goverrunent since the Union i n 1867 . 
Like the national banks in the United States, chartered banks in Canada 
can is sue notes of t heir ovm up Jco the paid in capital of its bank, plus 
the amount of its deposits of gold and dominion not es i n ·the c entral 
1 
gol d res erve . Thus , as in the United States, the possibility of 
expansion of notes in time of' great need is limited from t his ang l e . 
During ordinary times t his t akes care of the industrial and c ommerc i al 
demands upon the ba.llks . However:~ during the crop seasons from 
September to February, the banks are a llowed ·t o issue addi tional notes 
up to fifteen per cent of t he i r unimpaired paid up capita l and r eserves . 
Interest at five per cent per annum is charged by the Goverrunent upon 
the amount of not e issues . Here again the amount of the i ssue i s de-
pendent upon t he pai d up capital of the banl<: and gives a limited chance 
for expansion in this crop moving seasonal demands . 
1 . Section 60 of the Bank Act of 1934. 
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The Dominion Note Issue is of great importance to the monetary 
system in Canada. The fi rst a ct, lmmm as the Dominion notes Act, was 
passed in 1868 and limited the issue to ~~8,000,000 of. which the first 
C5,000, 000 required a twenty per c ent reserve and the remainder a 
1 
t wenty-five per cent reserve in specie. From time to time changes 
i ncreasing i:he amount of Dominion Notes in circul ation, have been made . 
Here again there seems to b e a limit to the amount of notes that can be 
secured immediat ely for seasonal demands . 
Some means had to be devised to t ake care of the increa sing 
demands of the country for mor e currency duri ng the World !Jar and as a 
result the Finance Act was pe.ssed in 1914 to cope with t his emergency. 
By this Act a type of re- dis count system was created for Canada which 
is in some phases similar t o that of the United States, ·with the e.:x:-
2 
cept ion of t h e raachinery through whi ch the note issue passes . By this 
Act the chartered bsnlcs and the savings banks , to which the Quebec 
Savings Bank Act s.pplies, could is sue notes i f they presented to the 
}finister of Finance selected securities as collateral to cover the a.mom1t 
of the issues . This gave to t h e ba..'1k s an elasticity of credit v.rhich they 
had never bef~re possessed, and provided the necessary capital for the 
ever increasing demands upon them for more loans . 
This Ac-t vm.s passed as an emergency measure bu-t the benefits of 
its ex istence p roved so beneficial that it became a peace time ex-
pediency as well as an emergency measure by the Act of 1923, Chapter 70 . 
In order to make these notes pass at par , the securities were to be 
of no longer ma.-turit;y than six months , which gave them a liquidi-ty 
1 . Report of the Royal Comr.1isnion on Banking arJ.d Currency, P• 21, 
Toronto, 1933. 
2. McLeod, J . A. - op. cit., p .. 36, ( Present ·:'lark i ng of Canadie.n Syst em) . 
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necessary for irrnnediate transference into cash if' necessary. Th is 3 in 
t-u.rn , was suff icient re s erve e.gainst t he notes so they were not quest ioned 
as to value in relation to other note issues. 
The interest rate to be charged for re-discounting v1a s to b e d e-
termi n ed by the Treasury Board and could be changed at the discretion of 
the Board . A study 9f the rates shows the.t they varied 1i ttle from t h e 
rates charged by the Bank of En gland and the Federal Reserve S'IJst em in 
the United States. 
Thus, the need for extra credit facilities during periods of 
expansion and financial strain vlere put into oper!:'.tion and are being used 
at the ]~resent time to aid in the demands for extra currency. Some 
qu e stion has been evidenced by the appointment of a Royal Cor.mD.ssion to 
ascertain the defects of the present ~Jstem and repor t whether or not a 
c entra l banking system ·would b e of more benefit to the country, furnish 
more a dequate no·te i ssues and general l y stabilize t he monetary conditions 
in the c ountry. I!lore attention will be given to this in a l ater section. 
Contraction, - United States: 
Probably the most effective weapon v1hich U1e central banking system 
i n the United States has i s the re-discount rate fixing privileg e . Th e 
Federa l Reserve Banks in the v a rious districts have the right to change 
the r a tes at any time they believe J~hat it is expedient to the best 
i nt erests of the count1~ vnth the approval of the Federal Re serve Board. 
-;then t h e interest rate t;oes up it tends to retard the volume of borroYTi nr; 
for expansion, and liquidation t~?.kes place. Thus, much money i s returned 
to t h e Federal Reserve Banks and is retired froB circulation. By u s ing 
its open ma r ket policy of the buying and selling of governinent s ecurit ies 
68. 
it " can force member banks to increase the i r borrovrin at the 
reser-ve ba11Jcs , t hus inst i tuting a potent force i n the direction of 
higher rates . As mon ey mEl.rket rates r i se , t;he reserve banl:s increase 
thei r di scount r ates , thereby pr event ing the E:argi n b et1·roen l ending 
and borrowing rat e s f rom becoming t oo wide . On ·the other hand , by 
the pur chase of open market securitie s~ the reserve banlcs permi t 
member banks to r educ e t hei r ind eb t edne ss and t hu s help to bring 
about easi er money condi t i on s . As the r ates in t h e money market fal l, 
rese :o·ve ban.'k: d i scount r ates are adju sted to lower l evels and the whole 
1 
money sit uation bec omes easier . 11 
' ":Jhether or not this expan s i on and contraction policy invested in 
t he authorit~r of the F edera l Rese rve Syst em is a ctual l y controllable 
may be i n que stion. Up to the t ime of the break i n t he stock market 
i n 1 929 , the policy of raising and lov-.rering t he d i scount rates , as 
occasion seer:ted expedient ., end t he open maxket po licy of the reserve 
2 
banks see:med ·to contr ol t he credit base r a t he r suc ces sfully. How-
ever, uith the advent of this per i ocl. of over- expansion !:tn.d 1..-ilc: 
specu lative craze on the :part of the peopl e of the country , and in 
fact the worl d , and despite the steps taken by the Fed er al :2eserve to 
curb it , the re- discount 1·ates increased. Government securiti e s held 
1)y the banks ·were reduced to a low "level but their efforts were of 
3 
Suffi ce i t to s<J.y tho..t economi c factors , o-t her 
than those of money , entered into the depression activity. From the 
depression period we are !lovr experiencine; , it would appear t ,at steps 
vr5.l l he.ve to be taken to bring i nto closeT control ·the expansion and 
contraction fac i liti es n ow in existence. 
1. Bradford , F. A. op . cit ~ - PP • 353- 354: , (Be.n1cin:s )• 
2 . Ibid - P• 355. 
3. Ib i d. 
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ColYcr acti 0n - Canada: 
In those periods when the ban1cs n eed extra credit f aci litie s to 
meet the demands of t heir cl i ents, credit has been furnished to 
va.rying degree s by methods described i n the previou s sect ·_on on 
"Expansion of Note Issues". Nature.l l y , when i~he need for the wi der 
credit b?.se has ceased , the l arge ~rolmne of notes m.ust flovt back i nto 
the channels from v1hence it came and be rede emed. 
This proc e ss takes place under -the direction of the chartered 
bankG who , ;;rhen they have compl eted the u se of t he notes, return them 
to the Tr easury Board and in turn receive the securiti es which were 
1 
deposited ther e when the notes VJere issu e d. 
Th e vary ing di scount rate ha s , of course , some ef fe ct upon ·the 
amounJc of credit secured. It has not a direct bearing upon the 
2 
expansion n.nd contraction of note issues, how·ever. I.Iore weight is 
placed in the hands of the v-ariou s chart ered banks as to amolli'1.t of 
credH; to expand and contract than is t r u e of the banks in the Unit ed 
Sta t es . 
1 . Tieport of ·the Royal Commissi on on Banki ng and Currency, P• 36 , 
Toronto , 1933. 
2 . Ibid - P• 59. 
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PART III. 
BRAHCH BAiTKilJG 
(A) Legislation i n the United States. 
Branch banking in the United States on a national .scale has been 
tolerated but very little through nationaJ. statutes.. On the other hand, 
branch banking in Canada has been the main type of banking structure 
and seems to hav e proved to he a most succ essful venture. 
The First and Second Dal>1rs of -the United States vrere exH . .mples of 
branch banking in 1791 and 1816, respec-tively . It i s dov.btful if 1-re 
arc justified in saying that b1·anch ba11Jd.ng vras the c ause of the · 
failure of these two h?.nks in the es.rly h i story of banking in the 
Unit ed states . 
James B. Fo:r•gan said, 11 The deve l opment of a na·tiona.l system of 
baD.ldng in t his country has twice been diverted from its natural course. 
In the first instance by politics when President J ac son ref\lsed to re-
nevr the charter of the Bank of the United States and again when fo 
the purnose of creating a market fo r its bonds , tte Federal Gov-ernment 
l 
established our present nationa l system of isolated banks. 11 
The f'nncl a..111.ental principle underlying b ranch bo.nking is tho.t of 
centralizing f\mcls in e. few na tional banking systems Tlith brru1ches in 
la.rgc areas or the entire section of a country . The question of 
"Nhether branch b anJdng should be permitted on a nation- Yri de Ol' 
11 trade area11 scale in the United States will be developed during the 
progress of the TTOrk. In the follo'!r ing pages the advantages and, in 
many ca ses, offsetting eli sadvantages , will be discussed at some lengt_l-
1 . The Practical Problems in Banking 0: Currency, edited by '.falt er 
Henry Howe, Addressed by James B. Forgan, President of the First 
national Bnnk of Chice.go , before the Ba::.-1kers Club of Hilwan1::ee , 
in Uay, 1902, PP • 238- 254, MacFadden, Hew York, 1907. 
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and a conclusion ·will be drawn nhich, in the writer 's opinion, i s 
justified from the facts presented . 
One of the first steps which is neces sary to bring branch banking 
about in the United States is a continui ty of opinion on the part of 
our leadir.g bankers . Vle have yet a tremendous barrier to Stlrmount 
before Vie can svring the majority of our hankers to t he side of branch 
banki ng . Some wri·ters and authorities vrho are des.ling vri th tlli s 
p~~oblem impartially, question whether some of the lee.ding authorities 
on the independent unit side are sincere i n their proclamations . l.If'.ny 
b i g independent unit bankers, as well e.s small bankers , are afraid 
lest they may lose through branch banki ng on a nation-wide or 11trade 
areatt scale. John Poles , Comptroller o f Currency , made ·!:;he statement 
that "The count2·y i s too large , and it s vast financial operations on 
too v0.s·b a sca l e to permit complete conso l idation in r.few Yor}: City , the 
l 
world ' s market . 11 
Thomas 'J . Lt?.mont said " th!?.t no thorough go i ng banking reforms can 
be brought about unt il vital changes· have b een accomplished. The :Li st 
is to br i ng all the corn.mercial banks of the country, small as well as 
large , under the single aegis of the J:i'ederal Reserve 8-p:d::; en. The 
second is to establish sensible provisions for regional branch banking . 
Th e geogr-aphical limits for each to be carefulli worked out and regu-
2 
latecl . 11 
One of t he worst bar1..king records i n exi stenc e is that TL ich has 
occurred during t he l v.st decade in i>~'Tlerican banking. At the pea}: in 
1920 there vrere approxi mate l y thirty thousand independent unit banks 
1. Poles, tTohn - (Comptroller of Curr ency ) Branch Ba..'rlki ng, Uo . 4 of 
Vol. 39 J A.rnerican Federationist, April , 1932, pp. 391-395 . 
2 . Lamont, Thomas Vl. - Primary steps for Banking Reform, P• 107 , 
Taken from the Proceedings of the 1\.cadenw of Political Science , 
No . 2 of Vol . 25, J anuary, 1933 . 
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in the United States. I n 1 933 there a r e s ome eighteen t hou sand novi in 
operation. In other vmrds ., bet17een eleven and tw·elve t housand banks 
have failed i n the Unit ed States in a period of thirteen years . The 
Comptroller of Currency has stated ,.That Jche banking problem can b e 
solved by g i ving b r P...nch bai'J.::ing povrers :rri.thin IV"hat he calls ' trade areas ' 
surrounding their places of operation in a ll stntes regardles s of state 
l 
laws.~~ 
Equally as many authorities have recognized ·the necessity of branch 
banking on some ntrade arean basis a s the comptroller sttggested, but 
there seems -t~o be tt question as to just how practical application of 
this theory could be ma.d e. 
Prior to 1927 little or no l egislation had been passed ·which 
favored branch barucing in the United States. 
2 
In 1927 the 1'lcFadden Act was passed which gave some encourage!ilen-1:; 
to the proponents of branch banking . Laws noYf p ermitted national bark <:> to 
continue all br anches ·which were in lawful operation at the pas sage of 
the Act. Some state s in the union haYe branch banking lavvs which 
permit thei r bank to establish branches . It was charged that ne.tional 
ban.."lcs were being handicapped and in some c a s es seriously harmed by 
the severe compeJGi tion of state b anks . This was one reasOl1 Tihy the 
opponents of branch barudng were willing to vote for the passage of 
the Act . 
The Act also provided f or the continuation of its branches in cases 
where ste.t e banks with branches joined the Federal Reserve System. Th is 
provision may be instigated as a move to increase the membership in the 
Reserve System. 
1 . Cartin.hour~ G. T. - Branch ~ Group and Chain Banking , P• 285~ 
Macmillan Company~ New York, 1931 . 
2. I b i d . 
73 . 
A.."YJ.other section pemitted h ro or more national bnnJcs vtho mi ght 
wa.nt to consolidate ~ to ctill operate any branches which it had at 
the time the Act was passed . However, if any bank had esJcablished a 
branch unlawfully after the Act was passed, it could not become a 
member of the Reserv e System until i t had relinquished operation of 
the branch bank. 
A provision which was welcomed by national banks was that which 
ftllowed them to establish branches in those states where branch banks 
yrere permitted; however, with certain limitat ions, namely:- no br(?.nches 
v1ere to be established in cities of less than 25,000 people; one branch 
in cities Tlith population up to 50 ,000; two in cities ·with popula tion 
up to 100 , 000 and in those cities ·with population above 100 11 000 the 
nmnber should be left to the discre·bion of the Comptroller of Currency. 
The foregoing provisions permit t he national banks to compete 
with the state ba..-r1k s in those states where branch banks are legal ; un-
doubtedly this has been a factor in keeping r~o re national banks in 
operation. (See section on 11 Govermnental Remedies" for further dis-
cussion on l egislation). 
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(B) Advan-tages of Branch Banking. 
1. Ster~nng the Tide of Failures: 
Ban}:: failures by the hundreds crune to a momentary stop vrhen 
President Roosevel t declared the Bank Holiday in :ii;Iarch of 1933. IIow-
ever , this was only an emergency measure to save the country from 
financial destruction according to Presidential I/[es s age. Either a 
complete collapse of the banking and industrial life of the country 
was to fol low or d1·astic measure imposed. The latter Ttas chosen. 
Branch ba:nking seems to be one of the possibilities for Jche stem-
ming of the ·tide of bank failures. It should be ·with considerable 
pride t hat Canada tells the vrorlcl that she has not had a baJ1J:: failure 
since 1924. In a large degree this has been due to branch banking . 
As Yrill be pointed out l ater., the competition of' the member and 
non-member ba..l'lks has had a tendency to loosen the banking s-tructure 
with forty-nine d i fferent sets of bank laws and no compulsion on the 
part of the state banl<.:s to become members of the Federal Reserve 
~;stem. It has been stated by reliable sources that the bank cri sis 
of 1933 we.s not proTi1pted by the dep1·ession necessarily, or by foreign 
events nhich were unfavorable -to the United States , o:t_• even by S:'ecu-
lation, but rather by t he non-uniform laws and regulations of the banks 
l 
in our country. 1'Vhen forty-nine different jurisdictions are d ictating 
the laws regulating banks W-d thus forty-nine differen-t groups are 
clamoring for patronage, . there is little doubt tha.t some of these l aws 
are going to lose and be without benefit to the greEtte st number .• 
Conseqv.ently, viTi th a national unification of banking laws which 
v.rould pcrmi t the cstablishJTJ.en·l'; of branch banks , and the elimination 
1 . Da.iger , J. H. - To·ward Safer and s-t~ronger Banks ., PP• 558- 564, 
Current History_, February, 1933. 
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of a ll the contrad.ictory l m•rs e.:;:isting in the cotmtry toc.lay _, a ;;:.o st 
i;:1portsnt step ·would be me.d e to p revent the recnrrence of T;hn.t l1as been 
l:a!Jpening; dur i ng the past ten or fift een years . 
The ab sorption of all neal: and unnecessm-y r.)anks , es:9 ecially in 
sn.all co!illnuni ties , will give the country a much sounder bank ing structure 
and a l so ghre strength to those banks remaining ~ 
2. Strengthening S'mall Cormnunity _Banks: 
( a) Cap_it e.l -
The local benk of a small town hc,ving a population of n0 t mor e than 
10./)00 ha s at its COITilD.a.J."'ld l im.i ted resources . }.lost of the c ::.pi te..l is in-
industry car r ie s on the i ndustrin.l life of that COllli'Tru.nity. tt .tUl the 
eggs are in one basket . 11 
It has been an m·guncnt of long standing that local or unit b!:tn.l( s 
give grco..ter support to local business t han '.'iould a bre.nch be.lJ.~ing system. 
Br anch ban.'lcs have at their co:r:L'T!D.l~.d the re sot1rc es of the great central 
o:'fic e which l el1d s a stability not possible under tl1e unit ban1~. 
I f one surveys the ::;uppor·t vrhi ch is g i ·.ren by bc.nks in Cn.nada to 
lo co.l corrnnunity project s , one often find s ev en more wiJ.lingr_e::;s on -l~~'le 
part of t:w na11age r to support J.o ce.l project s than is f ound in our o·;nl 
c ountry. 
The zeal and enthusiasm of an independent unit ban}: president i'or 
vr..tat seem to be 11 tips" and " good schemes" for making the t own boom 
indu strially ~ ar e checked v-ery l ittl e as cortpared to t he branch banking 
manager. He l'1ttst a c count fo1· such loans to the head office while J . ·~11e 
un:Lt be..nk presi dent may dominate h i s board of direct ors and grant loans 
of qu estionable s ou ndness. 
I n times of financial stress or even in times of prosper i ty and 
rapid expansion, the independent bank often finds difficulty in 
securing the necessary capital for expansion ; thus 1 it cannot acconuno-
de.te the comnru.ni t-y in its de:rnands. Hei ther in time s of stress can it 
f ind the necessary capita l to withstand the heavy vrithdrawal o f cash 
upon thc:t bank as c an the branch ba.11k in a little community. There cG.n 
be little doubt t hat branch banking strengthens the ban}:ing facili t ies 
of that particular comnru.ni ty . 
Adequate capi1cal is necessary in order to make a banking s;:v::::tem 
stable . 
It is quite evident tht?.t one of the many reasons for the f ailure 
of independent banks in the United States is due to small capital which 
exists in so meny of t hese banks and one reason that ·\;he independent 
bank is open to severe critic ism in the present d:;>.y banking si tuai~~.on 
is the fact t hat banks c an be organi zed for such small ce.p i tc,Eza tion 
·with a minimum of ~)25_,000 worth of capitd . A bank can be organized in 
Ce..nada for no les s tht:>..n (1500 1 000 ·worth of capital. 1.Yith sv.ch a small 
amount of money required., an individual can apply for membership in the 
nati onal banking system. ·w11.ereas., if the requir ement were h i gher, 
fewer banks Yrould be organized and propor tio!lately as many failur es 
1'vould not exisi~. (A banking S'Jstem ·:vhich draws i 1GG capital from a Tride 
area has, e.t the very outset, ·working carital enough to bring about 
loans in wide areas., and a capi tal which is very superior to that of a 
number of ba11.ks equ~.lling t he same amount of capi htl stock •. ) 
Also., reserves a re not so h i gh i n larger banks as i n the branch 
bank and c onsequently more capi tal is available for l oan purposes . 
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(o) Diversification of Assets : 
Sou...'1.d banking is synonymous with diversification of imres·cmont . 
As was stated i n a previous section~ most of' the capital of a 
small independent bs.nk is inves ted with i n the conmunit-y· n:n.d if {;hat 
cor,mw.ni-ty ' s indu stri es are not prof'ite.ble, then it is quite po ssible 
that the bank wi l l noJc prosper . In branch banking , the capital of 
the be.nk is invested i n many sections of the country or 11 trade 
areas
11
• This one poh1t i s of major consideration i n a banking 
s:lstem. 
Because of t he f act of its size and fL1ancial strength., the 
larger branch be.nlc is in a better position to diversify its loans 
a.'1.d hence is better e qu ipped to -rri thstand a business dep_ ession or 
financial strain than is the Ul1it bank. 
A ·;:ell proportioned branch bank is in a go od position to keep 
its funds en~ployed at all t i mes i n aid of financial and productive 
enter p:cise 4 Those sections of the country '\!:hich are susceptible to 
seasonal demands are helped a!ld rd.ded by a well 1;1a11aged bra..n.c:h 
S'Jstem because the branch syst01:1 can move its f tL.ds e£:.sil;,r fron one 
section to another to take care of the ebb and f l ovr of seasonal 
demands and does not :aced to c a l l upon other sources of capital to 
t l de over ttis seasonal fluct uation. 
This :fact has been evidenced by "che many failure s, for instance _, 
in the grfl.in areas of the Uni ted states 'Vrhere little or no di ve1·sifi-
cation of f'ar;iti:J.g exis·ts - a one c rop area,. Consequ ently., banl:s are 
sJcrained to the limit in their seasonal demands. In times of de-
pression t hese bs.:rt.Jcs · come to the breaking po i nt and often fail. 
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(c) Benefits of Broader l'Ianagement -
Even from a purel3r impartial exrunination~ there can be little 
doubt that ·Ghe branch bm:,Jcs can lend to its customers a type of 
service superior to the independent unit. It is not expected of a 
small ind ependent unit bank that it will have all of the depe.rtments 
which are ibtmd in a l arge branch bank ing sy stem; first and foremo st 
because it cannot afford to spend this extra money fro11 t h e income 
it receives from its deposits, whi ch nec essarily are small. Expert 
service, therefore, can.rwt be render·ed or expert advice given in 
the same degree as under the bra11.ch bank ing cystem. The centre.l or 
head office of a branch banking system has at its command all of the 
facilities which are necessary to advise expertly . !Jot only has it 
expert e.dvice to render to its customers, bu-(; it has at its co:rm.1and 
statistical experts and others to gather ru1d forec a st business con-
ditions ru1d to guide in the investing of capital for long and short 
time periods . 
11 The concensus of opinion among large and smal l ba11J~ers inter-
vievfed in California is that the large bankers do somev1hat better in 
handling t heir bond accounts thru1 do the small banks , by virtue of 
their size rather than their character . The branch ba:'l.ks charge 
better than the small unit banks . The large bank can afford to rnain-
tain a person to study th~ bond market and g;uide its purchases and 
sales. The mnaller bru1ker must rely on his correspondent bank and 
on bond salesmen and on his ovm limited lmowledge of goverr.ment and 
l 
corporations issuing the bonds." 
1. Cartinhour, G. T. - op . cit. - p. 285. 
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~redit Facilities in Small Communities -
The branch banking sy stem has o f t en b e en criticised becs.use it 
did not loan money as readily as the independent unit bank. However, 
it seems that branch bank s have had the tendency to be more ·willing 
to extend credit which is properly drawn o.nd endorsed t han the unit 
bank s h ave had. 
Many charge that local branch banJc w .. anagers vrill not extend 
credit in the same ma..'l1.11er as local oo.nkers in unit banks. This is 
u ndoubtedly true due to more investigation on the part of the former . 
The shifting of managers fron1 place to place in the branch 
banking systeu because of desire to satisfy the public demand for 
credit, has not been over- exercised on the part of the head off ice. 
However, it is the policy of branch banking t o render as much service 
as possible to the cornmunity. In many cases, however , i t may require 
more investigation than is true of unit banl:ers . Credit wzy not be 
loaned on what appears to be hazardous products or projects as often 
as the unit bank er . United bankers are all too often urged through 
organizations of a promot ional nature to become the hero of the com-
munity with their philanthropic gestures. These fante. stic drenms are 
often a f a ilure and the be.nk not only loses its money but much of its 
prestige and good will. 
We have in California a state banking system which has b een a 
success and 11 the branch banks there have led the vray in requiring 
borrowers ' statements w·hich is a lso a safeguard against loans to 
'1 
particular individuals . They have been criticised for being 'cold 
blooded ' i n their loan policy, but generally speaki ng, the result is 
' 
1 
sounder ban..1dng than the easy-going methods of many country banks. 11 
Although the manager has a restricted credit limit that he can 
loan to any person without referring to the head office~ the means of 
comnunication and the facilit i es set up by these systet1s make it 
possible for a definite answer on the part of the bank within a 
comparatively short time . This would appear to be sound banking, 
sound business; and in the long run, better satisfaction, on the part 
of both the lender and the borrower . 
1. Wernette, John Phil ip - Branch Banking in California and Bank 
Failures, p. 370, Vol . XLVI of The Quarterly Journal of 
Econonics, February, 1932. 
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(C) Disadvantages of Branch Banking . 
1. Absentee 1Ianagemen~: --
Coupled with the many advantages which t he branch banking 
~rstems seem to afford for Canada and other countries of the world 
except the United States, there are , of course, some disadvantages 
vthich should be discussed. In the first place, absentee manager;lent 
has long been a point of varied discussion. Yfi th the establish.'";lent 
of a branch the control of the bank is immediately taken from the 
board of directors a.11d placed in the head office of the ne·IN bank. 
This would seem to mean that the interest which had previously been 
shown by a board of directors in building a fine institution ·would 
be lost. We might think that pride would be diminished and all 
personal attention would go when the management of the bank leaves 
the hands of a board of directors . On the contra17, this is not the 
case lJecause the manager of the branch is just as eager to have the 
public satisfied and progressive as the board has been. 'That was 
go od for the board is good for him. As vvas stated elsewhere, 
decisions that would have been made by the cashier or executive 
officer of the bank are now made by the manager of the branch and 
that type. of business which needed the t hought and revievt of the 
board of direc-tors is nov1 handled by the head office. This has a 
tendency to bring to the co!:1J-:1 .mi ty a better type of lending 
facility in that lending ·will be carried on according to a basis of 
business ,judgment rather than by dictates of local patriotism. It 
is qu.i te generally lmovm that those bankers today who adhere to 
sound princi ples of banking r a ther than to the ambitious demands of 
chambers of corm:terce are those banks 17hich are now doing business . 
There can be little advantage in loaning money on such questionable 
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bases. 
Although this has been listed a disad-..rantage to the branch 
banking system~ it would seem that absentee nanagement has some 
good features. AJ'ter all ~ what a community wants is a banking in-
sti tution that will gi -..re to them sound banldng services at all 
times. It ·would l)e hard to estimate the number of independent 
bankinr; units which have led a checkered career because of their 
unsound loan policies . 
2. Bank Identi_~Y Lost in Cor.rrnunity: 
Another disadvantage w·hich i s pointed out by the opposition t o 
branch banking is the loss of identity of the bank in the community. 
It appears that the bank's president especially fears the loss of 
his title as president and it would be a demotion of a high degree 
to be c alled manager of a branch bank. This, of course~ vrill hinder 
his ·wife 's social aspi:cations Hhen she has to be called the v;ife of 
the manager of the banlc rather than the wife of its president. 
Should such trivial objections as this sta_'rld in the Tray of a sound 
banking syster1? 
Bankers oppose this type of system of banking because they 
1 
11 feel that the new system would interfere with bested interests." 
The bank president may have several pet interests on t h e side which 
he is nourishing along with the bank 's funds. As president he has 
the opportu.1· .i ty to earn extra money which could not come from the 
positions as manager. The manager vmuld be l ess free to loan money 
to those individuals and projects in whom and in which he has a 
personal interest~ because all such loans ".Yould have to be revievred 
by the head office and consequently such procedure vvould be of a 
1. Southworth, s. D. - Branch Banks for America, p. 522 ~ American 
Federationist ~ May ~ 1932. 
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questionable nature. 
Here agai n it is justifiable to show that the identity of the 
bmL'ks in the co1;1.munity would not be lost, because the manager 's 
interests would be the interests of the cOLliil.Unity. Undoubtedly the 
name of the bank '.'lould be lost but its traditions and physical 
features vrould be tb.e same . Should sentiment and emotionalisB 
control a matter so important? 
3. Pe~sonal Obligations Lost to Community: 
Branch manag ers have been charged with being unsympathetic to 
local needs and consequent ly do not give to the community the t ype 
of service tha t a unit bank would , whose very· existenc e is de-
pendent upon the local business . It would seem that this statement 
is made with little regard for conun.on sense . Would the head off ice 
establish branches in these small comnunitie s and then place a 
manager -there Yrho would not give service? To this might be said 
that the head office itself would not e:dst -.rery long. "The policy 
of the banks is to encourage the managers to take an i nterest in the 
1 
cow.ruuni ty ' s so cial and economic life." The manager of a branch 
certainly can.11.ot plan to stay long in any cornmuni t·y if he does not 
give satisfaction and the people are not s l ow to let the head offic e 
lmovr that the :r.u:mager is not giving service if such is the case . 
Naturally some shifting about of managers is going to exist in any 
system. Vfe find that prevalent in the large chain store group 
vrhich dominate s various fields of endeavor today. It vrould seem 
that better satisfaction might be given -!;o the cmcrnuni ty because the 
inefficient managers are moved or removed while an i nefficient 
- - -----------·------
1 . Beckhart , Benjamin H. - op . c it . - P • 467. 
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president or executive officer of an independent bank might control 
sufficient votes to hold his posi tion. 
In Canada, many communities have adviso ry committees to assist 
1 
and aiel the manager of the branch ban1c. This gives to the com-
muni ty a local representation in the ma:n.agement of the bank, es-
pec ially in the matter of making loans. If the manager of the branch 
does not sense the community spirit and needs at that par·ticular 
·time, the local conuni ttees can be of assistance. 
The personal obligation of the community may be lost in the 
sense that a local board of directors does not direct the activities 
of the fimm.cial institution but the bank does not lose its personal 
obligation. 
4 . Un-America:n: 
11 Canada .has branch banking and Canada has not had any bank 
fa ilu.:res durin.g the depression. Is this situation a matter of cause 
and effect? It is, declare the advocates of branch banking in the 
United States. It is not, the opponents retort, and besides, even 
2 
if it w·ere, branch l)ank ing is a v icious un-1\merican syst em." 
The last sentence of the quotation reveals the attitude of many 
of the bankers in this country today regarding branch banking . It 
is un-.''\.Jnerican. What every country needs and wants is a banking 
system that will stand the test of time; the least number of failures 
-that occu1·, the better the system. If vv-e were to reviev-r the banking 
S'Jstems of the vvorld and the f a ilu:ces that have occurred during the 
1. Beck..hart, Benjrunin H. - op . cit. - p. 471. 
2. Greer, Guy - Why the Canadian Banks Don't Fail, p . 722, Harper's 
Magazine, ITo. 966, ~Jay, 1933. 
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past fifteen years in each country, we would be safe in saying that 
the number of bank fa:ilures in the United States Yrould far exceed 
those of most other countries. Most countries of the world have 
some sort of branch banking system which aff ords them the many ad-
vantages of transfers of funds from connnuni ty to community in time 
of need~ and also the many other advantages mentioned elsewhere. 
The United States had branch bm1king under the first tvro banking 
system char-ters by Congress, 1791 and 1816. Yfi th the r evocation of 
these charters, branch bonking as a central financial organization 
in the United States crone to an end. Even in those earlier days the 
opponents of the act which created them did not object to them on 
1 
the cl a i m that they were un-American. 
Branch banking is un-American because it t akes away that in-
dividuality which has alvrays been called the mighty right of the 
American people. And to take from every hamlet, whether or not it 
can aff ord a bank, the right to govern the banking procedures of 
the community, would be taking from it the sacred right granted to 
it in the Constitution of the United States. 
After passing through this great crisis in v,rhich billions of 
dollars have been taken from circulation on account of thousands of 
bank failures, it vrould seem that this un- Juneric:::m argument would 
carry little we i ght and especially with thofie who h e.ve lost all their 
earnings. It would seem that the critics Yrould be willing nmv to see 
how the picture looks in other parts of the v.rorld ·where branch 
banking is a success, especially north of us in Canada. 
1. Beckh.art, Benjamin H. - op. cit . - P• 358. 
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Again we cannot help but turn to the ever recurring question: 
Is a sound banking system what ·we want or rather, do vre vrant inde-
pendence to rule our bank s? If' branch banking is un-Anerican, then 
it mus t be that sound banking i s un-American. 
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(D) Branch Banking in Canada 
J:.:ain Typ e of Banking : 
To dTrell long on the branch banking systern. in Canada Tiould be 
to repeat what has already been sa id about the bax~.king i nst itutions 
i n that country f or Canada has had the branch banldne; typ e of 
financial insti tutior. ever sin ce statutory au-t.hori ·by has been 
1 
grru1.ted i n what is non Canada . I n 1882, patterning a bank from the 
First Bank of the United States, the legislature p;r anted a charter 
to the Bank of :•:ontrea l and provided for the establishment of 
branches . From that tiri1e until the pres ent , one of the distinctive 
features of the Canadian banki ng syste!!l has been the success with 
which it has operated its banking systen with branches. 
This type of system has been an extremel y i mportant factor in 
the development of the frontier of this wide and expv.nsive prairie 
country. When a small hamlet had become important enough to need 
banking facil ities , some one of the banks with offices in the htrge 
i ndustrial centers would estab l i sh a sr!lal l b ank for the cor.IHUnity 
It was all too often that this bank vrould not be e. paying proposi-
tion for tv;o or three y ears but the bank offic ials had foresi ght in 
believi ng tha-'c it ·would be eventually . In the Uni-ted States , a l -
though banks could be organized for as little as ~$ 25 , 000 capita l 
stock, srnall comr:mni ties often did not have the capi ts_l to invest 
i n this ms.nner . As an il:dependent unit bank, i t Tvas nec e ssary for 
this u nit to become self-supporting from the very f irst ; should any 
financial or economic reverses take plac e in the meantir.1e it spelled 
dOOl!l for this nev'f unit ·bank and undoubtedly for rn.any of the in-
dustries that it had helped to develop in the community . On the 
---------------
1. HcLeod , J . A. - op . cit. - p. 31, (Historical Outline) . 
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P. 
JJU].iBEH. OF B:RA.lJCHE S OF D.JDIVIDUAL CAlJAD JJUJ CH.ii.HTEHED BA?JKS HJ EACH 
PROVIUCE Alm I lJ OTHEH COUiiTRIES AS AT D~~CE1 iBER 3_l., 1932 . 1 
New Br i·tish 
E. Nova. Bruns- On- 1\la.ni- Sa. skat- Al - Colum-
Other 
Count-
Barile I sland Scotia wick Quebec tario toba chewan bert a bia . Yukon ries 
. -
--
- . 
Baruc of 
Eontreal 1 14 13 120 216 36 51 55 52 2 13 
Bank of 
Hova Scotia 9 36 37 23 134 7 22 9 
-
6 
- - .. -!-- 39 
Bank of I I I Toronto 
- - -
15 104 12 27 13 9 
- -I Provi ncial e I 1 Banque I 
I du Canada 4 
-
13 107 14 
- - - - - -
Canadian Bank I of Commerce 7 19 6 67 300 43 9_1 67 65 2 15 
Royal Bank I 
of Canada 6 62 22 82 253 72 118 68 55 
-
91 
Domi nion 
I Baru.c 
- -
1 8 99 12 4 5 4 
-
2 
Ban que Cana.diennE 
Hationale 
- - -
213 15 8 7 6 
I ~: - ' 1 ---·· - ·- ------ --- -Imp erial Bank of Canada 
- - -
4 122 8 39 23 
- -
- ! Bare l ays Bank 
(Canada) 
- -
-
1 1 
- -
- - - -
-··-
TOTALS 27 1:31 92 640 1~258 198 359 246 20 3 4 161 
- .... 
--- --
.... 
I 
Total 
I 
573 I 
I 
322 I 
I 180 I 
I 138 I 
682 j 
I 
' 829 ' i 
I i 
135 I 
I 
' 
.... 
250_- l 
208 
2 
3 ~ ~].~ 
1. Currency and Banking in Canada, p . 29, Canada Year Book, General Statisti cs Branch, Ott~ma , 1933 . 
(Chart No. 2) 
(X) 
c.o 
• 
other hand, in the case of the branch ·which Canada had , funds could 
be drawn from other parts of' the count ry end the prof'i t which was 
made elsewhere would help to offset this nev; industrial comrnuni t y' s 
losses. 
Industrial development and banking progress in Canada have 
gone hand in hand ever sin c e the · establisP~ent of' the Bank of 
Eiontreal in 1822. Especially has the branch ba.n.k been a prime 
factor in developing western frontier tovms. 
Embodied in the Canadian banking system have been those qualities 
v'rhich go to make up a go od financial system: - reasonable charges, 
availability of credit, and control of credit and safety. Interest 
rates seem to be characteristically high in al l newly developed 
sec-tions of a country and this is particularly true in the sections 
which have independent unit b anks being develop ed at the same time. 
Canada , through her branch banks, could off er rates of from 7 % to 
1 
101~ 1-vith 8fo as the av erage . Ho·wever, "farmers in the Dakotas , 
directly across the Canadian border, ·would be gla d to obtain loans 
2 
at 12~~." Thus Canada has been able , in some sections at least, to 
be of greater service to her strugglint; areas than has the Uni t ed 
States ·where the unit banlt;: prevails. 
1. Beckhart , Benjamin, H. - op. cit. - p . 451 . 
2 . Ibid - P • 453. 
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PART D!. 
BAliK FAILURES. 
(A) United States 
Major Causes: 
The thousands of bank failures in the United States since 1920 
certainly needs explanation. Starting in 1920 and continuing through 
to the bank holiday in March, 1933, the United States experienced 
one of the worst , if not the worst, banking failure periods in its 
history. Causes for this period of bank failures are many and 
varied.; hov1ever , the major causes as analyzed by economists and 
bankers will follow. 
One of the major reasons for our financial debacle has been 
caused by the forty-nine jurisdictions which legislate for the banks 
of the country. Every state has the right to have organized bank s 
vlithin i ts borders as well as the Fede ral government; thus, we have 
bnnks which ar e chartered by the several states as well a s the 
national government . This means that we have state s 1Yhose bank laws 
are strict, and in many cases as strict as the Federal government lavrs 
and we ha-ve sta.tes where we can organize a be.nk vrith little or no 
supervision. Uew Jersey has been notorious as a State , having lenient 
laws for corporation seeking charters, and we find states today whi ch 
have similarly lruc laws to stimulate such practices vrhich go t o harm 
and degrade the system as a whole. Tvto states side by side may have 
such diverging sets of laws that a hardship is placed upon the state 
with strict lm-rs . The mortality has be en much greater in state 
1 
banks. Consequent l y , a more notable wealmess must exist in the 
1. Spahr , Walter E. - Bank Failures in the United States, PP• 215-
223, Amer ican Economic Review, Vol . 22, 1932. 
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states' system than in the federal. However, this fact does not in 
any sense imply that the federal bank s are above reproach. 
It is equally true of state as well as of federal ban1:s that 
1 
the supervi sian is inadequate. In most of the states there are too 
fev1 examiners to make a thorough examination often enough. This is 
also true of the national banks. Even 17hen they have taken an audit, 
i t is often inadequate beco.use of lack of time or facilities. A 
maj or step in the right direction could be made by requiring more of 
these examinations. 
To go i nto .the many handicap s of the bank examiner ·would be use-
less in this inste.nce but suff ice it to say that the Com..rn.i ssioner of 
Ba~~ing in the several states sometimes cannot refuse the granting 
2 
of a charter for a new bank. When such a situation as this prevails, 
i -!; is no Tronder that we have so many bank failures. If any banki ng 
revision is needed, it certainly should be in the matter of granting 
charters. 
In many sections of the country we find an over-supply of bank s. 
There are many bs.nks in the a gricultural sections of the country where 
the population is scarce and thus they can_llot support them even in 
the more prosperous times. Evidence of t his is shovm when v1e f ind in 
North Dakota one bank to every seven hundred and fifty people, and in 
3 
Im'ra one bank to every fourteen hundred people. As we lo ok to 
Cane.da we find that it has a traditional apprenticeship or profession-
al code to "i'Thich i t adheres rather rigidly in making promoti ons for 
such a high off ice as a president of a bank or even one of its more 
1. Spahr , 'iial ter E. - op. cit . - pp. 215-22 3. 
2. Poles, John - op. cit. ~ p. 412. 
3. Vol . I I of Recent Economic Changes in the United States ~ PP• 
694-695 , Repor-t of the Committee on Recent Economic ChanE;es of 
the President ' s Conference on Unemployment, McGraw Hill Company, 
New York, 1929 . 
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responsible officers . In ·the United States if a man is a success in 
the business vrorld , it is a pre-requi site for his becomi ng a banker . 
}.:luch progress could be made in the rai sing of the profes sional 
standard s of the barJdng profession in the United States. 
To substantiate the statement that tlie agricul tur ~-1 sections 
of the country are those in which more bank failures have t aken 
place t han elsewhere, the Federal Reserve reports tha:t; 11 In the 
districts of Bos ton, lJew York and Philadelphia there we r e only f orty-
three failures during 1921 to 1928. These districts have an area of 
1 50 ,000 square miles and with a population of 33,000,000 and vrere 
served in 1927 by 3, 287 barucs . The Chicago district has 190, 000 
squnre miles with a population of 17,000,000 people and 5,17 5 barucs 
and a record of 550 b~.nk failures in the same period. Again i n 
lfinneapolis district it is true with a much great er area, 414 ,000 
square miles ., a population of 3 , 500_,000 and 2 ,633 banks in operation 
1 -
after 1_,087 bank failures in the same period . 11 The agriculturnl 
plight has been a varied one since the World War~ and despite the 
many pieces of legislation passed by the Congress to alleviat e the 
i'a rm situation, the results have been negative . The farmer 1-rould 
be much better off' if the politician who lmm<r.s nothing o:r f a r mi ng 
would let him TfOrk ov:t his oTm proble1-:1s in a more sound and 
logice.l manner . V!hen the farmer needs help , let him seek it rather 
than allow the politician to thrust it upon him. Therefore, bank 
failures have been more numerous in the agri cul tural s ections than 
in the industri al sections of the country. A maj or cau se has been 
pointed out as being the over-supply of banks and the inability of 
the farmer to market his goods for a reasonable price. 
1. Vol. I I of Recent Economi c Che..nges in the UniJced States - op. 
cit ~ PP• 694- 695 . 
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A..nalagous with the changes t hat have taken place in the agr i -
cultural structure since the 'lio rld Viar have also been chang es in 
the structure and f i nancial pro.ctices of industry and trade. 
During the World \tar a superstructure v.ras set up to cope Yri th the 
ever-increasing demands u pon the Juner ican industries to ma.nufact· .re 
for the world her supply of goods to wage the war . Although ::>ome 
recessions toolc place between the Worl d War snd the depression of 
1929, the business structure became very top heavy with consoli-
dation::> , rrBrgers and the creation of git:mt corporations which , in 
some cases _, were near monopolies , in many industries . Tfith this 
chan.ge carne the demand for financing these superstructures , c.nd 
rather than secure the mon ey necessary in the usual way of di r ect 
Joans from banks, t"~e money was obtained by the flo ating of security 
issues on the ;rarious stbck exchanges . With this came the craze for 
eve:r";j.rone t o p lay the stock mar1:et; so hand in hand v;e created a 
superstructure for industrial c oncern s und created a bull market 
for securities on the stock exchange . This meant that industrial 
concerns secured their financing indirectly and without any direct 
l 
re sponsibility to the banks. Thu s the control of a large amount of 
the financing voided itself of the banks and loans made by the ba.-,lks 
were for loans to smal ler borrower s and for the purchasers of sto c k 
on the e:~cha:nge. The wi ld bul l market break i:r:. 1929 put t o a stop 
the tovrering structure whicl1 had been creating nevv stock companies 
to increase the coffers of its stockholders and directors . IJext to 
m.ism.anag;ement, Edward k1gly says nHothing has caused as many cracl<:s 
in the 1\meric!:<.n ba.'Ylking structure as the h5_r;h pressure expansion of 
1. The Ba:nJ:ing Si-l~uution in the United States , P • 100, lJational 
Industrial Conferenc e Board , 1932 . 
9· 
the promoter spirit . Its strerun has been gonere.ted from greed and 
1 
ambition. 11 
Some of the major weal:ncsses ho:ve been discussed, c.nd the a ctual 
statistical story of what has happened i n the pRst fifte en yee.rs uil l 
be foux1d below. 
1'. Jl..ngl;r , Echrard - Our City Banks , pp . 33- 36 , i·Te-rr Outlook, Uarch, 
1933. 
95. 
KI £ID_S __ .i\l'TD 1JQ1,1BEH _Q.f BAllES IlJ UHITE'D S'l'JI.'i'ES l92Q - 1_.:~- · 
AllD TJJEI R AfFI LIAT_IOlJ ' .. i_ITH F:S'DER.I:}L RESERVE SYS_TEI.I. 
-
I>.:cmbcr Barllcs lJon- Hember ::3an1:S: 
All 
---,~----- ---
1 11utual Other non-
=---=-~~te ____ -7i-_B_a_Tl_J_cs -~_'Eo_~a~- IJa_-{~~?::~a~l_' ~S_tate Sa-ving~_s ~·.I_ember 
1 920 June 30 
192 1 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
19292 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1-Jov. 1 5 
Dec. 29 
- June 30 
Dec. 31 
- June 30 
- De c. 31 
II II 
II II 
II !I 
II II 
II II 
- Har. 27 
June 29 
Oct. 4 
Dec. 31 
II II 
II 
It 
11 
11 
1933 - June 30 
!I 11 
1934 - Mar. 5 
29 , 829 9 , 398 I 
9 , 567 
9 , 606 
30 , 560 9-' 7 4 5 
9 , 779 I 
20 ,158 9,892 ' 
29,505 9,774 
28,806 9;587 
28,257 9, 489 
27, 367 9 ;260 
26,416 9,034 
25, 576 8,837 
25,341 8,755 
25,110 8,707 
24,951 8,616 
24-' 6 30 8' 52 2 1 
22,769 8,052 
19,966 : 7,246 
18;390 I 6;816 
14;530~jj;6o6 jl 1 5 ,060 6,0ll 11 
- 6,206 II 
8 _, 024 1 , 374 
8 , 118 1 , 449 
8 , 125 1 , 481 
8 , 150 1, 595 
8 , 165 1,614 
8,244 1, 648 
8,179 1,595 
8,043 1, 544 
8,048 1,441 
7,906 1,354 
7,759 1,275 
7,629 1,208 
7,569 1,186 
7, 530 1,177 
7,468 1,148 
7,403 1,119 
7,033 1,019 
6,368 878 
6 ,on 805 
4;897 709 
5;1 54 857 
5,288 918 
--'--- ---- --
631 
634 
630 
6 30 
62 3 
621 
618 
618 
613 
612 
611 
611 
609 
603 
597 
594 
576 
581 
19 , 800 
20 , 181 
19,6 36 
19,101 
18,596 
18 ,147 
17,489 
16,7 64 
16,126 
1 5,974 
1 5,792 
1 5 ,724 
15,499 
14 ,114 
12,12 3 
10,980 
8,348 
8 ,468 
1. 1920 - 1928, Annual Report of' Federal Reserve Board, P • 159, 
Decemb er 31, 193 3. 
2 . 1929 - 1934, Federal Reserve BulJ.etin, P• 587, September, 1934. 
( Chart No. 3) 
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lllJ1:iBER ATID DEPOSITS OF MEMBE_R_A.IID_l~lE1ll3_ER BAHKS. 
OF THE FEDERAL RE SEffVE SYSTEM 
SUSPEJIDIID 19211 .. 19332 
~~--- --------,-- _--_ -~-,--_r_·Jm_--~dB=E_R_· _ _ ----r--- _- __ -----~-----.----- __ - ~ EPO_SI1' ~ -S ~00 - ir~i tt~1d) ·-----r I I Iifiembers Members 1 ---::- --1 
All f----------i! _ Non- All . _ _ __ _ __ !Jon-
Year i Banks l'Jat'1 State ! Members _ Bank~ Hat 1 1 State I 1fembers 
1921 I 501 
1922 354 
s1 19 1 431 196,460 21~285 21;218 153,957 1 
45 12 I 297 110,721 19,092 5,151 86,478 I 
648 90 34 524 188,701 32;904 18,324 137,473 1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
776 122 37 617 21 3;338 
1 
60,889 13,58o 138,869 I 
612 118 28 466 172,900 58;537 8;727 105,~36 
956 125 35 796 27 2 ,488 47,866 20,946 20 3,676 ' 
662 91 33 538 193,891 46,581 19;755 127,555 
491 57 16 418 138;642 I 31,619 10,621 96,402 
642 64 17 561 234;532 I 37 ;o07 20,128 , 177,397 
1 
1345 161 26 1158 864,715 i 173,290 207 ,15w 484,275 
1931 2298 409 108 1781 1,691;510 439,171 294,357 9 57,982 
I 
1 1932 1456 276 55 1125 715,626 214,150 55,153 446,323 1 
1933 389 64 22 303 207,890 71,819 22,182 11 3 ,889 
--- --'---- ---------'-- -~--- -'-------~-
1. Federal Reserve Bulletin, P• 144, Earch, 1933. 
2. JanuaMJ and February, 1933-, Federa l He s erve Bulletin. 
(Chart No. 4) 
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;DEPO SITS OF IoiEJ;EJ3ER AriD N'OlJ- MEMBER BAlTICS OF 
THE FEDERAL RE SERVE SYSTEl~ REOPEITED AFTER SUSPE:HSIOH 
Number 
All ~·.lem­
Year Banks ~ers 
1921 
1922 I 
1923 
1924 
1925 I 
1926 I 
1927 ! 
1928 I 
m~ 
1
1 
1932 
1933 
60 
65 
37 
94 
62 
149 
95 
39 
58 
147 1 
276 
290 
41 
10 
24 
14 I 
20 
14 1 
14 I 
11 1 
5 
5 
7 
31 
52 
1 
Hon-
Mem.:. 
bers 
20 
41 
23 
74 
48 
135 
84 
34 
53 
140 
245 
238 
40 
19211 - 19332 
All Bank s 
17~ 493~000 
35;565,000 
n;674;ooo 
22,462;ooo 
1s;61a;ooo 
60,610,000 
35,729 ;ooo 
15,727,000 
25,829;ooo 
s1,599;ooo 
158' 187 ,ooo 
276,194,000 
29,431,000 
Deposits 
Members 
3,132,000 
11;618,000 
s;o68;ooo 
7,19o;ooo 
s;779;ooo 
8;179;ooo 
8, 311;ooo 
6,510,000 
2;273,000 
3,538,000 
53;944,000 
71;666,000 
3,6 27,000 
1. Federal Reserve Bulletin, P• 144, J.Iarch., 1933. 
Hon-Hember s 
14 , 361,000 
2-3,947 ;ooo 
6,606,000 
15,272;ooo 
9,839,000 
52,431,000 
27,418,000 
9,117 ,ooo 
23,556,000 
58,061,000 
104 , 243,000 
204;528,000 
25,804,000 
2. All banks wer e clo sed by Presidenti a l Proc1 runation March 6, 1933. 
The figure represents the amount f or January and Feb1~ary, 19 33. 
(Chart No. 5) 
98 . 
BANK S"lJSPEliiSIOrJS 1921 - 1931 
CLASSI:?IED ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF CITIES AND TO'ms.1 
·-·- -· - -
Cities or Tmms With Humber of 
Populat ion of Suspensions 
Less than 500 3,386 
500 to 1,000 1, 813 
l,OOb to 1,500 897 
1,500 to 2; 500 
' 
897 
2,500 to 5,000 746 
5,000 to 10,000 439 
10,000 t o 25,000 371 
25,000 and over 734 
Total - 9,285 
1. Anderson, Thoma s Joel, Jr., - Feder al and State Control of 
Danking , P• 310, The Bankers Publishing Company, 1934. 
(Chart No . 6) 
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DEPOSITS OF lJJEliBER AliD } TOH- MEMlillRJ3A:tJKS 
OF THE FEDERAL HESEE.VE SYSTEM REOPEl>iJ:,"'D AF'rER @SPENSIOH 
19211 - 19332 
-
-- --~ llUJ,ffiER -- I DEPOSITS - ~ - All I Hem.- -I ---- ~---Non- Hon-
· Year j Ba.n...l<:s ' ber s Members I All Banks Members Members 
I - ·---- --- ·- - -
I 17;493,000 1921 60 10 20 I 3,1 32,000 14,361,000 i 1922 65 24 41 35 ~565;ooo 11,618,000 23;947,000 
1923 I 37 14 23 n;674;ooo s;o68,ooo 6,606,000 
1924 94 20 74 22;462;ooo 7,190,000 15,272 ,ooo 
1925 62 14 48 16,618;ooo 6, 779;ooo 9,839:,000 
1926 149 14 135 60;61o,ooo 8,179,000 52,431,000 
1927 95 11 84 35,729,000 s;3n,ooo 27;418,000 
1928 39 5 34 15,727 ,ooo 6,610,000 9, 117,000 
1929 58 5 53 25,829;ooo 2,273,000 23 , 556,000 
1930 147 7 140 61,599,000 3,538;ooo 58 , 061,000 
1931 276 31 245 I 158; 187 ; 000 53,944;ooo 104,243,000 
1932 290 52 238 '276 ;194,000 71;666;ooo , 204,528 ;ooo 
1933 ' 41 1 40 29 ,431 ,000 3,627,000 I 25, 804,000 I 
j _ 
1. Federal Reserve Bulletin, p . 144, March 1933. 
2 . All bs..r>J;:s were closed by Presidential Proclamation l•iarch 6 , 1933. 
The figure given represents the amount fbr the months oi' January 
and Februa~J, 1933. 
(Chart No. 7) 
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100. 
1_92_~---:~-~2-__ - :_: _23 -~-9-24- 1925_ : 192~_2;27 192_8~ 1929- 1 1930 ~--'----"19--3-'--"1-_1 1932 t 1;33' Total 
505 367 646 775 618 ! 976 669 479 1 659 1352 2294 14_?6 _ 462 11~278 
1= = ======-·-:c--- --
All Banks 
146 _ 1~~ _ 122 73 __ ~1 _\ -~88 1 
I 
5lll_ 331 89 2 119 I i r--:1c:_·Ie"-m_c_b_e-=r----'B-'-a_n_k-=.s ________ , _ 7].. _ 62 122 160 
- f---'- · 
52 49 90 122 118 I 123 91 ____ f[!__ ~1= I_ 1_6~ I 66 1~.678 I Na-tional Banks ----~----1-------~ 40E276 
I 
I 
31 16 17 
-:---
27 107 55 23 441 
--!------tl-------1 
Member State Banks 19 13 32 38 38 35 t-------------------- -1--- ---------- -- - ,-----!------+---~+ 
- 17~8 _1125 _ __ 3_7 _3 _ !~159 615 472 818 547 '----------------------'------'---~---L-----'------'-----'-- -- ---non-Member II 
II 434 305 524 426 1164 578 
1. 1921- 1932, Annual Report .of the Federal Reserve Board , p . 206, December 31 1 ·1933. 
2. January 1, 1933 to J>.,rarch 3, 1933~ Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. 251 , April , 1934. 
3. All banks were clo sed by Pres idential Proclrunation on Harch 6_, 1933. Licensed banks suspended March 16, 
1933 to DeceBber 31, 1933 were: - National Banks 29, Member state Banks 6, and Non- Member Banks 206 . 
During the same peri od non-licensed banks placed in liquidation or receivership from 1\Iarch 16, 1933 to 
December 31, 1933 were : - :National Banks 464 , t.Iember State Banks 45, and 1\on-Member Banks 591. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bul l etin, p . 251, April , 1934. 
(Chart No. 8) 
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( B) Cano.da. 
Failures since 1920; and Consolidations since 1867: 
The story of bank failures i n Canada is a short one, f or O!lly one 
bank has failed since 1920 . This v;as the Home Bank of Canada, organized 
in 1916 which failed in August , 192 3 . The s.rnount of' deposits involved 
i n this failure was fifteen million dollars ( ~15,000, 000) as compared 
to four billion dollars ( (;4,000,000,000) involved in the failures of 
the banl~ of the United States during 1920 to 1932. 
The failure of the Home BanJ.:: of Canada was attributed to ni s-
ma..."YJ.agement and dishonesty at the head office. Opp onents of the branch 
banking system vrill charge this was a failure of this type o f lJank but 
investigations revealed that the branches were not invo l ved . The head 
1 
office policy of the bank was weak and had been for a long period. 
Prior to the failure of the Home Bank of Canada the chartered bank s 
had unusual freedom i n the supervisio!l of their activities . I n the 
banking l a·w revision which followed the failure of -this bank~ an 
I nspector General of Ba.."YJ.ks lilas appointed to supervise certa i n phases 
of b~:mking procedure . ( See Revisions of Bank Act, 1923). 
The closing of b ranches by the chartered banks n ay be terDed in 
one sen se as a. fai lure but such acts have not been particularly 
prevalent during the depre ssion period. The clo sing of the branche s 
d id not seriously aff ect the financial stability of the chartered 
banks and the major reas o11 for their suspension of business was t he 
decline of d epo sits prevalent throughout the country. 
In order to avert some be.PJc fai lures which might have been 
disastrous to the many depositors_, :nUlrierous consolidations or amal-
gamations b.ave tal::en place H.rr.ong the char·tered banks. I f a col.!lparison 
1. Beckhart_, Benj amin H. - op. cit. - pp . 479- 482. 
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mTiiiBER OF BRANCHES OF CHARTERED BAHKS J]T CANADA., 
-- . BY PROVII1CEs- I . 
192~19_3_3_3. 
Provi nce 1920 1926 1929 1930 1931 1932 
P. E. Isl~nd 41 28 28 28 28 28 
lJova Scotia 169 134 138 138 138 138 
Nev-r Brunswick 121 101 102 102 101 100 
Quebec 1;150 1~072 1,169 1;183 1,176 1,131 
Ontario 1,586 1,326 1,396 1,409 1,400 1,351 
Manitoba 349 224 239 239 222 202 
Sa skat chewru1 591 427 462 447 394 361 
Alberta 424 269 308 304 278 251 
Br i tish Columbia 242 186 223 229 229 206 
Yukon 3 3 4 4 4 4 
TOTALS 4,676 3,770 4,069 4,083 3,970 3,772 
1. Currency and Banking in Canada, P• 29, Canada Year Book, General 
Statistics Brru1ch , 1933. 
2 . Includes sub- agencies for r ec eiving depo sit s f or t he bank s empl oying 
them for all years. 
3. · Total - 3,198. Detailed fi gures were not available on the various 
Provinces. Source: The 1935 Ca.t~ada Official Handbook of Present 
Conditions and Recent Progress, Dominion Bureau of Statistic s, 
Ottawa. 
( Chart No . 10) 
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Island 0 
' I 
r'4 I Scotia 169 I -35 0 0 0 
I 
I 
i 
' 
I ]Jev":r Br ummick 121 I - 20 11 G -1 ~ , · I -..... 
' 
I 
Quebec 1 .~1 50 - 78 ' f97 ! ,.:'14 - 7 - 4 5 : 
! 
' 
O:!ltario 1,586 ' - 260 /.70 tl3 /9 -4-9 
I 
' 
,!}5 M::t::J.itobe. 349 . ... 12 5 ' 
- 17 -20 I ,., 
: I 
I 
Sa ske.t chew~m 591 ·: ... }64 35 -15 
- 54 --33 
' I 139 Al bert a 424 I -155 
-4 -26 - 27 
Br i ti sh Columbi a 242 - 56 I -23 
I 
_J_ Yukon 3 ,L I 0 0 
--- · ---- -·-- -- ·-·-- ---
___ !__j_ 
1. Adapted from Chart #17, Curr ency and Banki ng i n Canada ~ P• 2 9 ~ 
Canada Year Book, Genera l Stati stics Branch , 1933 . 
2. Includes sub- agencies for receiving deposits for the banks em-
ploying them. 
(Chart No. 11) 
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DEPOSITS OF OPERC\.TING Aim SUSPI~llDED RAJJT~~ TIJ 
THE IDJITED STATES AND CAli..t\.DA, 1920 - 1932. 
-- --~-------------~-- - I 
f---- --- -- --O_p_e_r_a_t,-i_n_g_ B_a_nl __ c_s ___ _ _ ____ Su_ spend~~B-~!l~s _ 
Canada3 I United Stntesl Year· 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
2~438,079,792 
2, 264; 586 ;7 36 
2,120, 997 ;oso 
2;1o7;6o6,111 
2,130,621,760 
2,2 21,160,611 
2,277;192,043 
2,415;132;260 
2,610,594,865 
2,696,747;857 
2' 516' 611,587 
2,422,834,828 
2,256,639,530 
United . States2 
21,136,ooo;ooo , 
20; 387 ,ooo ;ooo 
23,796 ,ooo ;ooo 
24,996;ooo,ooo , 
27 ,836;ooo,ooo 
20 ;o29 ;ooo ;ooo I 
30,474;ooo,ooo ! 
32 ;o63,ooo;ooo 
34 ,826;ooo,ooo 
33;865;ooo ;ooo ' 
32; 560 ,ooo,ooo 
27 ,432 ;ooo ,ooo 
24,803,000 ,ooo ' 
_4 I 
,· ) 
172 ,1so ,ooo5 I 
93,043,000 
149,601,000 
210,151,000 
167,555,000 
260 ' 378 ,ooo 
199' 329 ,ooo 
142 ,580,000 
2 30; 643 ,ooo 
853,363,000 II 
1,690,669,000 
715,626,000 I 
'--- ---- --- - --- ----··-. --- - -
1. Currency and Banking in. Canada - P• 20, Canada Year Bo ok, General 
Statistics Branch, 1933. 
2. Annual Report of Federal Reserve Board , p. 163, 1933. 
3. BecJ.chart, Benjamin H. - The Banking System of Canada, P • 481 , 
Henry Holt lc Co., Hev7 York, 1929. 
4. Figures not available for 1920. 
5. Annual Report of Federal Reserve Board, p. 206, 1933. 
(Chart No. 12) 
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were 1. acle of the number of consolidations and absorptions i n the 
United States and Cuno.da since the Civil War :~ there ;-rou1d still be 
that striking difference i n the percentage of banks eliminatea by 
this procedure in the United States as compared Ytit il Crcl"'J?.da.. A 
chart of the consolidations since 1867 i:..1. c~.nada foll ov:s : 
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AHALGJlJviA.TIOHS SINCE 18671• 
Purchasing Bank4 
Bank of Montreal 
Canadian Be.nk of Commerce 
Ea:nk of IJov a Scotia 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Imperi al Bank of Canada 
Banque d'Hochelaga3 
Bank of J'Jew Brunsrfick 
l:J:erchan t s ' Bank oi' Canada 
Union Bank of Halifax 
Northern Cr ovn:1 Bank 
Union Bank of Canada 
Home Bank of Canada 
Standard Bank of Cam•.da 
Bank Absorbed 
Exchange Bank of Yarmouth, H. S. 
People f s Bank of Halifl".x , IJ.S. 
Ontario Banlc 
People ' s Bank of Uew Brunswick 
Bank of Briti sh North America 
Merchant s ' Bank of Canada 
Bolson ' s Bank 
Gore Bank 
Balik of British Columbi a 
Eo..lifax Ba1iking Company 
Merchants' Bank of P. E. I. 
Eastern Tow!lships :Bs.nk 
Benik of Hrunil ton 
Standard Bank of Canada 
Union Banl:: of P. E. I . 
Bank of Hew Brunsvrick 
The Metropolitan Be..nk 
The Bank of Ottawa 
Union Bank of Halif~~ 
Trader s ' Bank of Canada 
Quebec Bank 
Northern Crmm Bank 
Union Bank of Canada 
Ni agara Di s·trict Bank 
The \ileyburn Security Bank 
Banque r!ations.le 
Summerside Balik 
lierchA.n·t s r Banlc 
Commercial Bank of Co.nada 
Commercial Ban.'k of Vfind sor 
The Horthern Bank 
Crmm Bank of Canada 
United ~npire Bank 
La Be.nque Internationa.le d tt 
Canada 
·western Bank of Ct".nada 
Sterling Bruik of Canada 
Date2 
Aug., 190 3 
Ju:'le ., 1905 
Oct .. , 1906 
Apr ., 1907 
Oe;t., 1918 
Mo.r. , 192 2 
J~.n ., 1925 
May , 1870 
Dec. , 1900 
Ida.y, 1903 
IJay, 1906 
Feb ., 1912 
Dec., 1923 
lTov. , 1928 
Oct. , 1883 
Feb. , 19J.~) 
Hov. , 1914 
Apr ., 1919 
nov .. , 1910 
Sept., 1912 
J an., 1917 
July, 1918 
Aug., 1925 
June , 1875 
l\Iay , 1931 
Ap1·il, 1924 
Sept., 1901 
Feb. , 1868 
June, 1868 
Oct ., 1902 
July, 1908 
July, 1908 
l1ar., 1911 
Apr . , 191 3 
Feb. , 1909 
Dec . , 1924 
1. The purchasing baliks na.rned in the latter part of t he table are no 
l onger in busi ness. 
2 . 
4. 
Dates given since 1900 are those of the Orders i n Council authorizi ng 
the absorptions . 
The Banque d ' hoche1a.ga after absorbing the Eanque lJations.le adopted 
t he name Banque Ca.nadienne Uationale . 
Banking and Currency in Canada, P• 19 Report of the Ro'.'fal Co?-
mission, Ottawa , 1933 . ' ""' 
(Char t No • 13) 
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.J.• ·' ... .. -"' . 
Pe.id ·bo-
Year Fet e- Depos-
Sus- Paid up Reserve Liabili- Holders ito1· s. 
Hrune. pended. Capital . Fund. ties. Assets. c/.. ,o % 
Co11unercial Bank of N. B. 1868 /''600.,000 
-
0671,420 ~;1,222,454 100 100 
Bank of Acadia2 1873 100,000 
-
106,914 312 ,346 
-
... 
Metropoli t rm :aank 1876 800.,170 
-
293 ,379 77 9 ' 225 ·100 100 
1Jiechanic s t Bank 1879 194 ,794 
-
547,2 38 721,1 55 57! 57.1. 2 
Bank of Liverpool 1879 370,548 
-
136,480 207,877 100 96 6/17 
Consolidated Bank of Canada 1879 2,080,920 
-
1,794,249 3,077 , 202 100 100 
Stadacona Bank I 1879 991;890 
-
341;500 1,355;675 100 100 
Bank of Prince Ed . Island I 1881 120,000 45; ooo 1;1o8;ooo 953 , 244 591I 591=-
Exchange Bank of Canada 1883 500,000 300,000 2 ,868,884 3, 779,493 100 66
2
3/8 
Maritime Banlc of Do.n. of 
Canada 1887 321,900 60~000 1,409 , 482 1,825,993 100 10 2/3 
Pictou Ban ... lc I 1887 2oo;ooo - 74;364 "277;017 100 100 Bank of London in Canada 1887 241,101 so;ooo 1;031 ;280 1 , 310,675 100 100 
Centra l Bank of Canada 1887 500,000 4s;ooo 2 , 631; 378 3 , 231,518 100 99 2/3 
Federal Bank 1888 1,250;ooo 150 ;ooo 3 , 449;499 4,869;ll3 100 100 
Commercial Bank of l!Iani toba 1893 . 552;650 so;ooo 1 , 341 , 251 1,951~151 100 100 
Banque du Peuple 1895 1 , 2oo;ooo 6oo;ooo 7;761,209 9' 533; 537 100 7~ 
Banque Ville- Marie 1899 479 , 620 w;ooo 1,766,841 2,267 , 516 100 17; 
Banlc of Yarmouth 1905 · 3oo;ooo 35;ooo 388,660 723~660 100 100 
Ontario Banl~ 1906 1 , 500 ~000 700,000 15,272,271 15,920 ' 307 100 100 
Sovereign BalLlc of Canada4 1908 . 3 , 000,000 - 16,174 , 408 19 , 218,746 100 100 
Banque de st. Jean 1908 316 ; 386 w;ooo 560, 781 326 , 118 100 30 1/5 
Banque de St. Hyacinthe 1908 331;2 35 1s;ooo 1 ,172 ,6 30 1,576,443 100 100 
st . Stephen ' s Ba11Jc 1910 2oo;ooo 55~000 549,830 818,2'71 100 100 
.. 
Farmers ' Bmuc 1910 567; 579 - 1,997 , 041 2 , 616 ;s8·3 100 l'Jil 
Bank of Vancouver 1914 445;188 - . 912 ;137 1,5321786 100 o3 
Home Bank of Canada 1923 11960,591 550_,000 19 678 ,747 27 . 434 ,~709 100 03 
-----
1. Currency and Banking in Canada, Canada Year Book , pp. 32- 33 , Ottawa 1 1933. 
2. This bank was only i n existence for three months and twenty-six days. Some of its no·bes were redeemed 
on its re-openine; for a fev; days. The Do:rtinion Government received twenty- f ive cents on the dollar on 
several thousand dollars worth of the notes which it held. 
3. Liquidation i mcor,lplete . 
4 . This bank never su spended payment . The bank which took over its b ranches a sswncd a ll liabilities to 
.. • 
....... 
0 
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PART V. 
SECURITY MA.RKETS AlfD HlVESTlffiHT S 
(A) United States. 
Supervision of Securities: 
1928 and 1929 were years oi' rising prices in the sto ck markets 
of this country whi ch were unprecendented in our histor:-r• It vras 
the latter part of 1929 vlhen the stock market broke and prices 
l 
dropped 260 points in a comparat ively short period of time . This 
speculative orgy was on the minds of all; even those "\'Tho had onJ.y 
a meager income and who found stock buying s.nd selling a hope for 
making money quickly. The vast volune of sales on the exchanges 
kept mount ing to new levels until the much predicted crash cara.e . 
Although the 1 eading banking a 11.d financial authorit i es of the 
country were wel l ·aware of the hazard ahead , and despite some at-
tempts on the part of the Federal Reserve 31Jstem to curb this 
securities market increase , people took little heed of the signs 
which were pointing to the inevitable market sltunp. 
As is always the case when a group of people have been the 
victims of a system which has caused them loss or inconvenience , an 
investigation is later made into the· practices of that system to 
see if there exists corruption and malpractice of one k ind or 
another . An investigation was instigated by the Congress into the 
practice s of the stoc k exchanges of the country , especially the IJevr 
York Stock Exchange, t o see vrhether there Yva s any po ssibili ty of 
controlling some of the acts of the members of this exchange as 
·well as other s·tock exchanges . 
1 . Dow-Jones Average s, Boston I'Jevrs Bureau, June, 1931 
llO. 
The fact that some of the members do violate the accepted code 
of practi ce which has been set up as the right and ethical duty of 
al l to follow undoubtedly exists no more i n this system than in any 
of the other busine ss pursui ts of the country. However,. mal practi ce 
and violations were found which needed correction and along ni th the 
other legisle.tion during the first session of the seventy-third 
Congress, the stock narket came in fo r its share by having passed 
the Securities Act of 1933. 
This Act was passed primarily for the purpose of controlling 
some of the distorted informat ion which had been circulated regarding 
the issue of nev,r stock as well as the sale of stock already issued. 
Little attention had been paid to this fact in the issuing of stock 
and thus many people bought stock ·which had been misrepresented to 
them by the pre-issue prospectus . 
Under the Act, securities had to be registered and the registra-
tion or prospectus had to be si gned by the person or company issuing 
1 
the stock. This requirement had a tendency to make the issuer state 
accurately the conditions of his business as well a s any other in-
formation which was informative toward his business in the prospectus . 
Section 26 of the Act sets forth the infon~ation as required by this 
new law and which must be signed by i~he issuing company. 
Vlhether the depression has been a contributing factor to the ne-v; 
issues which have been floated during the existence of this new Act 
or whether the regul ations pertaining to the ne-vr issues e.re too strict 
is a <p.mtion of wide debate, but many are of the opinion that this 
--~-----------------------------------------------------------------------1. Section 6 of the Securities Act of 1933. 
lll. 
security registration has caused many to refrain from new issues and 
turn else·where for the necessary loans for expru1sion and development 
purposes. 
Security Exchange Legislation: 
"Trru1sactions in securities as conun.only conducted .upon security 
exchanges and over the counter markets are affected with a national 
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and 
control of such transactions s.nd of practices and matters rele.ted 
thereto, including transactions by officers, directors ru1d principal 
security holders , to require appropriate reports end to impose re-
quirements necessary to m.n.ke such regulation and control reasonably 
complete and effective in order to protect interstate conw.erce, the 
national credit, and Federal taxing povrer , to protect and make more 
effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System z,nd 
1 
to insure the maintenance of fair and honest market ." Thus, 
Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act ·of 1934 describes the purpose 
of t his Act in another attempt in 1934, e.s well as 1933, t o affect a 
clo ser control over stock market practices . 
Exposures of malpractice and abuses of stock market privileges 
were brought t o light in the senate investigation into the exchange 
practices. 
The fact that the New York Stock Exchs.nge was a private corpora-
tion and thus not vii thin reach of the Fed era~. or the Ste:l:;e Govermnent, 
before the recent authority given by Congress to investigate it, made 
it impo ssible to secure the desired information upon which to base 
legislation of a corrective nature. 
1. Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1934. 
112. 
In the Securities Act of 1933 the administrative body was the 
Federal Trade Corrilll..ission. As the applic ation of the Act progressed~ 
it beca.ne evident that the many duties which it would have to perform 
would seriously tax the Trade Commission so the Securities Act of 
19:~4 created a new administrative body to be knovm as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
Consequent ly, it is seen that definite steps are t aken to bring 
under closer control those acts of the stock exchanges ·which have i n 
the past been detrimental to the financial condi tio11 of so many 
people. 
In general , the powers of the new commission may be ·divided a s 
1 
follows: 
1. To make rules and regulations, including those 
governing registration statement and prospecb.tses . 
2. To interpret accounting, tec}m.i cal and trade terns 
used in the Act •. 
3. To issue stop orders suspending effectiveness of 
registrations . 
4. To secure injunctive assistance from the courts 
restraining violations of the Act and to secure 
writs of mandamus to compel compliance with the Act. 
With the povvers thus given to the Commissio!l_, it should be able 
to supervise some of the questionable practices of the exchanges . 
The speculative market of 1928-1929 revealed the need for such a 
commission. Attempts haYe been made in the past to bring some such 
guiding hand over the exchanges but very little progress was made. 
1. Lasser and Gerardi - Federal Securit i es Act Procedure, p . 191 , 
lJ:cGra.w-Hill Book Company, l'JeYl York, 1934. 
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I-1:; sonehow takes a. great cal amity to bri ng some type of revisions 
into being . Despite the vmrning of those 11 on the inside 11 the public 
refu sed to stop its speculative orgy until it had ta s-ced defeat . 
Then public opin i on ran high for a reform. 
It is not my purpo s e ~ however, to discuss the lack of foresi ght 
in the public mind. 
114 • 
(B) Canada 
Investment Po licy of Charte red :Bank s: 
A factor uhich definitely contributes to t he success or failur e 
of a..'1.y bank , whether it be independent, unit or branch , is the in-
vestr:wnt policy nhi ch it pursues. Probably no item in the many 
·that come to the attention of t he director should have mor e time., 
thought , and wise pl a:r1J1i ng than this item of i nvestment policy. 
It can b e generally said that the policy of chartered bank s 
is a conser;rative one. The general pu rpo se of chartered banks has 
been the emplo;yment of funds in commercial loans as far a s the 
demand s .-1arrro1ted them and then inYestment in securities of the 
l 
highest grade vfi th the remaining porti ons of their funds ·which vrere 
not used as reser;res against deposits and note circulation. 
As of June 30 , 1 933, the ten cha r tered banks of Canada showed 
that the loans and discounts of t hese banks combined, represented 
2 
~~1,410,846,629 as against (;860 ,1 54 , 340 invested i n securities. Else-
vrhere it has been explained that a l arge portion of these loans are 
made by the branch managers , but when large amounts are involved they 
are considered at the head office as ·well as all in;restments i n 
securities. The proportion of loans and discounts to securities of 
course varies with the seasonal demands for loans . Securities are in 
the portfolios at all times but the harvesting season particularly 
changes its content. 
It has been a long standing po licy of these ba:n."ks to make loans 
for short periods of time , nml!ely on the average of ninety da:rs . This 
has given to them a liquidity with which to meet the unusua lly lare;e 
1. HcLeod, J. A.-Some ' feature of the Present Working of the Canad i an 
Banking System - P• 35, Bef ore the Royal Comrn.ission on Banking and 
Currency, 1 933 . 
2. Currency and Banking in Canada - op . ci-t .. - P• 20. 
115. 
• 
demands upon them as well e.s to keep their loans end discounts in a 
most fa-vor able position at all times. The facJc ·that these banks are 
so large makes it possible for them ·l:;o .h!we research departments in 
the field of investments of all kinds; this is not possible in a 
majority of the unit b anks in the United states. With t his increased 
i nvestment knowledge better and wiser inves·tments can be made ; thus 
their reserves are placed in a sounder and more e.vailable po sition. 
1; .. '1., i teLl vrhich has caused some contr ov ersy in the sphere of in-
-vestments has been the policy of ba..11.ks in entering the investment 
1 
banking field. Ho1Never , the be.nks have the ri ght by l mY to 11 deal in ~ 
discount and lend money and make advance s upon the security of, and 
tak e as colla teral security for any loan made by i t , b il ls of exchange , 
promissor y notes and other negotiable securities, stocks and bond s, 
debentures and obligations of munic i pal ru1.d other corporations, 
whether secured by 'mortgage or otherwise, or Dominion, provincial, 
2 
British , for e i gn and other public securities." The general business 
carried on by the chartered banks comes into tv:o cl asse s; first , 
that in i.vhich the bank acts as fi seal agent for i t s customers i n buy-
ing and s elling securities with a broker where they a sk a commi ssion 
for the service, and secondly, that i n vrhich they undervrrite an issue 
of government obligations or of some high grade security . 
The chartered banks usually underVIrite s ome issues of the 
Domi n ion and Provincial Governments on a purely competitive basis, 
along -vri th investment be.nks and oJcher s, and if their bid is the high-
est , it goes to the chartered bank for distribution at what i t wi l l 
bring i n the na rket. The b anks concern themselves vrith onl y the 
1. Curren cy and Banki ng in Canada - op. cit . - P• 76. 
2 . Section 75, Su.b- t: ect i on C, of the Bank Act of Cs.nada, 1 934 . 
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highest gr ade issues in this field. Sometirw s s~,rndic::d~cc: cere 
o r ga::;_ized to undenr.cite issu es of various l::i nds i n Trhich the 
charte r ed bP.nk s participate , usually to fvxnish the necessary 
c apital. After the issue has been sold , the synd icate i s dissolved . 
The chartered b anks , i n contrast t o the P ... m.erican b anl:s , have no 
definite reserves other than that nThe bank shall hold in Dominion 
notes not less than forty per centum of the cash reserves ·which it 
ha s in Canada. 11 Al though this r e serve requirenent would seem 
rather small and perhaps weak , it has had a tendency to n ake the 
Canadi an banke1·s keep an ad equate reserve and that rese1·ve in such 
liquid condition that the bank is not in dang;er of fail i ng , i f unusual 
demands are made upon it. It could readi l y be c all ed a p rofes s i onal 
responsibility as stmed by the ban1: heads. 
Still another restriction upon the chartered banks is the p ro-
hibition of loaning on r eal e state; ·this is an element of Tiealmess 
2 
in commercia l banking. Long ten-n investment s naturally o ccur unc~ er 
this type l oan and make it difficult for a b ank to be li quid at all 
times. A commercial bank must have its investment liquid and this 
is impossible i f a l a r ge p roportion of the deposits are in real 
estate . The American system peruits real estate ho ldings and is a 
wesJc spot in our banking structure. 
Stock Ex change Activity: 
The a gitation caused by t he infl ation of stocks and by some 
of the prc.ctices on the stock exchang e has not been as prevalent 
1. Final Hearing o f Royal Coriillli ssion on Banking and Curr ency _, 
P• 13, Ottawa , 19 33. 
2. Harwood , E. c. - A Closer Vievr of Canada ' s Large Danks , p. 30, 
Vol . V.X:X:VI of .American Bankers Association Journa l, new York, 
August , 1933. 
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in Canada as in the United Sts.tes . One reason for this is the fact 
that the exchanges in Canada do not play such an important po.rt in 
the i'inancing of new issues of stock. Generally speaking, they do not 
list nen issues on the excha...'llge s until after they have enjoyed a 
1 
rather 1Nide distribution; this , hoi'rever, is in almost direct contrast 
to the conditions in the United States where large issues, new or 
otherwise, are listed o~ the exchanges if they meet the requirements 
of the listing exchange . 
Another reason the excha...'llge does not carry as rrmch influence is 
that the number of shares of stock transacted in 1929 by two of the 
largest exchanges i11 Canada; namely, Montreal and Toronto, were 
2 3 
35,468,626 shares as compared to 1 1 117, 824 , 200 on the Hew York 
Stock Exchange alone . 
1 . Currency and Banking in Cans.da. - op. cit . - p. 45 . 
2 . I bid - P• 27. 
3. Be.rron1 s Weekly, Boston, p . 28, December 30 ,1929 . 
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PART VI. 
BANiaNG SYSTEHS DURIHG THE DEPRESSIOH 
(A) United states 
Goverrunental Remedies: 
With the world passing through a depression which is probably 
more extensive a..11.d grave than any other in our history, at le:ol.s·t since 
the Declar ation of Independence, it is hopeless to expect that the 
credit machinery in ope;_·ation i!l 1929, when thEJ depression started , 
would be able to maintain itself intact . Under normal circmnstances 
the baTlJ-:s have survived without government assistance. The over-
expansion of credit during the years just pre,r:Lous to 1929, stimulated 
by the stock market speculative craze, brought the country into an 
economic stagnation of overwhelming proportions. In the middle part 
of the year 1929 business ·was receding from its high poin·t of 1928 
and early 1929 until the crash of the stock market in October of that 
year when it took an unprecedented drop. YJhen it i"Tas realized that no 
reaction was going to take plo.ce by way of a revival from the ever 
deepening depression., the government intervened. The paralyzing of 
the stock mar ket depreciated stock values so rapidly that many banks 
failed due to the fact that to liquidate reserves, meant the necessity 
of a tremendous loss to the banks . In order to release some of the 
frozen assets of the distressed banks , the National Credit Corpore.tion 
1 
v.ras orgs.nized under the supervision of the Federal Reserve S'IJstem. 
By having all banks pool a small percentage of their time depo sits 
1rvith the corporation, in return for renewable gold notes , a fund was 
created v;hich , upon the approval of the Federal Reserve Banks or local 
1 . The Banl:ing Situation in the United States, P• 145, national 
Industrial Conference Board , 1932 .. 
11 
associations , bought the fro zen assets of the distressed banl-:s. 
This Act relieved the sHuation mo:r.1entarily but did not bring 
the desi red resul ts . 
In January of 1932 , Presi d ent Hoover created the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation with a capit a l of ~~5001000 ,000 and a borrowing 
l 
capacity, by mee.ns of no{~es or bonds , of thre e times that a.mount. 
This Corporation was created for the purpose ,of making loans to banks, 
to spec i fied kinds of financia l i nsti-tut i ons , to railroe.d s , to farmers , 
etc . Vlhere l oans could not be secured by i ndu s tries t hrough the banks, 
they were made through the Corporation. Thi s supervision proved 
helpful . The fund s available have been incr eased periodically by the 
Congress . These l oans were not make without adequate collateral and 
were not ·to exceed three year s in duration. Howev er , they included 
the privi l ege of ren ewal at a ma::cinru.m of five years . In a speech at 
st . Louis in 1932 , President Hoover described t he f ar reaching effects 
of thi s Corporation in relat i on to the loans made t o a Chicago bank 
which was 0 11 t he v erge of bankrupt cy. Similar cases , and many of them, 
could be ci t ed to show h ow i mportant it was t o t he economic welfare of 
the country. There can be lit tl e doubt but Jchat this measure has been 
o.:t' vast importance to many indu stri e s 8.nd banks during the past fe1fr 
years . 
The member be.nks of the Federal Reserve System w·ere experiencing 
difficulty in securing the necessary funds to meet the denands of their 
customers even after the National Credit Corporation and the Re-
construction Finance Corporation had been in operation to aid distressed 
banks . Loans had been secured from the district banlcs with e.ll eligible 
1 . Th e Banking Sit u ation in the Uni ted States, p . l 45 , liational 
I ndu st r ial Conf erence Board, 1932 . 
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1 
paper available under the Act. 
In order to create more credit the Glass-Steagall Dill opened up 
a nevr avenue of credit. This bill made it po ssible for groups of five 
member banks, who jointly requested advances on the security assets 
not ordinarily rediscountable with Federal Reserve Banks , to borrovr 
further. It also provided that under emergency conditions a Federal 
Reserve Bank could rediscount for a member bank, with a capital stocl: 
not exceeding five million dollars, assets not ordi~1arily eligible 
for rediscount. The control here lies i n the interest rate of one 
per cent above the highest effective discount rate in the district 
where the loan is made . This feature will tend to retire these 
loans at sn early date. 
The collateral securities received by the reserve be.nks ·were not 
pen1i tted to be used as security against note issues under the Act. 
It d id, nevertheless, permit the reserve banks, with the approval of 
a majority of the Board, to submit the direct obligations of' the 
United States as collateral against the issuance of notes. 
As the Hew Deal Administration swung into operation on Harch 4, 
1933, drastic and startling changes in the policy of the govern.r:1ent 
regarding ba...'Ylks was seen necessary by the President, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, and the first move vvas to close the banJcs. (This topic 
vrill be r eviewed under a l ater heading). The depression was grovring 
worse instead of better; more supervision and intervention by the 
government seemed necessary a.."l.d from March 6, 1 933 , the government 
has been more and more in evidence in its attitude toward the banl-::s 
and the general econoDic condition of the country. 
1. Glass-Steaga11 Act, Section I. 
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The economic stabili tJr of a country ca nnot rest u pon any o _e 
factor but upon a ll; namely, t he financia l, economic , and soci al con-
ditions T-rhi ch exist. I n order t hat E>.ll of these f actors might be 
brought into great er coordinat i on aP ..d unity of purpose t:l.nd action, 
the 11 alphe.betical admini s t rations" were created . Some of these., 
which dire d~ly bear u pon the b a nks , vfill be cited . Heedless t o sa~ , 
they a ll have been crea ted for the purpose of shifting the burd en of 
relief from the shoulders of the government, and indirect_y t o t he 
ta."Cpayer . V.fhen business i s go od , the i ndustrial and financ i al i'acili-
ties of the country are a ble to creat e profit and realize a surpl u s. 
Al l t he "administrations " were f o r this purpose ; a ll direct l y or in-
directly affecting the banks o f the counJcry. Eowever , the ones 
me21tioned be l o v have a dil~ect bearing upon the banks and its credit 
e_ pansion CJJ.d contraction. 
The plight of the farmer r'ra s a major consideration as the level 
oi' prices for fan:1 product s has been dangerously low for a l ong period 
and his condition must b e adju sted . The Federal Farm lio rtgage Corpora-
l 
t i on was created by an act of Congress and approved J anuary 31 , 1934 , 
as an aid t o the Federal Land Be.nks and the Land Bank Cor.uni ssioner , 
in financ i ng their l ending operations . The farmer, heaYiJ.y in debt, 
without t he necessary money to meet mortgage p:::.yment s , c au sed the 
banks "'co t ake over the property. The farmer was l eft v;ithout a 
po ssible method of regaining his farm. :!:n order to allow the farmer 
to J:eep ~1is property, financial aid Via s gi-ven to the agencies 
mentioned t>.bove, by t he government . The Farm Credit Admin.:.strs.tion vra u 
another a:;enc~r t o e.id ·the f armer in making avai l able to h i m long tern.~ 
1.. iJational Economic Council Servic e , P• 39 . 
122 . 
short term, and intermediate credit in the form of f arm mortgage , J?l'O -
ducticn, and cooperative 111<u·ket loans. This Administration w·as 
l 
created in I:Iay, 1933 . 1hth this a id the farne r was abl e to continue 
operation of his f arm e.nd it indirectl~r ~trengtl-"oned ·the ba!l. :i ng; 
facilities of the farming areas ,. Further assistance to the farmer 
2 
c ame in cres.ting the Commodity Credit Corpor a tion, v;ith povlers to 
buy, ho ld , :>el l., such commodities as the President mi ght direct , a c -
qui ring the surpluses produced b;y the farmer. Especially ne r e ti.1e 
g r e.i n rmd cotton growers in need of this aid . 
The home 01mer had been experiencin,o; difficulty in holding h i s 
properjcy b ecause of his im•bili t y jco pay the taxes , pay t he cooperati- e 
ba...11k shar es, pay ·th e interest on the mort gage. He could r_o t pay ·;ith 
his salary de cr ec.sed , in l'lrmy cases eliminated, and rent for property 
ma.tcriaJ. ly lov•ered. Aid :rrmst be so ught to save the home ovmer. I r. 
c rdAl" to a i d tb.e ba.nks holding these mortgages and relieve the home 
mmer of his bu:rde11, the government c &-ne to the aid of t housands by 
3 
ere ting t he Home Ovmers ' Loan Corpore:Uon. This Corpore.tion gave 
assistance t o those vrho could not i':'l o.n:r other 1'!~-:r secure credi· -I:o 
financing t heir propc:rty. It gave to t he owne r a l ong term morte;B"ge 
••ith n low int erest rate. This , in turn, has been a contr i btttinG 
fac·to :c to t!1e policy of banl~s to l ov:er their i11t ere st rates on 
mor tgar;es in many sections of t h e country. 
4 
'l'he Federal Home Loan Dank System was also insti·tuted to aid t h e 
saving::: b-:w.1l::s , insuranc e compani es , building be..nks, Federa l Sa-ving s and 
Loan Associat i ons, homestead associations and ot her financing i n::::titutions 
1. nat ional Econmaic Council Service, P• 9. 
2. Ibid, P• 4. 
3. Ibid, P• 82. 
4. Ibid, P• 267. 
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as a credit reserve. 
Thus the government has attempted to aid the farmer, the home 
owner, and nov£ it turns to aid the millions of unemployed. Purchasing 
power r.mst be increased, local governments nust be given support in 
carrying the burden for relief so the government enacted the law 
1 
creating the Emergency Rel ief and Construction .Act whi ch made posnible 
·!:;he expenditure of ~'? 1,500,000,000 for loans to states, municipalities 
and public and private agencies for the construction of self liquida-
ting public works . Under this Act numerous corporations were created 
1·.rhich have directly supervised the work of relief with the hope of 
increasing purchasing po·wer so imperative to recovery. 
Therefore, the government has taken direcJc supervision of re-
constructing the financ ial and industrial fabric of the country. 
Whet:':ler this is the most eff'ecti ve Dethod for recovery cannot be 
ee.sily maintained . Economists , bankers , political leaders, and lay-
men, have dist>.greed . Recovery was nece ssary - the ~overn;·.wnt inter-
vened. 
Fed eral Reserve System: 
The Federal Reserve System has been of considerable assistance 
to the banks of the country during the depression period . The extent 
to which this system has contributed to sound banking and the al-
leviation of bank failures has been a topic of debate from many 
sources. 
Volumes have been written on the discount rates and their ef-
fe ctiveness in controlling the expansion and contra ction of currency . 
1 . Bc..nl~ing e.nd t~ e Hew Dea l , F.lnerican Institute of Ban]:i ng , ~Tev1 
York, 1933, The }\.i11erican Banld.ng Association, p. 111. 
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To say that i f rate changes had been raade a t different timE)s than 
they were ~ the effect mi e;ht have been more or l es s pr ono1.n,c ed upon 
t he credit facilities of the count:;:y , is merely conjectu r e , e.nd an 
at tempt will not be m de here . 
The changing of the discou~1t r a·l:;e of the Federal Reserve Ba.'rlks 
during t lli s p eriod is demonsJcra t ed by the fluct· a t ions of the Hevr 
York Federal Re serve i3ank. Although the other eleven banks d i d not, 
. , . in all cases , r e~djust their discount rates a t the same t ime as -;:; n l.::: 
ba.:nk , they did follow e;ene1·ally in a short per:L od o:f' t i rr_e.. The rat es 
var i ed on the average o f from one- half to one per c ent higher ou ts i d e 
of New Yo1·k. 
The c hart v1hi ch folJ.ows shm1rs the monthly changes of the discount 
rates during the years 1 928 to 1933 , i n clusi vee 
HEN YORK FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUITT RATES 01\T 
ALL CLASSES, Al'ID J,fP ... 'l'URITIES OF DIS COUNTJ'.;}) BILT.S 
r-· 
Jan. Feb . Idar. Apr Hay June July Aug. Sept . Oct . 
19281 4 4.! 5 
19292 6 
19303 4 3i 3 z.1. 2 
19314 1! :t 
0~ 
1932° 3 2.1. 2 
19336 ,., l 3 2.1. 2 02- 2 
l. 15th AnnuD.l Report of Fede1·al Res erve Board , covering 
t he year 1928 , Tabl e 34 . 
2 . 16th Annnnl Report of Federal Reserve Boar d , covering 
t !:le year 1929 , Table 32 . 
3 .. 17th Annual Report of Federa l Reserv e BotOtrd 1 coveril1.g 
the year 1930 , Table 3'Z 
"• 
? . 18th _i\.:rLnual Report of Federa l Re serve Board , covering 
the y ear 1931, Table 36 . 
5. 19th Annual Report of Federal Reserve Boc.rd , covering 
t he y ear 1 932~ Te.bl e 53 . 
5 . 20th Annual Report of Federal Reserve Board , covering 
t he year 1933, Tabl e 57 . 
(Chart IIJo . 15) 
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The Federal Reserve Banks found it necessary to deal directly 
wi th the open market in influencing changes for the good of the credit 
base of the country. Several m~thod s had been used to accomplish t his 
but Yfi th varying suc ce·ss . Under the Banking Act of 1933 a Feder 1 
Open Mar ket Co!:tmi ttee we.s created composed of a member f rom each 
district ban}c. This Committee was to have conferences at least four 
times a year e.t Washington to form tho po licy of the Federal Reserve 
Syst em on open market operat i ons . This should give to t he Federal 
Reserve System a un ity of action in :i.t s attempt to control the credit 
base of t!1.e nation. IJature.l l y t his will be only one method of control. 
Bank Holiday: 
Business was at a standstill during the campai gn for the 
presi dency during t he F8.ll of 1932 and even a f ter the election , little 
change was evid enced. During the early part of February, conditions 
became more critic 1, particularly in the banking fi e ld, until on 
1 
Febru.ary 14, 1933 , the Governor of Mi chigan c losed the banks o f that 
Ste.te t o stop the unpr ecented withdrawal of gold by depositors. Y!hen 
the corporations of this State were no longer able to draw on their 
accounts , they inunediately started draving on reserves which had been 
deposited in banks in other sta t es . This agitated the denosi tors o f 
Jd1e banks in these s tate s and thus wholesale withdraYre.ls took place . 
State after state closed their banks until the morning of the 
i naugurati on o f President- elect Roosevelt he declared a national Bank 
Hol ida,y and n o banl<::s wer e to open until su.fficient examination of the 
banks were made . The first act after his inauguration vras to cal l t _e 
1 . Astrolenk , Bernard - \Nhy the BBJ.J.ks Collapsed , pp . 152-158 , 
Vol . L'CX:VT II~ :rro. 2, Cnrrent History, Hay , 1933. 
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Congress into session and emergency banking legislation was passed 
five day s l ater . In the legisla ·t~ion of March 9~ the acts of t h e 
President in proclaiming a BanJc Holiday as well as the a cts of the 
1 
Secretary of t he Trea sury were approved. To stop the hoa rding of 
gold by individuo.ls and others a gold embargo -v..-as enacted Tihich 
2 
prohibited the withdrawal of gold from circulation. The large 
amount s of e;o l d wi thdravm just previous to the Holida;,• ·were 
describ ed in the preceding section. 
With aU the banks closed in the country , either by state or 
fed era l proclamations , the Comptroll e r of Currency and the Corrunissioner 
of Banking in t h e various states, examined all the bank s and vrhen, 
in t he op i n ion of the pro~m· authori t i e s, the banks were solvent , 
they were a gain allov;ed to open their doors . Thi s measure was known 
3 
as t he Bank Conservation Act . For those banks vrhich were not 
solvent, conservators were appointed by t he Comptroller of Currency 
to t alee over the bank ' s assets and cause either a reorgan.:..zation of 
the present bank , liquidate the remaining assets , or place the present 
org1mization in a solvent position. The details covering the results 
brought about by this Act are not important at this point. 
4 
Under the Acts of March 24 , a further breaking do;rn of the rul es 
pertaining to loans by the Federal Reserve Act we.s pa s s ed >Yhich made 
it possible for non- member banks to apply for loans with the Federal 
Reserve Bank s provided, in the opinion of the States Banking Con-
mission, the bru1k was solvent. Also, in the reo rganization of the 
1. Section 1 of Eme r gency Bank Act of Earch 9 , 1933, 7 3rc1 Congress. 
2 . Ibid - Section 3. 
3. Sections 202- 211 of Bank Conservation Act , March 9 , 1933, 
7 3rd Congre ss. 
4. Amendment to Bank Conservation Act, 11arch 9, 1933 , 7 3rd Congress . 
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closed banks· it ·was po ssible for t he Reconstruction Finan ce Corpora-
tion to buy preferred stock from those banks which ·were not rnerubers of 
the Reserve System. 
Thus, to meet the emergency conditions in our banking centers, 
all previous barriers were lowered to aid and assist not only those 
who vrere members and rightfully eli gible to the benefits enacted, but 
those outside of the system as y;ell . 
Repeal of the Gold Standard: 
March 10, 1933, President Roosevelt issued a Procla.Iil.ation vvhich 
gave to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to place an 
embargo on all gold going out of this country. HeaV'J withdrawals of 
gold from this country and from the banks of the United States by the 
depositors had seriously lowered our gold reserve, the base of currency 
in the United States. Not since the Gold Standard Act of 1900, which 
placed the country on a gold basis, had vre abandoned the Gold Standard. 
On April 5, 1933, the President issued another Proclamation which 
prohibited the hoarding of gold and ordered all gold holding s to be 
delivered to the Secretary of the Treasury by May 1, 1933. 
Still later, on April 20, an executive order vras issued pro-
hibiting the earmarking of gold f or foreign account and the export of 
gold coin or bullion was also prohibited . 
The Proclanation issued Me.rch lOth was the beginning of the 
effort on the part of the government to devaluate the dollar. Further 
s·teps were taken because on Hay 12, 19 33 there was a new clause in the 
Thomas Amendment which s"cated 11 That notes and all other coins aJld 
currencies heretofore and hereafter coined or issued by or under the 
authority of the United States shall be legal tender for all debts 
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public and private~ nor shall the weight of the gold dollar be fixed 
1 
so as to reduce its present ·weight by more than fii'ty per centum." 
The matter oi' stabilizing the dollar took some time and the 
actual setting of the ne·w valuation did not occur until after the 
2 
Gold Reserve Act had been pas sed. On January 31 , 19 34 , the 
President issued a Procla:;nation fixing the we i ght of the gold dollar 
at 15 5/21 grains , ni~e-tenths fine . This is 59.06% of the i'ormer 
·we ight of 25 8/10 grains , nine-tenths fine, as fixed by Section 1 
of the Act of Congress, March 4 , 1900. 
Thus , the repeal of the Gold Standard had taken place and along 
with it, the devaluat ion of the dollar by forty per cent of its 
original value . · 
Inflationary Legislation: 
Vfuen the Congress of the United States passed the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act on 1'.1ay 12 , 19 33 , it included an amendment popular l y 
knovm as the Thomas Amendment, which in substance, was a move on the 
part of the government to inflate prices as a means of lifting the 
country out of the depression. Yfuen the Act was first passed, it 
caused much discussion and great amciety on the part of many leading 
economists and baPJcer s. There were , however , as me.ny 1 eading 
economists and bankers giving support to the measure as an emergency 
step. Despite the controversy, i t contained possibilities which 
would provide for a recurrence of the historic period during the Ch'i.l 
Viar ·when the 11 Greenba ck 11 wa s issued to finance the Tfar and recon-
struction. 1:'fe have not experienced repetition of that event, however. 
1. Gold Reserve Act pas sed January 30 , 1 934 . 
2 . Emergency Farm 11ortgage Act of 1933 , Section 43 . 
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The section which authorized these inflationary potent i alities 
states that whene-ver the President finds that (1) the forei gn co:r:u..11er ce 
of the United States is adversely affected due to the appreciation of 
f oreign currency , or (2) a ct ion is necessary i n order to regul ate and 
mai ntai n the parity of the currency issues of the United States, or 
( 3) an economi c emergency requires an expa:2sion of credit, or (4) an 
expansion of credit is necessary to secure by i nternationa l stabi li za-
t i on at proper levels of the currencies of various goverlli~ents , he may , 
in his discretion, direct the Secretary of the Treasury and t he Federal 
Reserve Board to permit the Federal Reserve Banks t o (1 ) carry on open 
marJ>::et operations i n obligations of the United States or cor porations 
i n which the United State s is the major s·tocld1older, ( 2) purchase and 
hold treasury bills or other obligat ions up to :)3 ,000 ,000, 000 in addition 
1 
to those already held. If the Federal Reserve Banks r efuse to assent 
t o (1) and (2) above the President may direct (1) t he Secretary of the 
Treasury to issue United States Hotes (Greenback s) up to ~~ 3 , 000 ,000 ,000 
f or t he purpos e of meeting maturing federal obligat ions and pu r chasing 
bonds of the United Stat es_, ( 2) by proclamat ion put t he country on a bi-
metallic standard by fixing weight of the gold and silver dollar, or 
( 3) in con....'lection ·with an interna·t ional agreement to reduce the weight of 
the go l d co ntent of the standard gold dollar by not more than fift y per 
2 
centum. 
Thus, the way vras cl ear novr for t he President to direct a period of 
i nf l ation T.rhich might gain proportions unknm1rn to the American peopl e. 
Time has shown that prices did not rise to unprecedented l e·v·els , that 
t he President did not exercise the broad powers gr anted to him. A study 
1. Section 43 of Emergency Farm Mortgage Act , 1933. 
2. Ibid . 
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of the index number s for the period uEder discussion will show mo1:1entn.ry 
changes but not a jump to ne·w high levels, bo;:dering on i nfJ.ation. 
J. 
The Act further provid e s that the Presid ent may a cc ept silver in 
paym.ent of debts due us from fore i gn governments up to ::~ 200 ,000 , 000 at 
not more than fifty cents a."l ouCJ.ce. This had a tendency t o stinrulate 
liquidation of some outstanding debts vrhich had been long overdue . 
The mo.tter of the gold reserve which affected r11a ter i ally the 
stability o f money has been noted in the previous sec·tion on the Go ld 
Stande.rd . 
-~Vith the passage of the Silver Purc hase Act of 1934, the Congress 
made it po ssible to i'urther increase the method s of i nflating our 
currency. In this instance, the Secretary wa s g iven ~che right t o 
pu rchase si 1 ver un.-bil it became one- f ourth of the amount of gold held 
2 
in the Treasury. For t h i s silver purc hased, s ilver certificates 
could be issued and placed i n circulat ion . Less than t wo months a fter 
the passage of the Silver Purchase ll.ct the Pres ident is sued a p rocl ama-
tion for the :t-Jationalization of Silver , requiring all si l ver to be de-
livered to the Treasury within ninety days . This vras a repeti tiOl'l of 
-.-rhat happened with gold less than a year before. 
Eistaken Theory of Time Depo sits: 
Hot as a result of the depression but more definitely a s a cause 
of it, have time and demand deposits ~md the i r relationship been dis-
cussed. The question asked is, 11How should time depo sit s be handled? 11 
The point of reserves needs attention f irst, bec~-use it i s i n this r e -
latio~1. that the difficulty is experienced . Under ·the Federal Reser ve 
1. Section 45 of Emergency J.i'arm :Mortgage Act 9 1 933. 
2 . Section 3 of Silver Pu.:rc ha se Act o f 1934. 
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Act, reserves of seven, ten , and thirt een per cent on demand deposits 
i n the three respective sizes of cities and three per cent on time de-
l 
posits are required by the member banks. In other words, care should 
be taken on the part of the bank in making loans from these two types 
of depo s its. Although the banker has knovm that long time inves·cment s 
generally do not carry the same liquidity as short time, he has made 
loans l argely in this manner for time deposits in his bank. Up until 
2 
1913 loans could not be made by natione.l banks on reo.l estate, but t h e 
ke en competition of the state banks who could, led to permissive legis-
lation. Time deposits are by rule possible of withdrawal after due 
notice . However , this has not been the case. The che.nging position 
of demand e.nd time deposits is reves.led by the "steady increase in 
proportion of time as against demand deposits. On the basis of the 
average percentages for the years 1919 to 1925 we find that demand 
depo sits a:rnounted to fifty per cent s.nd time deposits thirty-two and 
five tenths per cent of the earning assets of the m.ember banl~s of this . 
country v1hil e on June 30 , 19 30, demand deposits amotmted to fifty-tvro 
per cent and time deposits to thirty-eight per cent of the earnil"'.g 
3 
assets. 11 
Against this ever-increasing importall.ce of time deposit s. s a.."l'l 
earning power of the bank, there is only a three per cent re serve , e.s 
cited above. 'Whi le against the demand deposits of U1e same bank there 
is a required reserve averaging ten per cent e.t least. Th e bankers 
are using time deposit s t h e same a s demand deposits but Yrith lon er 
1. Goldc:r.rweiser , E. A. - Fede1·al Reserve SJ"stem in Opern.tion, p 79 , 
IfcGraw-Eill Boolt Co!npany, }!cTr Yo rk, 192 5 . 
2. Greer, Guy - llhy Canadian Banks Don 1t Fail, P• 728, Har p er ' s 
Ea gazine , lJew York, Eay, 1933. 
3. Spahr , rfalter - Bank Failures in the United states, PP • 215- 223, 
Ameri can Economic Review, Vol . 22, 1932. 
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reserve, which weakens their position. In times of a run.., the banks 
can require their tine depositor s to -rva:i t the required ar,1oU11t of time 
to give notice of vrithdravm.l . ·while the time depositor is waiting.., 
these legal requirements, the liquid assets of the baPJ~ are being 
i'!i thdrmm by the demand depositors . In order to create more available 
.capital for their tills, the conunercinl banks have in the past given 
interest on demand deposits over a certain stated ~mount . This feature, 
1 
however, has been forbidden by the Banking Act of 1933. 
To more fully protect time depositors, greater super-vision must be 
extended to include the control of greater reserves against these de-
po sits and -the practices of the speculative bankers f orbidden. The 
separation of time and demand deposits entirely into different de-
partments, separate and distinct from any other, with separate control, 
or more conservative use of these :f.'unds , will be in line for a piece of 
progressive legislation. 
1 . Kniffin, Y'Tillia.m H. - Better Banldhg, P• 422 , LlcGrm"'T Hill nook 
Company, Hew York, 1934. 
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( B) Canada 
Strict Regu]-atory I?.eport s: 
In dealir~g vtith this section in relation to the depression 
period, it has been found elsewhere that there have been no bank 
failures in Canada during this interval and thus the compar ison of 
t h ese banking systems is not synonymous . Tiowe-ver , the fact that there 
have been no failures duri ng this period woul d give rise to some com-
ments as to why this S1Jstem has not experienced the ssme d i s tl ster that 
has the United States . Attention will be given here t o some of the 
more i mpo rtant reo.sons why this system has stood the depression period 
so well. 
Perhap s no more stric t in the main, than the systen of audit and 
examinati on by bankin g supervisors i n the United States, the Canadian 
system has apparently been mor·e effective . The an.'tlual and spec ial 
statement s of the chartered banks o f Canada sre specifical l y directed 
1 
as to Yrhat shal l be contained in them. These reports are to be :made 
by the banl:s themselves . By statute an audit is required by t-v!O share-
2 
holders ' auditors who are appointed by the Hinister of Finance. Strict 
rules and regulations are set forth U:!'ld er the a c t for the choosing of 
these auditors and thei r du-ties . 
Uot until after the f a i lure of the Home Bank of Canada 9.t Toronto 
did t he government :make an annual inspect ion of the chartered banks. 
Um·rever , a special sec t i on is embodied in the Bank Act ·which has 
3 
created an Inspectoi· General of Banks under the Ei nister o:f.' Financ e 
Tlho causes an annual governmental inspection vri th definitely defined 
1. Section 53 of the Bank Act of 1934. 
2 . Section 55 of the Bank Act of 1934. 
3. Sect io:c 56 of the Bank Act of 1934. 
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du·He s for the inspectors. When, in the judgment of the inspector ~ a 
bank is insolvent, he shall report the same to the l1inister and the 
Mi nister may n·without ·waiting for the bank to suspend paymen-t , i11. 
specie or Dominion notes, of any o~ its liabilities as they a ccrue, 
forthwith appoint in vrriting a curator to supervise the affairs o~ the 
bank :md such appointment shall have the same effect as if the bank had 
suspended payment in specie or Dominion notes of any of its liabilities 
1 
a s they acci·ued . 11 This section is i mportant in that it is possible to 
detect the failure of a bank y;i thout delay and further loss to the de-
positors and stockholders. 
2 
The monthly statements from each of the chartered bal"ks is an 
important source of valuable information to the Hinister. It guides 
him in ascert aining ·the condition of each of the banks permitting 
further inspection if necessary. 
Hi th all these ste.tutor-y requirements as set forth under the Ba.nk 
Act , and the rnruw demands made upon the banks by the Canadi an Bankers ' 
Asso ciation, we can readily see that there is c l ose supervi sion and 
rogula·l:;ion of reports setting forth the conditions of the various banks 
at all times . Professional obligations would demand of these bank 
managers the performance of a. well regulated system. 
Defini tely Dofir.ed Currency Is sues: 
Up t o the time of the Finance Act of 1914, Canada had ~vo distinct 
methods of issuing currency; namely , the government issue of subsidiary 
coins and the notes issued by the chartered banks . The pressure o~ .-rar 
financing required her to look for other sources of credit. Under the 
1 . Section 56, Sub-division 11, of t he Bank Act of 1934. 
2 . Section 112 of the Bank Act of 1934. 
135. 
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r-------------------------1---------- 1929 1930 1931 
-· .-- --- -----< 
1932 1933 
1==========~(;==+=-::-7"::= ~'; [~ f~ $ ~ ~i ~-J_an_u_a_r_Y _________ l _, _4_2o __ ,o_o_o __ ~l-~_~_~l_?_~~-: ,_o_o_=o_·_·-r[ __ 5_7_,_s_4_2_,_3_o_o~r-d~~-l_, s_8_o_,_8_o_o __ ~----s~,_l_5_3~,_s_o_o __ ~_31~,o-2_o~,~o_o_o __ +-4_o~,-~_7_3~,_z_o_o __ 
1 
:. __ F_e_b_r_u_a_r~y ________ 2~, 1_8_7-''~5_o_o __ ~_l_2~,-=4_6-=..0~,o_:_:_oo_:.___+-_4:..:9:...,~6:..:0:..:4::.,o:..:.:2:..:o:..:o:___1 18_ 1 595 , 80Q__ _ 2 ,~8~'-~1-22, 55G ,ooo _ 35,6 56,500 
i_ I_via_r_c_h ___________ s , ~-2~,_:oo __ 19!407 ,_40~ j _!7 ,740,0~)0 __ 21 , 488_,500 903, 800 17 ,7oo,ooo 37 ,ll0,700 I 
i -- ---- ------
! April 10,185,400 23,276,100 ! 57 , 520,000 22,470,800 3,083 ,300 18,465,500 37,500,500 
I Hay 11,578,000 31 ,386 ,500 24,950 ,ooo 3, 100,000 13,844.,000 39,3'70,900 
! June 12,120,000 35,830,000 60,747,900 22,158,300 1 ,660_,000 2 5,0-40 ,ooo 43,520.,000 
r July 14,654_,2oo 51,380, 7oo I 50,411 , Goo 
-------------------------~-----------t---
24 , 430,800 2,346,200 28,748,000 48,552,000 
-- -- - -- - --- ---- - -----------
1 Augus·b 15,4,83,300 52,194, 800 60 ,029, 600 8,881_,500 1,430, 800 18,633_,300 
Sept ember 42,838 , 300 55,941 ,700 3,440 ,000 13,040_,000 
Oc·tober 14,711,500 47,335,200 61_,601 ,900 9,447,800 13,764_,000 
Hovember 14,666,000 49,770,000 68 ,120 ,000 3,741 ,700 22 , 000,000 36 ' 575, 900 
December 12,826,900 39_,591,700 52,31S,OOO 2, 858,600 20,3 55, 800 
L-------------------------L-----------~-------------i-- -----------~------------L-----------~-----------
1. Banki ng e.nd Currency i n C nada, Report of Th e Royal Conuni s s ion , Ot tn.wa , 19:33, p. 4:3 . 
(Chart Ho . 16) 
Finance Act the banks could borrow from the government, upon the 
pre sentation of approved securities, limited amounts of addit i onal 
capital. The provision s of the Finance Act of 1914 vrere lcept in force 
until the DecemJ.ial Revision of 1923 when it became a. permanent 
feature . 
When the Bank of Ca..<J.a.da .1\.ct goes . into operation, this will be 
changed as the Act provides that the Bank of Canada have the sole right 
·to issue notes payable to bearer on demand and intended for circulation 
1 
in Canada. 
The extent to vrhich the Finance Act has been used is revealed in 
the chart on the following page. 
The ease vrith which Canada has handled her monetary problen has 
given the nation a stability to carry her through the depression. 
Adherence to Traditional Principles of Col7lJ!l.ercial Banking: 
(a.) Loan Time Deposits and Denand Deposits the Same. 
By Section 95 of the Bank Act, the chartered banks he.ve been given 
power to receive deposits on time and demand. When a bank assumes the 
responsibility of holding deposi ts on tliue , there arises a problem of 
just how those funds shall be kept.. Shall they be i nvested in long 
time investments or in short time investments? Will it be possible f or 
the depositor to receive or withdraw his deposits at any time that he 
desires? It has been the policy of the chartered banks to invest the 
·l:;ine deposits in the same manner as demand deposits . Thus., it means 
that the time depositor is not at the disadvantage he is often plac ed 
in by 'anks in the United States where long time investments have been 
1. Section 24 of the Bank of Canada Act ~ 1934 . 
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used~ and a notice of vrithdranal may be necessary. If a run is ·made on 
a. bank ., it is the demand depositor w·ho can withdravr his money inunediatel y 
at the cost of the time de po sitor. If proper care is ta}:en in tr"e 
securities used in placing time deposits, no such hardship Yrill be 
necessary to the notice depositor. 
Time deposits and demand deposits have the same rank in case of 
liquidation of a baru~ in Canada. In order of raruc~ t he notes issued by 
the banks have first lien; the claims of the Dominion Government., 
s econd; the claims of the Provincial governments, third; and the de-
l 
positors claims, fourth. Therefore 11 it has been the practice of the 
char·tered banks to treat the time and demand depositors in the srone 
manner regarding investments for quick liquidation. This has been a 
contributing factor to the stability of the Canadian banks during ~che 
depression year s. 
(b) Diversification of Assets . 
The very f oundation of branch banking is the advantage it has in 
diversi~ring its assets. The chartered banks of Canada have branches 
i n l!early all of the Provinces of the Domi nion Yvhere it loans and de-
posits alike., coming from every type of business and industrial enter-
prise . Naturally enough, all business activity is not slack or 
flourishing at one time. It means , hovmver , that a steady flow of 
credit is demanded in some section of the Dominion at all times. Vfl~en 
deposits are larger i n one section than in another, it is possible to 
shift them easily and ·with some assurance that they are wel l plac ed . 
Canada has highly seasonal needs for her credit facilities on 
account of the large grain crops raised in the country. The fact that 
1 . Section 131 Qf The Bank Act of 1934. 
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the banks are nat ion-nide nakes i t possible f or them to shift all 
po ssible credit to t he farming area at this season of the year. If 
the crop is a failure it does not cause an in..n.umerable list of bank 
suspensions as the experience in the United States . The advantages of 
diversification T/ere discussed in a previous section and apply here . 
(c) Granting Credit . 
One criticism of branch ba:DJcing has been the difficulty in 
securing loans -;·rhen they are needed . This charge would naturally be 
made by those who had 11 schemes 11 of questionable validity to promote . 
The head office sets certain standards which must be maintained and a:p:y 
difficult cases in the branch offi ces are referred to the head office. 
The farmer has in most countries a difficult time in securing the 
amount of credit he desires because it is generally such long time 
credit. However , the chartered banks or any other be.nk cmmot loan 
money if the return of that money is not assured. Farmers are given 
proper consideration . by the branch managers in their demands for crecli·t 
e.nd find it cheaper to borro;r money in their mm country than does the 
farmer across the line in the United States. 
It should be a tribute to the chartered banks the:\; their organi-
zations have come through the depression with such little loss. If 
loans had been made carelessly, forgetting the trust the depositor has 
in the banks to safely guard his money, the situation would have been 
differ en·!:; . 
(d) Director- mmership. 
In Canada the banking lavrs specifically state the amount of stock 
1 
which a di rector of a chartered bank must hold . P,_n. individua l 'Nho has 
1 . Section 20 of the Bank Act of 1934. 
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secm~·ed one share of stock to enuble h i m t o become a director of a 
ba:r:.lr has not the L'lt erests of the bank at heart; he h~ s merel placed 
himself in a better position in the conununity to view affairs fr·om 
the inside. 
These and many other practices of the Canadian banks have g iven 
/ 
t o them a stabiJ. ity to withstand the depre s sian. The underlying 
principles of bank ing are considered professional in nature and high 
standards are prevalent. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
There can be little doubt after reviewing the material presented 
here that some change is necessary in the supervision of banks in the 
United Sta-bes. The material pertaining to Canada does not support 
the contention that cha.-.11.ges are not in order but I think it does re-
veal that a different type of supervision has been prevalent in that 
country ~ and with success. 
If the banking structure of the United States had been on a sound 
foundation 3 it would not have been necessary for thousands of banks to 
fail since 1920. If the ba~~s of the United States are to continue on 
a sound basis, and if the failure list i s to be arrested 3 vte must 
subrni t to changes which vrill eliminate the major causes of failure 
during the period in question. 
I n the first place, legislation should be passed, taking f rom the 
state the right to grant charters to banks . The failure list in our 
country has been very much larger among those banks under state 
supervision. There can be no uni f i ed policy with forty-eight different 
jurisdictional areas, with as many different purposes for organizing a 
bank. Wi th only a state line dividing the good and the poor banking 
unit, the better type bank is hindered in its policy of maintaining 
a sound f inancial system. The good bank in the state with strict 
rules must meet the competition of the bank with lax rules, and in 
order to exist under such conditions will, of necessity, have its own 
practices weakened . 
Therefore, by giving t o the Federal Governnent the right to grant 
charters to banking organizations, one of the difficulties of super-
vising the banks of our country will be eliminated. After the r i ght 
of chartering barucs has been given to the Federal Goverrunent , a system 
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of branch banks should be organized for the .country • . It Trould not be 
prad;ical f or this system to be organized on a nation-wide basis, like 
the . system now existing in Canada, because of the size of the country . 
Canadian ba~~s serve a population of 10 , 000 ,000 people as conpared to 
125,000,000 in the United States. Too 1:1uch power would be vested in 
the great f inancial center, Hevr York, if such a syster.J. existed . Like-
vfise , the needs of our coun·try are so rauch greater that the banks 
vwuld be too large for efficient operation. 
The Federal Reserve 'System has been divided into districts on a 
trade area basis so , in turn, the branch banks could be given the 
right to operate within these trade areas. Restricting t he operation 
of banks to definite areas ·would eliminate the possibility of contro l 
from Hew York City. 
Branch banks in the various districts would come under the super-
vision of the Federal Reserve System because all banks would be u nder 
nat ional charter and, as now, would be required to be a member of the 
System. 
A ·wealmes s in our s<Jstem has been the inability of state, as nell 
as national , bruu( exfuu iners to properly examine and supervise the bank s 
under their control . With so many sE~al l independent unit banks elir.ri.na-
ted u.."rlder a branch banldng system, the examiners vlil l have the op-
portunity to make a more thorough ru1.d detailed audit of the operations 
of banks . With a revision in examination r.J.ethods , failures, malpractice, 
and mimnanagement, can be minimized. 
Legislation passed in the last ten years has bolstered up the old 
S'IJ sten rather than provide a better system. Supervision of bank s in 
Canada by the government _, during its entire his·tory , has been minimized. 
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I believe one of the major reasons for the success of Canada's 
system has been due to the small amount of govermnente.l supervision. 
The responsibility of the bank has been increased to the degree Yfhere 
it becomes a duty to see · that nothing harms the funds of its deposi-
t or s. 
Consequently, the professional ajGtitude on the part of the 
ban}:::ers in Canada ranks high and the assmning of this responsibility 
has meant a great deal to the success of her system. Contras-t the 
syst em in the United States where statutes beyond number have been 
passed prohibiting ~ractices of a questionable nature. If a high pro-
fessional standard existed here, few laws vmuld be necessary and Bore 
efficient r.mnagement ·would ensue . Safety in banking v.rill never be 
secured if reliance continues to be placed on legislative restrictions. 
Punislu;wnt seldom creates ability or honesty. 
The participation of banks in AL!.erica in so many ·types of 
business enterprise, not a part of the function of strictly commerc ial 
banks , has c aused many bap.Jc failures. The practice has been 
restr icted i n part by the Banking Acts of 1933 and l934. How·ever , 
further m1d more drastic rneasur es are necessary to segregate the non-
comr.wrcial banking business . 
Since this report vras started , important legislation has been 
passed by Congress v1hich has materially changed the credit facilities 
of the United States. 
The inability of the Federal Reserve System to control the rapid 
expansion of credit during 1928 e.nd 1929 would indicate that super-
vision of our c redit facilities was inadequate. One of the f\mdro::ental 
causes for such an over- expansion of credit was the public mind . When 
the stock market reports brought news of 11 get rich quick11 profit _, 
hundreds of thousands of i ndividuals who lmmv nothing about such 
opera.tions pls.ced orders to "buy" . Specul£l.tion se·l:; e. pe.ce un-
precedented in our history. Despite high interest rates and re-
discount rates , it was no-!:; checked . Reorganization of our security 
E1arkets has Jcaken place during the "Hew Deal 11 Administration. However 
strict the rule and regulation, it will not gain the desired results 
if the attitude of the public n ind does not change. The ·l:;emper of 
the f.Jnerican people has changed rapidly since the Viorld \\far. I n be-
coming a creditor nation vre forgot sor.1.e of the conservative and basic 
rules governing credit. Vast fortunes Tiere created ond wealth becfl.r:le 
the "password " to success . Despite the s·uccess of Canada ' s moneb: ry 
systen in the expansion and contrac-tion of credit after the :!?i nance 
Acts of 1914 and 1923, Car>.ada has created a cenJcral ban}~ and will, 
vrhen it starts operation, have complete supervision of t he issue of 
liloney ::md the credit base . r.11ether this will be more adequate, time 
will ho.ve to reveal. It is inevitable that a more direct supervisi on 
of currency will be ma.de in the future and vrhen the branch banki ng 
system has been creaJced in our country , currency issues viill, undoubt-
edly, be centered in one agency; either the Government or the Federal 
Reserve Board. 
Recent 1egislation has brought about the separation of private 
banki!lg from the investment e.nd security business . Speculation and 
sound banking , as oil and nater, do not mix well. 
The bran ch banking system of Canada has served the country 
financ i ally, economically, and industrie.lly. It has, TI'om t 1'le b egilmi ng 
a.ppreciated the needs of the country and aided generously i n its 
progress. The f a c·t that no bank in Canada has fs.ilecl during the 
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depression is sufficient evidence that supervision of bo.nks i n that 
coun·t;r;:,r is adequate. 
The indep endent unit banJdng sy ster.1 of the United Sto.tes lw.s 
furnished adequate capital for the grovrl:;h of the country but it has 
failed to r.1.ainto.in a soundness so neces ~mry to suc ce:ss . For-'cy- nin e 
separate enti·cies , Yvith equally a s many sets of lans, ca __ not sup ervi se 
a vre11 developed , unified and coordinated system. Therefore , sup er-
vis i on i n the Uni ted States has not brought the desired r e sttl ts, and 
a change in the public mind as '.vell as the type of syster,l , i s in- -
evitable. 
I n smmn.ary : 
Organization -
1. Branch banking i n the United States on a trade area basis must 
come. 
2. Capita l requirements for t h e organiz i ng of a ban.~ nust be 
raised. 
3. Absolu te separat ion of cwunercio.l and i nve s t ment ban:ting r.1ust 
come. 
Performance -
1. Large profits by baTL1:s r:~ .u st be sacrificed for a sound policy 
il'l handl i ng depo sit ars r money . 
2 . A professional standard , whi ch will dr i ve the unscru pu l ous 
from the banking field , is urged. 
3. A more deliberate and po sitive act ion by ·those controlling 
credit is nec essary i n times of pa:c1.i c and c r i sis . 
SD.p ervi sion -
1 . Closer exarrtination of banking practic e and performanc e is 
need ed . 
l 4E 
2. 
'? 
·J • 
A u n i f ied n:::<.tio:nal control of all cornr:ercial banking a ctivi-
tie s i n our country . 
The restrictions of l arge loans to co rporations i n enter prises 
of questionable future succes s must c ease. 
4: . The establishnent of mor e rigid requirements in t h e train i ng and 
exp erience of bankers~ who assume the res Jonsibili ty of dir ect-
ing; the banking a ctivity of our cou nt ry-, nust be a ccepted. 
5. The eliminating of political favor ~ i n currency and banki ng 
problems, v-;ill promote n ore con fidence in the publ ic. 
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